Art and Verla Strain (The Strains), as special administrators of the estate of their son Tyler Strain (Tyler), deceased, commenced a wrongful death and survivorship action against Appellant, Harry Christians (Christians). The matter came on for trial before a jury. The jury returned a verdict in the Strains’ favor in the amount of $75,-000. Christians appeals. We affirm.
Tyler was fourteen years of age. He had lived on a farm most of his life. At the time of Tyler’s death, the Strains lived on a farm approximately one-quarter of a mile from Christians’ farm. Tyler worked for his father on the family farm, and, in 1986, began to work for Christians at his farm after school. Tyler did not operate Christians’ two big tractors. During his second year with Christians, Tyler started stacking hay bails and used small tractors and their attachments.
In the fall of 1987, when Tyler was thirteen years old, Mr. Strain began teaching him to use and operate the family's tractors, including a 1974 International model 1066 tractor.1 After Tyler had begun his third year of employment with Christians, in April 1988, he was allowed to operate Christians’ 1973 International model 1066 tractor in the farm field, stacking hay and pulling implements. The 1973 model 1066 was essentially the same as the Strains’ 1974 model 1066 tractor. Both the Strains’ and Christians’ tractors were more powerful than “twenty PTO horsepower.” Christians allowed Tyler to operate his tractor alone.
Tyler’s parents knew at the time Tyler was operating Christians’ tractor and did not object. Mr. Strain testified he had helped Christians in 1986 and had driven Christians’ tractor. He noted the steering on the tractor was loose and Christians’ tractor was difficult, if running at a high speed, to “keep ... between the ditches.”
Christians requested Tyler take a tractor operation safety course prior to his third year of employment with Christians. Completion of such a course permits employers to employ fourteen to sixteen-year-olds in an occupation involving such activities without violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.), discussed more fully in part I. On June 7-8, 1988, the Brookings County Extension Office put on a twenty-hour “Hazardous Occupation Safety Course” pursuant to part 570 of the Code of Federal Regulations,2 which will be discussed in more detail in part I.
Tyler successfully completed two written tests and a driving test during this program. On June 8, 1988, the county extension agent in charge of the safety program issued to Tyler a certificate certifying he had successfully completed the training program. Tyler was then certified to operate a tractor with over “twenty PTO horsepower,” and to “[connect or disconnect] an implement or any of its parts to or from such a tractor.”3 Mr. Strain acknowledged he and his wife were both aware Tyler had taken and successfully completed a tractor and farm machinery safety course at the request of Christians.
On the morning of June 11, 1988, Tyler went to work at Christians’ farm. He was to stack hay with Christians’ tractor; consequently, it was equipped with a bucket loader and a double bale fork. Tyler drove Christians’ tractor to the repair shop of *785Lyle Krueger (a self-employed welder and repairman) for the purpose of welding a hair-line crack on the reservoir of the loader. In response to a question by Krueger, Tyler stated he was having no problems with the tractor in its operation. At morning’s end, Tyler, Christians, and another farm hand went to town to have lunch. After lunch, Christians took Tyler to where the tractor was parked and told him to drive it back to Christians’ home. Christians then went home to take a nap. Shortly thereafter, the tractor was found upside down and on fire. It had rolled over, smashing the cab with Tyler inside. Tyler was killed.
The investigating officer stated it appeared the tractor had eased off the gravel at a very slight angle over a distance of approximately 100 to 125 feet. It appeared Tyler jerked the wheel of the tractor to get back onto the roadway surface. The tractor then slipped sideways and overturned.
The Strains commenced a wrongful death and survivorship action against Christians, alleging Christians had employed Tyler in an occupation dangerous to his life and health as prohibited by SDCL 60-12-3 (1978) (South Dakota’s child labor statute).4 Christians denied he had employed Tyler in a dangerous occupation. In the alternative, he asserted Tyler’s employment was with the knowledge and consent of his parents, and Tyler’s own negligence proximately caused his death.
