(dissenting). Plaintiff, consisting of certain residents and taxpayers of the city of Ludington in Mason county, filed the bill of complaint in this case to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the proposed construction of a county infirmary in the city of Scottville in said county. These taxpayers adopted the designation Mason County Civic Research Council. The defendants are the county of Mason and the' city of Scottville. The trial court, after a hearing on stipulated facts, filed a comprehensive written opinion and entered an order dismissing the bill of complaint. Plaintiff appeals.
Two principal questions are here for decision: (1) Does the board of supervisors of Mason county have authority to erect a county convalescent .home and infirmary building at. the proposed location in Scottville; and (2) does the city of Scottville have authority to deed to the county the parcel óf land *317on which the building is to be located. Appellant adds a third incidental question, involving the right of ■ the board of supervisors to use' county sinking funds to erect an infirmary.' • ■ ■
■ The facts have been stipulated. In 1942 the county acquired and has since maintained a place in Ludington as an infirmary, under the name of Mason County Convalescent Home, and under the manage^ ment and control of the county social welfare board.1 In 1949, by a vote of the electors in said county, a county sinking fund was created and taxes voted for the purpose of constructing a new county jail and a new county convalescent home.2 No action has been taken by the county sinking fund commission3 to allocate or use the fund. In 1952 the board of supervisors authorized its building committee to procure plans for a new jail and a new convalescent home or infirmary, which was done. Also, in 1952, the electors of the county voted favorably for a bond issue of $165,000 for the purpose of constructing and equipping “a new county convalescent home (infirmary).” In 1953 the city of Scottville offered to deed to the county approximately 3 acres of land out of an 18-acre park known as McPhail Field, as the site for the proposed new “county convalescent hospital (infirmary).” The board of supervisors voted to accept the offer, subject to providing a merchantable title.4 In June, 1953, the county prosecuting attorney gave the board of supervisors a written opinion approving the title to the Scottville site, and the board of supervisors adopted a resolution “accepting the proposed Scottville site and approving the construction of the infirmary in aceord*318anee with the plans and specifications prepared by the architect upon the site in the' city of Scottville.”
In July, 1953, the plaintiff Mason County Civic Research Council filed the instant bill of complaint seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain the city of Scottville from conveying the proposed site to the county, and to restrain the county from further proceeding with the plan for the construction of the proposed county infirmary in Scottville. Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal, by the trial court, of its bill of complaint.
1. Does the county board of supervisors have authority to erect a county infirmary at Scottville, under the facts in the case?
The applicable constitutional and statutory provisions are as follows:
“Each county may also maintain an infirmary for the care and support of its indigent poor and unfortunate, and all county poor houses shall hereafter be designated and maintained as county infirmaries.” Const (1908), art 8, § 11.
“The board of supervisors of any county in this State in which a county infirmary is not already erected, may, at any annual or special meeting thereof, determine to erect such a house for the reception of the poor of their county.” CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147).
“The said several boards of supervisors shall have power and they are hereby authorized at any meeting thereof lawfully held:
“First, To purchase for the use of the county any real estate necessary for the erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county, and for a farm to be used in connection therewith;
“Second, To purchase any real estate necessary for the site of any court house, jail, clerk’s office, or any other county building in such county;
■ “Third, To fix upon and determine the site of any ¡such building, if not previously located; * * - *
*319“Fifth, To remove or designate a new site for any county buildings required to be at the county seats, when such removal shall not exceed the limits of the village or city at which the county seat is situated, as previously located;
“Sixth, To cause to be erected the necessary buildings for poorhouses, jails, clerk’s offices, and other county buildings, and to prescribe the time and manner of erecting the same.” CL 1948, § 46.11 (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 5.331).
Plaintiff mainly relies on the language in the first sentence of CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev '§ 16.147), supra, authorizing the board of supervisors to erect a county infirmary in any county “in which a county infirmary is not already erected.” Plaintiff claims that a county infirmary has already been erected in Ludington, hence, the county has no authority to' change the location and “erect” an infirmary in Scottville. The legislative intent may readily be gathered from the ensuing provisions in the same act, as well as in the other acts above referred to. Obviously, there was no legislative intent that once a county infirmary had been “erected” in a certain place, the county must be limited in perpetuity to that one location for an infirmary. In fact, the record here shows that the Mason county infirmary was originally located in Amber township, which farm site was disposed of when the infirmary was relocated (apparently in conjunction with a “county convalescent home”) in a large former residence building in Ludington. Under plaintiff’s theory, the farm site would be the only lawful place for a county infirmary. There is no merit in appellant’s claim that the board of supervisors may not acquire a different site for the infirmary.
