concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority affirms an enhanced twenty-four-year sentence imposed for conviction of a Class C felony, Operating a Motor Vehicle While Privileges are Forfeited for Life. The twenty-year enhancement was given pursuant to I.C. 35-50-2-8, the habitual offender provision.
I concur as to Parts I, IV, V, VI and VII of the majority decision. I dissent as to Parts II and III and address myself to those matters in reverse order.
TII
Suspendibility of Habitual Offender Emhancement
Under subsection (e) of I.C. 35-50-2-8 (West Supp.1991), the enhancement for a habitual offender status determination may never be less than five years to be added to the underlying sentence, i.e., subtraction of up to twenty-five years from the fixed enhancement term of thirty years if a period of ten years has elapsed between discharge from the last prior unrelated felony and the date of commission of the underlying felo*742ny. This being so, subsection (f)1 of the provision must necessarily contemplate reduction of the enhanced portion of a sentence below the levels enumerated in the schedules of subsection (e). Were it otherwise, subsection (f) would be redundant. In my view, therefore, subsection (£) permits suspension of the enhanced portion of a sentence, so long as the enhanced portion is not reduced to less than a five year executed term of incarceration.
I reach this conclusion in light of, and not in disregard of, Marsillett v. State (1986) Ind., 495 N.E.2d 699. In Marsillett, our Supreme Court consolidated into thirteen issues some approximately thirty-nine matters. One of those issues involved Marsillett's contention that the record did not reflect whether the trial court considered as within its discretion that a portion of the thirty-year enhancement might be suspended. Our Supreme Court merely held that suspension of a portion was not authorized under then subsection (c), now subsection (e). The decision did not hold that suspension was impermissible under subsection (f).
II
Enhanced Sentence as Disproportionate to Offense
In Mills v. State (1987) Ind., 512 N.E.2d 846, the Court affirmed a thirty-two-year enhanced sentence but noted that "(als the principal felony becomes more egregious, satisfying the proportionality requirement of the Indiana Constitution requires less of the prior convictions." 512 N.E.2d at 849. In Mills, the underlying felony was theft of a vehicle and the prior convictions all involved unauthorized use or theft of vehicles. The Court found significance in the fact that the thefts were more egregious than the theft of gasoline in Hensley v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 1053, or the theft of $50 worth of spark plugs in Taylor v. State (1987) Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1036.
Conversely, in Clark v. State (1990) Ind., 561 N.E.2d 759, the defendant's drunk driving conviction was enhanced by thirty years pursuant to I.C. 35-50-2-8 because of a prior burglary and a prior theft conviction. The majority there concluded that "where there is no injury to person or property, [a thirty-year enhancement] is entirely out of proportion to the gravity of the offense." 561 N.E.2d at 766.
Similarly, in Best v. State (1991) Ind., 566 N.E.2d 1027, the defendant was convicted of two felonies, one of which involved driving under the influence. That conviction was enhanced by twenty years under IC. 35-50-2-8. The prior felonies were theft, burglary, theft, and driving while an habitual traffic offender. In reducing the sentence from twenty-seven to seventeen years, our Supreme Court noted that the underlying felony "is not particularly aggravated ... [and] [tlhe incident caused little damage to property or person." 566 N.E.2d at 1032.
Best's prior criminal record, however, was substantially more serious than that of the defendant in Clark v. State, supra. Best had some eighteen prior convictions, several of which involved offenses against property and endangerment to public safety. The Court therefore found it appropriate for the underlying felony to be enhanced to some degree but not by the twenty years ordered by the trial court. The decision then directed the enhancement be reduced from twenty to ten years. That holding was made notwithstanding a dissent which posited that drunken drivers pose a serious hazard to life and public safety. The same cannot be said with regard to operators such as Stanek, who are not physically or mentally disabled or incapacitated other than by the absence of formalized state authorization to drive a motor vehicle.
*743STANEK v. STATE Ind. 743 Cite as 587 N.E.2d 736 (Ind.App. 3 Dist. 1992) Here, none of the offenses involved hanced sentence of not more than twelve equate with those present in Mills, Hens years. ley, or Taylor, or even with those in Clark or Best, We should not affirm a more severe sentence with respect to Stanek. In light of the cases cited, and particularly Best, I would affirm the conviction but would remand for imposition of an en- © & KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
. I.C. 35-50-2-8(F) reads as follows:
"(f) Notwithstanding the court's authority to reduce the additional fixed term of thirty (30) years imprisonment under subsection (e), if a person is found to be an habitual offender under this section, the court shall sentence the person to an additional fixed term of at least five (5) years imprisonment to be added to the term of imprisonment imposed under section 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 of this chapter."