During trial, the court ruled that neither party could present evidence pertaining to the contributory negligence of Tyler, or of Mr. or Mrs. Strain. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the issues of contributory negligence of Tyler or of the Strains. Christians objected. At the end of the plaintiffs’ case, Christians’ counsel moved for a directed verdict arguing first, federal law preempted imposing civil liability against Christians under SDCL 60-12-3 and second, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find Tyler was employed in an occupation hazardous to life or health. The trial court denied that motion. The jury returned a $75,000 verdict in favor of the Strains. The trial court entered judgment against Christians for that amount.
Christians appeals raising four issues:
I. Whether SDCL 60-12-3 has been preempted by the F.L.S.A. and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
II. Whether the trial court properly refused to admit testimony regarding the contributory negligence of Tyler and to give an instruction on the issue of contributory negligence of Tyler.
III. Whether the trial court properly refused to admit testimony regarding the parents’ knowledge of and consent to Tyler’s employment and to give an instruction on the defense of contributory negligence of the parents.
IV. Whether the jury verdict was against the law, and whether the $75,000 award was supported by sufficient evidence.
We will discuss these items seriatim.
I. CHILD LABOR STATUTE PREEMPTION.
Sections 3 and 12 of F.L.S.A. are substantively similar to SDCL 60-12-3. Section 125 prohibits employing “oppressive child labor” in commerce, and Section 36 provides employment of a child under *786the age of sixteen by any non-parent constitutes “oppressive child labor” unless the Secretary of Labor provides by regulation or by order that the employment of children between fourteen and sixteen years of age in occupations other than mining or manufacturing does not constitute “oppressive child labor.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(0, 212(c) (1988). An employer violating F.L.S.A. is subject to substantial criminal and civil penalties. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-217 (1988).7
Subpart E-l of Chapter 5 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations addresses “occupations in agriculture particularly hazardous for the employment of children below the age of 16.” According to the Secretary of Labor, “[ojperating a tractor of over 20 PTO horsepower, or connecting or disconnecting an implement or any of its parts to or from such a tractor[ ]” is “particularly hazardous employment [for] children below the age of sixteen.” 29 C.F.R. § 570.71(a)(1) (1990). Thus, employment of a child under sixteen years of age by a non-parent in such an occupation would normally constitute “oppressive child labor.”
Pertinent exemptions do exist to the general rule stated above. Those exemptions are contained in 29 C.F.R. § 570.72 (1990):
(b) Federal Extension Service. The findings and declaration of fact in [section] 570.71(a) shall not apply to the employment of a child under 16 years of age in those occupations in which he has successfully completed one or more training programs described in paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section provided he has been instructed by his employer on safe and proper operation of the specific equipment he is to use; is continuously and closely supervised by the employer where feasible; or, where not feasible, ... his safety is checked by the employer at least at midmorning, noon, and mid-afternoon.
Subparagraphs (1)-(3) of 29 CFR § 570.-72(b) describe various training programs, all of which require an employee or potential employee (1) to be fourteen years of age or older; (2) to complete a training program on safe operation of machinery; (3) to successfully complete a written examination covering safety; and (4) to demonstrate his or her ability to operate machinery safely. In addition, the regulation requires the employer to keep on file a certificate stating the child has completed all the required training and testing.
Where a child obtains certification pursuant to such a program, as Tyler did, an employer may hire him to operate tractors of greater than twenty PTO horsepower or other machinery without subjecting himself to criminal and civil penalties under F.L.S.A. Christians contends this statutory and regulatory scheme preempts South Dakota’s child labor statute. We disagree.
We have held whether employment is dangerous to the child’s “life, health or morals” is a question of fact for the jury. Koenekamp v. Picasso, 64 S.D. 567, 570, 269 N.W. 74, 77 (1936). Accord Dillman v. Madsen, 688 F.Supp. 1402, 1405 (D.S.D. 1988). Section 2 of F.L.S.A. states the policy of F.L.S.A. is to correct labor conditions detrimental to the health and well-being of workers. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988). Section 18 further indicates Congress’ intent was to provide a minimum floor for child protection, not a ceiling beyond which states could not exceed. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1988). See also 48A Am.Jur.2d Labor and Labor Relations § 2210 (1979).
