in part and dissenting in part.
To the extent that today's opinion suggests that the open and obvious rule is not an appropriate basis for summary judgment in a "general negligence" case, I believe the Court has eliminated an unnecessarily confusing element in Indiana law. By disapproving the majority's opinion in Law v. Yukon Delta, Inc. (1984), Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 677, and adopting the views of Judge Staton's dissent, the Court reaffirms the adequacy of traditional defenses such as contributory negligence and incurred risk.
In light of this effort to clarify the applicability of the open and obvious rule, I am surprised that the majority proceeds to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision in this case and find that the trial court properly used open and obvious to render summary judgment on the negligence theory of the complaint. I gather that the distinction being made is between negligence actions involving products and negligence actions not involving products. The basis for this distinction is not really explored in today's decision, and the suggestion in Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058, that the open and obvious rule is available in negligence actions involving products was dictum, as Judge Miller has *491pointed out in the Court of Appeals' opinion, since Bemis was a strict liability case based on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.