dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. On appeal of claims tried before the bench, we shall not set aside the judgment unless it is clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ind.Trial Rule 52(A). When the trial court makes no findings, we presume the judgment is based on findings supported by the evidence and will affirm if the trial court's judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Klebes v. Forest Lake Corporation (1998), Ind.App., 607 N.E.2d 978, trans. denied. Moreover, when reviewing a general judgment, we presume that the trial court correctly followed the law: this presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration of a case on appeal. Baker v. Baker (1986) Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d 361.
The evidence of record reveals that the Skiles' 1991 purchase of the house in Florida was made primarily as an investment on the advice of their financial advisor. Most of the other conduct the majority has relied upon to support its conclusion that the Skiles changed their domicile from Indiana to Florida was made in order to take advantage of the fact that Florida has no income tax, also on the advice of the financial advisor. The version of the facts relied on by the majority does not lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Skiles had acquired a new domicile in Florida as a matter of law.
The facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment reveal that Seott and Libby were high school sweethearts in their hometown of Plymouth, Indiana. - Upon graduation from high school, Scott attended Michigan State University on a basketball scholarship. Libby attended Purdue University in Indiana and paid in-state tuition. During the summers, both Scott and Libby returned to Plymouth. Seott has conceded that he considered himself an Indiana resident when he was attending college and playing basketball in Michigan.
At the end of his four years of college eligibility, Seott was drafted by the Milwaukee Bucks and moved to Wisconsin to play basketball. In January of 1987, Libby quit her job in Indianapolis and moved to Milwaukee to be with Scott. Scott has conceded *357that he never considered himself a resident of Wisconsin but was there to play basketball. At the end of the 1987-88 basketball season, Seott and Libby moved back to Indiana.
Seott was then traded to the Indiana Pacers and the couple moved to Indianapolis. In 1989, Seott and Libby purchased their Brown County home on Sweetwater Lake in Nineveh, Indiana, and made it their permanent home. Over the years, the Skiles have made substantial improvements to their Brown County home, including having 1) reshingled the roof, 2) built a screened-in deck, 3) remodeled the kitchen, 4) purchased one-half of an adjoining lot, 5) installed air conditioning, and 6) spent $30,000.00 on a new dock and boat house. The family me-mentoes (and most of Seott's basketball trophies) have remained in the Brown County home. The home in Brown County has been decorated and maintained in a home-like atmosphere while the house in Florida has a stark and impersonal atmosphere. The Brown County home has never been rented and the Skiles have never considered selling it.
Although the Skiles purchased the house in Florida in 1991, after Scott landed the multi-year, multi-million dollar contract with the Orlando Magic, they continued to return to their "Indiana home" for every off-season and for special occasions. The Skiles returned to their Brown County home in February of 1998 (during the basketball season) to celebrate Sean's first birthday party. Several of Scott's and Libby's friends and relatives, all Indiana residents, attended the party. The Skiles have no family and few friends in Florida.
The Skiles had waited until they returned to Indiana to schedule their son's surgery. In 1992, Seott obtained an Indiana fishing license, stating under penalties of perjury that he was an Indiana resident. A 1993 article in Sports Illustrated reported Scott's statement regarding an event that took place when he had gone "home" to Indiana.
During the summer of 1998, negotiations had been initiated regarding Seott's future with the Magic and there was discussion that Seott might be traded to another team. Scott told his best friend (an Indiana resident) that if he were to be traded from the Magic, the Skiles would sell their house in Florida. Seott informed the Magic that he would not bring his family back to Florida from Indiana unless he was assured that he would not be traded. After having been assured that Scott would have employment with the Magic for another year, the Skiles returned to Florida for the 1998-94 season. Less than two weeks later, marital discord escalated and Libby returned to Indiana with the children and filed for divorce.
Onee acquired, domicile is presumed to continue. State Election Board v. Bayh (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1313, 1317. A person who temporarily leaves his place of residence with the intention of returning has not lost his original residence. Id. Self-serving statements of intent are not sufficient to establish that a new domicile has been acquired. Id. at 1318.
Since high school, Seott (and later his family) had established the pattern of leaving Indiana to play college or professional basketball during the basketball season and then returning to Indiana for the off-season. The evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment supports the trial court's determination that the Brown County home was the Skiles' permanent residence where they always returned when basketball season was over and had always intended to return when Scott's career as a basketball player was over. Thus, the evidence supports the trial court's judgment that Scott's and Libby's domicile remained in Indiana despite the purchase of the house in Florida. The trial court's decision is not clearly erroneous and should not be disturbed.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the finding by the majority that, at the inception of the present proceedings, the Skiles were residents of Florida and not Indiana has become moot and works an extreme hardship on the Skiles family which, without a doubt, has suffered and will continued to suffer as the result of the protracted litigation. Now that the majority has effectively dismissed the present dissolution proceedings, all Libby need do is refile in *358Indiana and there can be little question that she now has been a continuous and bona fide resident of the State of Indiana for the previous six months. As noted by the majority, Florida has declined to exercise jurisdiction in favor of the instant Indiana proceedings. While it is not necessary that we take judicial notice of the fact that Scott now plays for the Washington Bullets, that fact makes Seott's claim that Florida is the better forum in which to litigate the dissolution less persuasive.
Finally, while I agree with the majority that it is hard to envision cireumstances that would warrant the expenditure of a quarter of a million dollars in preliminary attorney fees (plus whatever fees Scott has incurred), there can be no reasonable doubt that the reasonable attorney fees incurred thus far by both parties have been enormous. However, the issue of attorney fees does not justify the majorities' disposition of this case which, considering the mootness of the jurisdictional issue, will render the reasonable attorney fees incurred in the jurisdictional contest, a total waste. All the majority decision accomplishes is the requirement that the Skiles send good money after bad in effecting their dissolution.
Moreover, even if the preliminary attorney fees awarded in the case are unreasonable, attorney fees awarded prospectively are much like a retainer, the reasonableness which is subject to review in later proceedings. Kyle v. Kyle (1991), Ind.App., 582 N.E.2d 842, 850, trans. denied. When preliminary attorney fees are later determined to be excessive, the payor spouse is entitled to a refund. Id. The preliminary attorney fees awarded in the present case, even if excessive, are not cause for reversal.
Indiana law recognizes that divorce litigation is harmful to the family, especially the children involved. Lamb v. Wenning (1991), Ind.App., 583 N.E.2d 745, 751, modified on other grounds, 600 N.E.2d 96. I am left with the firm conviction that we are making a mistake by requiring the Skiles to start dissolution proceedings over and prolong this ordeal which, without a doubt, will continue to exact an immeasurable personal cost upon the Skiles family.
Sufficient evidence of probative value supports the trial court's judgment that the Skiles had never relinquished their Indiana domicile when they temporarily moved to Florida for Seott to play basketball. We should not disturb the trial court's decision but instead should stand aside to permit the present proceedings to advance to the final hearing scheduled for February 9, 1995, and the earliest resolution possible. Therefore, I dissent.