dissenting.
Recognition by the majority that Holcomb & Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Younge (1937) 103 Ind.App. 489, 8 N.E.2d 426, has not been overruled prompts my dissent. We must either straightforwardly reject it or we must acknowledge that its holding leads to a reversal of this summary judgment. Holcomb holds that provision for an annual income in and of itself does not preclude a determination that the employment may be terminated at will.
Holcomb also holds, however, that if annual salary is the stated rate of compensation, the trier of fact may find that the duration of the period of employment is for a definite period, provided one or more additional factors are present. One such factor enumerated in Holcomb was stated to be:
"(2) if appellee's employment was an important one and of a kind that a temporary and indefinite employment of appel-lee would not likely have been made;" 8 N.E.2d at 429.
My colleagues summarily sweep the Holcomb decision aside, without rational justification except for generalized statements of contract law principles, and citation to Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods (1982) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 440 N.E.2d 696. In Pepsi-Cola there was no dispute that the contract of employment was for an indefinite period. The sole basis for the decision was that the employee's right of recovery, if any, rested upon promissory estoppel against the employer not upon the at will contract. (Pepsi-Cola had induced Woods to terminate her then present employment in reliance upon a promise of employment with Pepsi-Cola.)
The authorities relied upon by the majority do not reflect adversely upon the underlying premise of Holcomb. As I perceive that premise, as related to our case, it is that although a contract of employment may appear on the surface to be one terminable at will, if the compensation is stated to be at an annual salary and if the facts and circumstances permit a reasonable conclusion that the employment was of a nature to be more than casual, temporary, or indefinite, the employment may not be held as a matter of law to be at will.
Such is the case before us. The uncon-traverted evidence before us would permit a trier of fact to find that Ewing's employment was intended to be for a one-year period. Kittle's letter of August 26, 1974, emphasized that Ewing was placed upon a guaranteed annual income in order to insure that there be no difficulties in anesthesia scheduling. I can construe this as nothing less than a statement by the hospital that Ewing's employment was impor*1100tant and "of a kind such that a temporary and indefinite employment would not likely have been made." Holcomb, supra, 8 N.E.2d at 429.
I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.