(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I dissent on Issue 1 — the rejection of proposed jury instructions concerning accomplice testimony. The majority opinion concedes:
The instructions Bradley proposed correctly reflected the law regarding accomplices, but the question is whether they had any application given the evidence in this case. The trial court decided that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find Lillegaard to be an accomplice. We agree.
Although Bradley was not entitled to have the jury instructed that Lilligaard was an *326accomplice as a matter of law, he was entitled to have the jury determine that question under his proposed instruction. In this respect, the trial court erred and the majority affirms that error.
There is evidence in this record to enable the jury to reasonably believe that Thunder Hawk was still alive when Lilligaard acted as a lookout while Bradley placed Thunder Hawk in the trunk of the car. More importantly, there is evidence in this record to enable the jury to believe that Lilligaard assisted Bradley much earlier (by acting as a lookout and in holding the door open so Bradley could carry Thunder Hawk into the kitchen). This occurred in the backyard, after Thunder Hawk was struck by Bradley and had fallen backwards and was knocked unconscious against a concrete stairstep. As stated by the majority:
There was evidence that Bradley stood over Thunder Hawk and kicked her in the ribs with his cowboy boots. Lille-gaard, by his own words, held a door open while Bradley carried Thunder Hawk inside the apartment. Bradley then undressed Thunder Hawk and commenced having sexual intercourse with her....
Thunder Hawk revived and struggled and was strangled by Bradley while Lillegaard watched. There was also some testimony that Bradley, Lilligaard, and Davids had intercourse with Thunder Hawk after she was dead. It is possible that Lilligaard was acting as a “good Samaritan” and not as an “accomplice” to Bradley in holding the door, but not very probable. It is certainly a question for the jury and not for the court. State v. Rufener, 401 N.W.2d 740, 746 (S.D.1987) (Sabers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Byrum, 399 N.W.2d 334, 338 (S.D.1987) (Sabers, J., dissenting); State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 431 (S.D.1986) (Sabers, J., dissenting); State v. Dominiack, 334 N.W.2d 51 (S.D.1983); State v. Johnson, 81 S.D. 600, 139 N.W.2d 232 (1965). Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting Bradley’s proposed instruction to require the jury to determine whether Lilli-gaard was an accomplice, and if so, whether his testimony had to be corroborated to sustain Bradley’s conviction. SDCL 23A-22-8. In addition, if Lilligaard was an accomplice, the jury had to be instructed that his testimony must be viewed with caution or distrust. Byrum, supra; Dominiack, supra.