(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Defendant Crestwood posits its claim that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiffs claim of tortious interference with his contractual relationship with defendant Polk on its assertion that plaintiff threatened *16to circulate letters to Crestwood’s customers. Crestwood further asserts that its employees, Jeffrey E. Gedz and Deborah A. Yowtz, were told by plaintiff that he would make copies of all service work that Crestwood did on his car, attach a letter stating what a lemon it was, and "send it to all of Chrysler’s customers. This was to be done to the best of our knowledge with information he had access to at R. L. Polk.” Plaintiff denies this. In granting summary disposition, the trial court said:
He threatened them. . . . He made the statements, no question about that.
His statements were such that any reasonable person would have to so react.
But I have a very real question about what statements plaintiff made. I do not see where he admits to having made statements that he would cull R. L. Polk lists to obtain names and addresses of customers of Crestwood Dodge or Chrysler Corporation and that he would use those mailings to communicate his lemon message.
Plaintiff testified in this regard during questioning by Crestwood’s attorney as follows:
Q. Now, it says on this piece of paper which is signed and dated by Jeffrey Gedz and Deborah A. Yowtz. I’d like to read it. "During the course of mediation on December 16, 1987 it was stated by Daniel Prysak while the mediator was out of the room that he worked for R. L. Polk and that if our small claims action was not dropped that he could make copies of all service work that had been done on his car and attach a letter stating, quote, 'what a lemon he had for a car,’ and send it to all of Chrysler’s customers. This was to be done to the best of our knowledge with information he had *17access to at R. L. Polk.” Now, did you make that type of statement to these two individuals?
A. No, I did not.
A. I was really mad. I said here’s all my bills, here’s, you know, a list of all my repairs and everything, I says this is getting too expensive, I says I’m going to copy off all these bills and, you know, just write a little note if you’re thinking about buying a Shadow don’t, you know, it is a lemon. I said I’ll take a day off work and I said I’ll stand out on your sidewalk and pass it out to Crestwood’s customers, and they’re like I wouldn’t advise that but you can do what you want to. Where they got this I have no idea.
Q. You told them you would stand out in front of Crestwood Dodge?
A. Yeah. I said I’ll stand out in front of Crest-wood Dodge and pass it out to customers.
Q. Did you say anything about sending a letter to customers?
A. I said I’ll write a letter saying what a lemon I had and staple to it all my bills and say here you go, if you’re thinking about buying a Dodge Shadow don’t.
Q. Did you say anything about sending it in the mail?
A. Oh, no, no.
Q. You made no statements about sending the letter to customers in the mail?
A. .. . No.
This is a classic question of fact. Certainly the jury or trier of fact could infer that plaintiff threatened to use R. L. Polk lists to communicate his grievances to defendant’s customers. The trial court on motion for summary disposition could not make that inference in the face of plaintiffs denials. Crestwood’s employees and agents could make *18that inference, which they did, but it is an inference, not a fact.
I believe that the majority’s disposition of issues IV and V is improper because they assumed that plaintiff admitted, or his counsel admitted for him, that he threatened improper use of R. L. Polk lists to communicate his grievances to customers of Crestwood Dodge. For that reason, I would reverse the grant of Crestwood’s motion for summary disposition.
I concur in the majority’s disposition regarding affirmation of summary disposition in favor of the employer, R. L. Polk Company.