*787Section 18 provides: “[N]o provision of this Act relating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard established under this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1988). Accord 29 C.F.R. § 570.50(a) (1990). Indeed, regulations promulgated pursuant to F.L.S.A. expressly state: “[CJompliance with [F.L.S.A.] ... does not relieve any person of liability under other laws that establish higher child labor standards than those prescribed by or pursuant to the act.” 29 C.F.R. § 570.129 (1990). Thus, if an individual state where a child is employed has a stricter child labor code and standard of employment, the federal law will adopt and apply the state’s stricter standard. P. McGovern, Childrens Rights and Child Labor: Advocacy on Behalf of the Child Worker, 28 S.D.L.Rev. 293, 297-98 (1983).
Permitting an employer to be held liable for civil damages which result from his violation of SDCL 60-12-3 would not create an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of F.L.S.A.’s child labor provisions. See Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3024, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 677 (1982) (actual conflict exists between regulations promulgated by Federal Home Loan Bank Board and state court decision); Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. Silva Redo, 558 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir.1977). Indeed, F.L.S.A. provides no private federal cause of action for its violation. Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 370, 373 (S.D.1991); Breitwieser v. K.M.S. Industries, Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969, 93 S.Ct. 1445, 35 L.Ed.2d 705 (1973). Therefore, the Secretary of Labor’s findings regarding employment of safety trained fourteen to sixteen-year-olds did not preempt the jury’s conclusion that Christians employed Tyler in an “occupation dangerous to life, health, or morals.” See Jensen, 469 N.W.2d at 373 (F.L.S.A. does not preempt South Dakota’s worker’s compensation law); Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perez-Rosado, 641 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1981) (F.L.S.A. does not prohibit state legislation in the area of wages or working conditions, nor does it implicitly prohibit state regulation by occupying the whole field and leaving no room for supplementary state provisions); Divine v. Levy, 36 F.Supp. 55, 57-58 (D.C.La.1940). The Secretary’s findings merely placed Christians’ act of employing Tyler to operate a tractor with greater than twenty PTO horsepower outside F.L.S.A.’s prohibitions against “oppressive child labor.”
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE DECEDENT.
During the trial, the court ruled that neither party would be permitted to present evidence regarding the contributory negligence of Tyler. The trial court refused, despite objections by Christians, to instruct the jury on the defense of contributory negligence.
Whether an occupation is dangerous to the life, health or morals of a child was determined in Koenekamp to be a jury question. Thus, in this case, Tyler’s safety training was relevant to the determination of whether a statutory violation existed. The trial court properly admitted evidence of Tyler’s safety training. The Koenek-amp court also held that violation of the child labor statute was sufficient, standing alone, to render an employer liable in the event of injury. Koenekamp, 269 N.W. at 77. However, the Koenekamp court declined to decide whether contributory negligence constituted a defense to a cause of action alleging a violation of SDCL 60-12-3. Id. As the Koenekamp court noted, a split of authority exists as to this issue. Id. This split exists because different courts have given different effects to the enactment of child labor statutes. See Annotation, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Cause of Action Based Upon Violation of Statute, 171 A.L.R. 894 (1947), superseded by 10 A.L.R.2d 853 (1950).
Some courts have held violation of a child labor statute constitutes “negligence per se.” See, e.g., Dillman, 688 F.Supp. at 1403-04, 1405. The plaintiff is required to prove violation of the statute proximately *788caused the child’s injuries. Accordingly, the child’s contributory negligence is a defense to such a cause of action. See Dar-sam v. Kohlmann, 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781 (1909) (contributory negligence a defense where child acted in violation of instructions and duties, reasoning that child labor statutes should not be construed to abrogate the ordinary rules relating to contributory negligence unless the statute is so worded as to leave no doubt such defense is to be excluded); Armstrong’s Adm’r. v. Sumne & Ratterman Co., 211 Ky. 750, 278 S.W. 111, 115 (1925) (in cause of action to recover for child’s death, child’s contributory negligence constitutes a defense); Besonen v. Campbell, 243 Mich. 209, 220 N.W. 301, 303 (1928).
However, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have addressed this issue have held that contributory negligence is not a defense. Typically, such courts have reasoned that child labor statutes are intended to place the entire responsibility upon the employer so that he is liable for injury to the child even though he has acted in good faith. The plaintiff need only show a violation of the statute, which must be resolved by the jury in the first instance, and injury to the child. Legal or proximate causation is not in issue because the legislature has determined causation exists. In short, once a violation is established, these cases have construed child labor statutes to impose strict or absolute liability. W. Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 Minn.L.Rev. 105, 118-120 (1948); D.L. by Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis.2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890, 912-18 (1983)'(providing detailed discussion of the difference between negligence per se and absolute liability). The following cases hold contributory negligence is not a defense: Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So.2d 1164, 1169 (La.1978); Vincent v. Riggi & Sons, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 406, 285 N.E.2d 689, 693, 334 N.Y.S.2d 380, 386, 56 A.L.R.3d 1157, 1163 (1972); Boyles v. Hamilton, 235 Cal.App.2d 492, 45 Cal.Rptr. 399, 403 (1965); Pitzer v. M.D. Tomkies & Sons, 136 W.Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437, 442 (1951) (overruling Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 68 W.Va. 405, 69 S.E. 857 (1919)); Langston v. Degelia, 186 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex.Civ.App.1945); Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419, 181 So. 403, 406-07 (1938) (reaffirmed in Baldridge v. Hatcher, 266 So.2d 112 (Fla.App.1972)); Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 172, 176 N.W. 482, 482, 23 A.L.R. 632, 634 (1920); Karpeles v. Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E. 101, 104 (1919); Louisville, H. & St.L.Ry.Co. v. Lyons, 155 Ky. 396, 159 S.W. 971, 975-76 (1913) (a master is an insurer of the safety of child employees); Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473, 140 N.W. 84 (1913) (violation of child labor statute equivalent to gross negligence; contributory negligence is not a defense); Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Min.Co., 218 Pa. 311, 67 A. 642 (1907).
As stated in Dusha, “The purpose of the [child labor] statute is to protect children in life and limb by prohibiting their employment in dangerous occupations where[,] because of their immaturityQ] they are likely inappreciative of risks and prone to be careless and heedless.” Dusha 176 N.W. at 482, 23 A.L.R. at 634. Courts holding employers absolutely liable typically reason that “the evident purpose of the statute would be defeated if the employer were permitted to set up the contributory negligence of the child, and that the legislature must have intended that no such defense should be available.”8 Prosser, supra, at *789119-20 (citing Karpeles, 124 N.E. 101; Pinaza 140 N.W. 84; Lyons, 159 S.W. at 975-76). Accord Annot., supra, 10 A.L.R.2d at 855; W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 65, at 461-62 (1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton).
Absolute liability has generally been limited to situations where the cause of action was based upon the violation of a particular type of statute — one enacted for the protection of a particular class of persons who are incapable of protecting themselves. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483 comment c. See also Dusha, 176 N.W. 482; Sharpness v. Seattle, 52 Wash.2d 490, 326 P.2d 747, 749 (1958). The child labor statute is just such a statute. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483 comment e.
The purpose of our child labor statute is to protect children from their own negligence. The statute is a declaration that children under the specified age do not possess the judgment, discretion, and caution essential to engagement in the prescribed occupation. 53 Am.Jur.2d Master and Servant § 226 (1970). To hold a child subject to the defense of contributory negligence would emasculate the child labor statute. Indeed, in most cases, it is the child’s negligence which is a substantial cause of the injury — he sticks his hands into an auger to clear it without shutting off the power, or he attempts to disconnect machinery without turning off the power. It is exactly this result that the legislature was attempting to prevent in outlawing the employment of youth to perform such activities. To subject a child to the contributory negligence defense would defeat this goal.
We hold, consonant with the foregoing, that a wrongful death action based on an alleged violation of SDCL 60-12-3 is not subject to the defense of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. In doing so, we recognize the legislature’s goal in passing the child labor statute to protect children from employment in dangerous occupations where, because of their immaturity, they are likely inappreciative of risks and prone to carelessness.
III. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR CONSENT OF THE PARENTS.
The trial court refused to admit evidence concerning the Strains’ consent to Tyler’s employment. Both of Tyler’s parents were aware of Tyler’s employment. They were aware Tyler had obtained a certificate permitting his employer to allow him to operate powerful tractors without violating F.L.S.A. They were aware Tyler’s duties would include operating Christians’ International Model 1066 tractor.
