(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the lead opinion that defendant Detroit Edison did not have a duty as a matter of law to any of the three plaintiffs because it could not have reasonably foreseen that someone would be injured in the particular circumstances of each case. Therefore, I join part n of the opinion, which concludes that the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant Detroit Edison in all three cases.
However, I cannot join part m of the lead opinion regarding the issue of general contractor liability in Bohnert v Detroit Edison. Because I agree with the lead opinion that Wendell Bohnert’s injury was not foreseeable to defendant Detroit Edison as a matter of law, I further conclude that there was not a “high degree of risk” presented by the overhead electrical lines to Bohnert for defendant Carrington Homes, the general contractor, as a matter of law. Hence, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Carrington.
*675I
As the lead opinion states, this Court has established that a general contractor has a duty on a construction project (1) to take reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers (3) in common work areas that- (4) create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers. See Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 104; 220 NW2d 641 (1974). See also Plummer v Bechtel Construction Co, 440 Mich 646, 666 (Levin, J.), 669 (Boyle, J.); 489 NW2d 66 (1992) (affirming Funk). I do not believe that there is an issue regarding whether the electrical power lines created a high degree of risk to Bohnert.
In examining whether there was a foreseeable risk to Bohnert for defendant Detroit Edison, the lead opinion concludes that “it was not foreseeable to Edison that an experienced, skilled workman would disregard clear instructions [on the boom] and operate his delivery vehicle directly beneath power lines.” Ante, p 660. For the same reason, I also believe that these power lines, which were not obscured by visual obstructions, did not present a high degree of risk to plaintiff as a matter of law when Stephen Dick of Carrington asked National Cement Products to deliver materials to the site.
The lead opinion claims that its conclusion that the electrical lines both (1) did not create a foreseeable risk of harm, but (2) did create a high degree of risk is “consistent” because Detroit Edison was not “informed that Mr. Bohnert would be operating a crane-like delivery truck beneath [the electrical power] wires.” Ante, pp 664-665. Yet, this Court has *676previously stated that even if an electric company “knew a building was under construction near its power line and that . . . mobile cranes were being brought upon the premises,” this would not by itself indicate to the company that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk to an employee performing work involving the crane. See Koehler v Detroit Edison Co, 383 Mich 224, 231; 174 NW2d 827 (1970) (emphasis added). Likewise, whether Carrington knew that Bohnert would be bringing a truck with a boom onto the worksite would not determine whether there was a high degree of risk created by the electrical power lines. Even if it were a factor to consider, there was no dispute that National Cement Products did not call Stephen Dick of Carrington to inform him that Bohnert was coming to the site to deliver the cement blocks on the day he attempted to deliver the materials. Consequently, there is no dispute that Carrington did not know that Bohnert was coming to the work-site when he did.
The lead opinion also claims that “when the elements of Funk are satisfied, a general contractor is presumed to have been able to foresee that readily observable and avoidable risks will lead to accidents and injuries.” Ante, p 665 (emphasis added). Yet, this analysis assumes its conclusion by asserting that when the elements of the standard are met, i.e., when there is a high risk of danger, the general contractor is then presumed to foresee that these risks will lead to accidents and injuries, i.e., that there is a high risk of danger. This reasoning is circular.
Instead, this Court should recognize that, although electrical power lines are “inherently dangerous” requiring expertise, see Schultz v Consumers Power *677Co, 443 Mich 445, 451; 506 NW2d 175 (1993), there was not a high degree of risk of injury for a delivery worker who had delivered concrete block for forty years when he drove onto a worksite with his truck that had two signs on its boom that read “Waming[:] Do Not Operate Within 10 Feet of Electric Power Lines.” The electrical power lines were not obscured. In fact, the owners of the property, the Adkinses, had asked Detroit Edison to move the lines before the accident “mostly for looks.”
The fact that the risk was not unreasonably high is underscored by plaintiffs own arguments and allegations. In Barbara Bohnerfs first amended complaint, she does not allege how Carrington could have made the worksite safe from the alleged hazard. Plaintiff relies on the sworn affidavit of her expert, William Heilman, arguing that Carrington was obligated to “delay commencement of construction until such time as the overhead lines were covered, moved, buried, de-energized, or made safe by some other means . . . .” Yet, the authority to take such action rested with defendant Detroit Edison. Detroit Edison had already moved the electrical power lines a further distance away from the worksite at the request of the Adkins family. In concluding that there was an issue of fact regarding whether there was a high risk of danger with respect to only Carrington, the lead opinion’s analysis thereby suggests that Carrington may have had a duty to have the electrical power lines moved or insulated to ensure that the worksite was reasonably safe even though Detroit Edison did not have a duty to move or insulate them because there *678was no foreseeable risk of harm to anyone. I do not think such reasoning withstands close scrutiny.
n
Wendell Bohnert’s death was a tragedy. However, it did not result, as a matter of law, from Carrington’s failure to take some particular action at the worksite where the danger was not unreasonably high for an experienced delivery worker like Bohnert. I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Carrington.