dissenting:
The majority relies exclusively upon what it assumes to be the language of section 2 — 1402 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402 (West Supp. 1993)) and cases considering the section prior to the extensive amendments to section 2 — 1402 in 1993. However, the facts of this case, although occurring long before the adoption of the amendment, must be read in light of the amendment because section 2 — 1402(1) expressly provides: "This Amendatory Act of 1993 is a declaration of existing law.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402(1) (West Supp. 1993).
To briefly restate the facts, in a Cook County law division case, plaintiff Podvinec obtained a judgment against Popov. During citation proceedings, plaintiff discovered that Popov had a case against the defendants pending in the chancery division of the Cook County circuit court. Plaintiff then sought to create a judicial lien upon any proceeds realized from the chancery case. To that end, plaintiff presented a petition to spread his lien of record in the chancery case where the defendants were all parties of record, had all been served with summons and received notice of plaintiff’s petition seeking the imposition of a "judicial lien.” An order was entered in the chancery case allowing the imposition of such a lien and some months later the defendants and Popov settled the chancery case, ignoring the "judicial lien” which had been spread of record. Plaintiff now seeks to hold the defendants to the amount they paid in settlement to Popov.
To follow the letter of the provisions of section 2 — 1402, plaintiff should have initiated supplementary proceedings against the defendants, had summons issued and served upon them, examined them in an appropriate forum and then reduced to an order one or several of the remedies granted to a judgment creditor under the statute.
Among other things, plaintiff could have compelled Popov to assign his cause of action to him (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402(c)(5) (West Supp. 1993)) or obtained an order allowing plaintiff to maintain the action in the chancery against defendants or therein intervened (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402(c)(6) (West Supp. 1993)) or restrained defendants from paying Popov any sums which may become due to him (735 ILCS 5/2— 1402(f)(1), (f)(2) (West Supp. 1993)). To be sure, there are technical requirements aimed at assuring that the parties all have notice and that they are aware of the details of the underlying judgment but plaintiff did none of these! However, these requirements have been obliquely satisfied by the petition offered in the chancery court of which the defendants do not deny they had notice.
Like plaintiff, the defendants were not without options at the time plaintiff served them with notice that he sought to impress the proceeds of any money due or to become due with a "judicial lien.” They could have objected to the character of the lien or the failure of plaintiff to institute a proper supplementary proceeding, to issue new summons, or to serve the summons upon them. In addition, the defendants could have complained that the petition did not expressly use the language of the statute in seeking a remedy or that the magic language of section 2 — 1402(b) which provides the items of which the respondent in supplementary proceedings must be afforded notice is missing or that the debtor has not had an opportunity to assert any exemptions to which he might be entitled. (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402(b) (West Supp. 1993).) But the defendants did none of these!
Section 2 — 1402 provides a method of satisfying a judgment, not the method. Section 2 — 1402(i) provides that this section "is in addition to and does not affect enforcement of judgments or proceedings supplementary thereto, by any other methods now or hereafter provided by law.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402(i) (West Supp. 1993).
The 1993 amendment, by its terms declarative of existing law, provides us with language that appears to bring this case within its penumbra. Section 2 — 14020) allows a creditor to reach assets which may become due to the debtor from a third party.1 Thus the statute anticipates the creation of a lien and the effect of such on the debt- or’s property, whether due immediately or in the future, in the possession or control of third persons as was the case in the instant matter.
The statute establishes the procedures that are to be followed in instituting supplementary proceedings: commencement by service of a citation issued by the clerk, certain language indicating that the person to whom the summons is directed could be in contempt of court and subject to jail if the document is ignored, limitation on the granting of a continuance and conditions under which an examination of a cited person should be conducted. 735 ILCS 5/1402(a) (West Supp. 1993).
Save for the service requirement and the notice of possible contempt, none of the provisions raise due process concerns. As to the issue of service, the defendants were duly served in the chancery case and do not claim that they did not receive notice of plaintiff s intention to spread the judgment of the law division case of record nor ought we to concern ourselves with the required legend relating to contempt since plaintiff has not requested that the defendants be held in contempt but merely seeks that a judgment be entered against them.
As to the subject matter jurisdiction of the chancery division to enforce the judgment of the law division, we note that circuit courts are tribunals of general jurisdiction which have equal and concurrent subject matter jurisdiction. (In re Estate of Zoglauer (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 394, 593 N.E.2d 93; Olsen v. Karwoski (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 386 N.E.2d 444.) Accordingly, a judge in one division can enforce an order entered by a judge sitting in another division. Olsen, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.
The method employed by plaintiff is not completely without precedent. In Home State Bank/ National Association v. Potokar (1993), 249 Ill. App. 3d 127, 617 N.E.2d 1302, the plaintiff creditor obtained a judgment against the defendant debtor in the circuit court of McHenry County. During examination of the debtor in a citation to discover assets, the creditor discovered that the debtor was a plaintiff in a lawsuit pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and first obtained an order from the circuit court directing the debtor to assign his interest in the Federal cause of action to satisfy the judgment. In addition, the circuit court entered a second order "requiring [the debtor] to turn over the proceeds from his Federal court lawsuit. The [second] order further provided that it constituted a lien on such proceeds to be imposed upon the attorney for the defendants in that [the Federal] lawsuit.” (Emphasis added.) (Potokar, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 130.) The Potokar court did not find such procedure troublesome and in fact considered it an exercise in due caution:
"[T]he [creditor] apparently was concerned about its ability to reach the proceeds of the Federal court litigation, should they actually be distributed to [the debtor], and the [second] order was an attempt to obtain control over any potential recovery in [the debtor’s] lawsuit before [the debtor] did.” Potokar, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 132.
The majority would allow the defendants to sit idly by and at the appropriate moment ignore an order of the circuit court. To allow the defendants that luxury is contrary to the law and is not in the interest of a society that imposes upon itself the rule of law. I therefore dissent.
Action 2 — 1402(1) provides:
"The judgement or balance due on the judgement becomes a lien when a citation is served in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section. The lien binds nonexempt personal property, including money, choses in action, and effects of the judgement debtor as follows:
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(2) When the citation is directed against a third party, upon all personal property belonging to the judgement debtor in the possession or control of the third party or which thereafter may he acquired or come due the judgement debtor and comes into the possession or control of the third party to the time of the disposition of the citation.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1402(1)(2) (West Supp. 1993).