A wrongful death action is brought by a deceased’s beneficiaries to recover for losses sustained as a result of the victim’s death. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 127. See also Flagtwet v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 188 (S.D.1985). Whether the parents’ con*790sent to employment of their child in a dangerous occupation constitutes a bar to recovery under a wrongful death cause of action also presents an issue of first impression in this state. The general rule under statutes creating a cause of action for wrongful death states a beneficiary’s recovery is barred if the beneficiary himself is guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributes to the death of the decedent. Annotation, Contributory Negligence of Beneficiary as Affecting Action under Death or Survival Statute, 2 A.L.R.2d 785, 788 (1948). Some courts have held where a parent procures or consents to a child’s employment in violation of a child labor statute, that parent may be barred from recovering for the wrongful death of the child, even though the wrongful death proximately results from employment in disobedience of the statute. Totten v. Parker, 428 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky.1968); Lucas E. Moore Stave Co. of Georgia v. Overbee’s Adm’r., 262 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Ky.1953); Besonen, 220 N.W. at 303; Armstrong’s Adm’r, 278 S.W. at 115; Swope v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 78 W.Va. 517, 89 S.E. 284, 285 (1916).
Other courts, however, have held where a child is employed in violation of a child labor statute, a parent’s consent to that employment does not bar recovery for the child’s wrongful death. Boyer, 360 So.2d at 1171; Tampa Shipbuilding, 181 So. at 407; Dusha, 176 N.W. at 483, 23 A.L.R. at 635. See also Pinoza, 140 N.W. at 86-87; Lyons, 159 S.W. at 975-76. The Dusha court recognized the policy behind child labor statutes is to penalize employers who employ children in violation of the statute, not to impose a penalty on the parents for permitting such employment. The Dusha court implied permitting a parent’s consent to bar recovery for the child’s wrongful death would contravene the legislature’s policy of protecting the life and limb of children by discouraging their employment in dangerous occupations. Dusha, 176 N.W. at 483, 23 A.L.R. at 635.9 We find this reasoning persuasive.
It is true the parents here knew of Tyler’s employment. Certainly that would be true in most any case where a child is employed in a dangerous occupation. The statute, however, is aimed at discouraging employers from hiring children to perform such tasks, not at discouraging parents from permitting such employment. Were we to hold the Strains’ consent to Tyler’s employment bars their recovery, the only parents who could recover for the death of their child would be those ignorant of their child’s occupation. In addition, such a holding would cause inequitable results. If a parent consented to his child’s employment and the child was injured, the child could recover regardless of the parent’s consent because he could have a guardian bring the cause of action on his behalf. On the other hand, if the child was killed, the parents, because they are the beneficiaries, would be barred from recovering because of their own negligence. Thus, the employer would be rewarded because the child was killed! These results were certainly not intended by the legislature when it enacted the child labor statute. Therefore, we hold a parent’s consent to employment of his or her child in a dangerous occupation does not bar the parent’s recovery in a wrongful death cause of action brought pursuant to the child labor statute.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE JURY VERDICT.
Christians’ final contention concerns the jury’s verdict. First, he argues the verdict is against the law, restating the same arguments discussed previously. We need not discuss those issues any further. *791Second, Christians argues the $75,000 jury award is not supported by sufficient evidence.
SDCL 15-6-59(a) (1984) provides in part: A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: * * * * * *
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law;
SDCL 15-26A-8 (1984) provides:
Such of the matters specified in subdivisions (6) and (7) of § 15-6-59(a) as may have been timely presented to the trial court by motion for directed verdict, request for findings, or other apt motion, offer, or objection may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment without necessity for an application for new trial.