. .“The board of supervisors of the county have exclusive authority over the subject of the erection of! houses for the reception of the poor of their county, ¡ *320and in the exercise , of this authority they may employ such agents as they choose to execute what they have determined upon to do.” Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 Mich 295, 300.*
2. Does the city of Scottville have the right to convey to the county a part of the so-called McPhail park in Scottville ?
This 18-acre tract was acquired hy the city in 1925 by gift from Curtis W. McPhail, the conveyance stating:
“This deed is made and executed by said first parties with the agreement and understanding that the land above conveyed is to be used for a public park and for no other purpose; except that such a portion as is necessary for an athletic field may be enclosed for such purpose.”
The city, anticipating in an excess of caution a possible claim that this entire 18-acre tract would have to be held by the city in perpetuity as a public park, cleared the title from the possibility by other claimants of an interest in the title. It should be noted that the conveyance from McPhail to the city did not contain a reverter clause, and was not expressly made subject to reversionary interests. When McPhail died testate in 1939 he devised the residue of his estate (which would include any possible interest in the park) to 2 churches, both of which have executed deeds to the city releasing any restrictions or right to the park property. Also, all of McPhail’s heirs have joined in a similar deed to the city, reciting that it was given for the same purpose. The city council of Scottville took formal action vacating the park as to the 3-acre parcel and authorizing the conveyance to the county for an *321infirmary site. In effect, plaintiff would insist that once a parcel of land had been conveyed to a municipality for a park, without a reverter or reversionary clause, it must be held forever by the city as a park. In Briggs v. City of Grand Rapids, 261 Mich 11, we held (syllabus):
“Where there was no reverter clause, statement in deed to city for valuable consideration that land was purchased for park purposes is merely declaration of purpose of conveyance, without effect to limit grant, and therefore city was under no obligation to maintain park in perpetuity.”
“It seems to be the weight of authority that, where there is no reverter clause, a statement of use is merely a declaration of the purpose of conveyance, without effect to limit the grant.” Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich 143, 151.
Furthermore, the city council took formal action vacating for park purposes the 3-aere parcel to be conveyed to the county. It had statutory authority to do so. CL 1948, § 100.3 (Stat Ann 1949 Rev § 5.1787). The city of Scottville had authority to convey the 3-acre site to the county.
Finally, appellant asks whether the board of supervisors has the right to “ignore” the county board of sinking fund commissioners and order the construction of a county infirmary partly out of sinking funds. Nothing here in the record indicates that the board of supervisors will fail to recognize any statutory authority of the board of sinking fund commissioners. It consists of the county treasurer, county clerk, register of deeds, chairman of the board of supervisors, and chairman of the finance committee of that board.* By statute, the sinking fund is under the control of said board of county sinking fund commissioners, “subject to the supervision and direction *322of the board of supervisors.”* We are in accord with the thorough opinion of the trial court, which is in the record, indicating that the board of supervisors, if it desires to use sinking fund moneys, should have no difficulty in “directing” the sinking fund commissioners.
This opinion is based upon an analysis of the statutory powers conferred upon boards. of supervisors by the legislature. The Michigan Constitution (1908)† provides:
“The legislature may by general law confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character, not inconsistent' with the provisions ■ of this Constitution, as it may deem proper.” (Italics supplied.)
It has been argued that boards of supervisors are administrative agencies, lacking authority to change the site of a county infirmary. A board of supervisors is the legislative agency of the county, and if it lacks that authority, obviously it must follow, if existing law is as now argued by appellant, that the location of a county infirmary must remain, perhaps in perpetuity, as originally located, unless further authorized by the legislature.
In some instances the Constitution itself has plainly defined the location of certain county agencies. Article 8, § 13, forbids a change in the location of the county seat of government, once it has been established, until the change in location has been approved by a majority vote of the electors. Article 8, § 4, requires that the sheriff, county clerk, county treasurer, judge of probate and register of deeds “shall hold their offices at the county seat.” Sig*323nificaritly, a change in location of the county infirmary has been left to other Constitutional provisions, and to the legislature.
There is neither a constitutional nor statutory requirement that a change in the loeation of the county infirmary shall require a majority vote of the electors. Unless the board of supervisors has that authority* none exists.
Decree should be affirmed. . No costs, a public question being involved.
Butzel and Smith, JJ., concurred with Boyles, J.See CLS 1954, § 400.55(e) (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 16.455. [ft]).
See CL 1948, § 141.51 (Stat Ann § 5.671).
See CL 1948, § 141.31 et seq. (Stat Ann § 5.651 et seq.). i
Reference will be' made later to a claim of defect in the titlftj which the city might convey to. the county, ;
This must now be qualified by a later requirement in CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147), that before a county infirmary 'is erected, the plans must be approved by the State department of welfare, which has been done in this case.
CL 1948, § 141.32 (Stat Ann § 5.652).
CL 1948, §141.55 (Stat Ann §5.675).
Art 8, § 8.