(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would remand this matter to the trial court for reinstatement of the neglect and dependency petition.
I agree with the majority that the best interest of S.A.H. must be the primary concern. Future reunification with appellant may, in fact, be in S.A.H.’s best interest. However, our affirmance assures that it will be exceedingly difficult for future reunification to occur. Under the present custodial arrangement, appellant has not only lost custody of S.A.H. pursuant to provisions of Minn.Stat. § 518.18 (1986), but will be required to meet the rigorous requirements of that statute in order to effect reunification. The provisions of section 518.18 serve an important purpose in preserving the stability and security of custodial arrangements in dissolution cases. However, in the present circumstances, where custody is being transferred from a natural parent to a third party, I submit the section 518.18 provisions conflict with those of MinmStat. § 260.012 (1986) which require that the court “ensure that all reasonable efforts are made to reunite a child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time, consistent with the safety of the child and the public.”
There appears to be no dispute that father’s advanced age prohibits him from seeking custody of S.A.H. In addition, there is ample support in the record for the trial court’s determination that custody of S.A.H. be with someone other than her mother at this time. However, I believe the best interest of S.A.H. will be served by assuring that the trial court include within its determinations on custody the concerns expressed in a chapter 260 petition, especially the concern that reunifica*558tion of S.A.H. with her natural parent remain an available future goal.
Finally, I submit the majority’s reliance on In re the Custody of E.A.Q.D. and T.L.D., 405 N.W.2d 262 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) is misplaced. In that case, the petition brought pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.156 (1986) was dismissed by the trial court when it determined that the “provisions in Chapter 260 clearly apply.” Id. at 263. This court agreed with appellants that “dismissal of the [section 518.156] petition was unnecessary” and remanded to the trial court for transfer of the section 518.156 petition to juvenile court and “joinder of the contested issues in one court at one time.” Id. at 264-65.
In remanding, the E.A.Q.D. court was sensitive to the “procedural dilemma confronting the trial court” in proceeding under both the section 518.156 and the chapter 260 petitions at one time. Id. at 265. There may be procedural dilemmas in this matter also. Of overriding concern, though, should be assurance that the parties have an opportunity to be heard on all issues which may impact on the best interests of S.A.H. The E.A.Q.D. court preserved that right by requiring that both petitions be considered. In contrast, the trial court in this matter heard evidence on only the section 518.156 petition.
Our affirmance of this custody arrangement guarantees that appellant will regain custody of S.A.H. only by meeting the section 518.18 requirements. Those requirements are uniquely applicable to custody disputes between two parents and are usually far more difficult to meet than chapter 260 neglect and dependency goals would be. I believe both the rationale of E.A.Q.D. and the legislative intent embodied in chapters 518 and 260 would be served by resolving this custodial dispute through consideration of both petitions and all the evidence which might be presented under each of them. I am certain that the best interests of S.A.H. would be served by doing so.