It is well settled, “[¡Insufficiency of the evidence may not be reviewed unless it has been timely presented to the trial court by a proper motion for a directed verdict, request for findings, or other apt motion, offer, objection, or exception.” City of Mitchell v. Beauregard, 430 N.W.2d 704, 706-07 (S.D.1988) (citing SDCL 15-6-59(a); SDCL 15 — 6—59(f); SDCL 15-26A-8); Pearson v. Adams, 279 N.W.2d 674, 676-77 (S.D.1979); Schoenrock v. City of Sisseton, 78 S.D. 419, 425-26, 103 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1960) (defendants precluded from raising the question of excessiveness of the verdict on appeal where they failed to bring to the trial court’s attention the particulars in which the evidence was claimed to be insufficient); Lang v. Burns, 77 S.D. 626, 632-33, 97 N.W.2d 863, 867 (1959); Gednalski v. Dell Rapids Quarry Co., 70 S.D. 616, 20 N.W.2d 226 (1945).
Nowhere in his brief does Christians state he made any motion to the trial court to overturn the jury’s damage award because it was not supported by sufficient evidence. The record does not reflect any “motion for directed verdict ... or other apt motion, offer, or objection” that would preserve Christians’ right to appeal on this issue. We hold Christians did not preserve these matters on the record so as to enable this court to engage in appellate review of this issue.
The judgment is affirmed.
HENDERSON, J., concurs with a writing. MILLER, C.J., concurs specially. SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., dissent.. Mr. Strain testified that Tyler had operated the Strains’ model 1066 tractor on at least one occasion. Strain testified he would stay with Tyler for an hour training him to drive the tractor and then tried to stay in the area to keep an eye on him.
. Generally, during the extension office’s course, instructors go over various materials with students relating to tractor safety. Next, the instructors show students the actual parts of the tractors. Each student is then required to pass a written exam. Finally, each student must complete a driving test where they pull a two-wheel implement on the back of a tractor and maneuver through a driving course.
.The program Tyler completed actually certified him to work with other machinery in addition to powerful tractors.
. SDCL 60-12-3 (amended 1991) provides:
No child under sixteen years of age shall be employed at any time in any occupation dangerous to life, health, or morals_ Viola-
tion of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor. This section shall not apply to minors employed by their parents.
. F.L.S.A. § 12 states: “No employer shall employ any oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (1988).
.F.L.S.A. § 3 defines "oppressive child labor” as:
[A] condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for *786the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation. ... The Chief of the Children’s Bureau [Secretary of Labor] shall provide by regulation or by order that the employment of employees between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years in occupations other than manufacturing and mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor if and to the extent that the Chief of the Children’s Bureau [Secretary of Labor] determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being.
29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (1988).
. A violation of § 12 subjects an employer to a fine of not more than $10,000 or, if not a first offense, to a jail term of up to six months plus civil penalties. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 216 (1988).
. Restatement (Second) Torts § 483 (1965) provides:
§ 483. Defense to Violation of Statute The plaintiffs contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of the defendant consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.
The comments to § 483 provide in pertinent part:
c. There are, however, exceptional statutes which are intended to place the entire responsibility for the harm which has occurred upon the defendant. A statute may be found to have that purpose particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves. Thus a statute which prohibits *789the sale of firearms to minors may be clearly intended, among other purposes, to protect them against their own inexperience, lack of judgment, and tendency toward negligence, and to make the seller solely responsible for any harm to them resulting from the sale. In such a case the purpose of the statute would be defeated if the contributory negligence of the minor were permitted to bar his recovery.
e. Child labor statutes. Statutes forbidding the employment of children or their employment in dangerous occupations below a certain age are customarily construed as intended to protect them against carelessness and even recklessness incidental to their immaturity.
f. If a child labor statute is construed as enacted for the purpose stated in this Section, a child plaintiff who bases his action upon the violation of the statute is not barred from recovery by any form of contributory negligence. Thus, he is not barred from recovery by voluntarily exposing himself to a risk which an adult would recognize as unreasonable, nor by conduct which in other respects would be negligent or even reckless in an adult, as when his careless inattention brings him into contact with moving machinery. (Emphasis supplied.)
. While discussing whether contributory negligence was a defense to a cause of action based on a violation of its child labor statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
[T]his court should incline to the side according the greatest dignity to legislative efforts to conserve the security of children, against even being employed by their consent and consent of their parents or guardians, where they will be subjected to serious dangers on account of inadvertently receiving bodily injuries, which evince such supreme care in respect to the matter as to make the employment, of itself, criminal.
Pinoza, 140 N.W. at 86-87.