dissenting:
I cannot agree that the Department of Human Rights lacks authority under the Illinois Human Rights Act to pursue charges of racial and sexual discrimination in an academic program of a public university. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The purpose of the Act is "[t]o secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable discharge from military service in connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations; and to prevent unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment in employment, discrimination in connection with real estate transactions based upon familial status and sexual harassment in higher education.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 1 — 102(A).) Where it applies, the Act is the exclusive form of redress in Illinois for civil rights violations. Mein v. Masonite Corp. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 1, 7.
As a remedial statute, the Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. (Arlington Park Race Track Corp. v. Human Rights Comm’n (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 698.) Where the language of a statute is unclear, a court should consider the purpose of the enactment and the evils to be remedied. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318.
As the majority notes, the primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. The majority finds that an academic program at a public university is not a "public accommodation” as defined by section 5 — 101(A)(1) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 101(A)(1)). While such a strict reading of the statute is appealing, the practical results are contrary to the purposes of the Act. Under the majority’s reasoning, the legislature "intended” to protect a student from discrimination suffered at the hands of a university cafeteria worker or bookstore employee, but not from a professor or administrator of an academic program at the same public university. I cannot agree that the legislature intended such an anomalous statutory scheme to secure the stated purposes of the Act.
The majority finds support for the conclusion that the Act confers no jurisdiction to the Department of Human Rights for racial and sexual discrimination in higher education from the legislature’s enactment of article 5A in 1983. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, pars. 5A — 101, 5A — 102.) That article confers authority to the Department of Human Rights for claims involving sexual harassment in higher education. The majority reasons that "[h]ad higher education already been covered by the Act, a simple amendment adding sexual harassment to the Department’s jurisdiction would have been sufficient.” (159 Ill. 2d at 213.) The majority then concludes that the addition of a whole new article shows the legislature understood that no jurisdiction had yet been conferred on the Department over institutions of higher education.
I agree with the appellate court that article 5A was intended as an expansion of a university official’s liability for sexual harassment, and in no way evinces a desire to limit a university official’s liability for discrimination. In the debates concerning the sexual harassment amendment, Representative Koehler stated:
"[This amendment] amends the Illinois Human Rights Act to include sexual harassment in higher education as a civil rights violation. Under the Human Rights Act, discrimination on the basis of sex already constitutes a civil rights violation. However, it is important to point out that there is a distinct difference between sex discrimination, which deals with prejudice!,] and sexual harassment, which deals with a hostile environment and repeated torment.” (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 5, 1983.)
This statement shows that the General Assembly considered sexual harassment to be a separate and distinct problem from other forms of discrimination already covered by the Act. Contrary to the majority, I feel the distinctive nature of sexual harassment caused the General Assembly to provide separate treatment for sexual harassment in article 5A. In addition, I believe Representative Koehler’s statement intimates that the General Assembly already believed institutes of higher education were covered by the general provisions relating to discrimination in the Act.
The majority’s limited definition of a "public accommodation” is also difficult to reconcile with the Act’s definition of civil rights violations involving public officials. Section 5 — 102(C) states:
"[It is] a civil rights violation for any person on the basis of unlawful discrimination to:
* * *
*** Deny or refuse to another, as a public official, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantage, facilities or privileges of the official’s office or services or of any property under the official’s care because of unlawful discrimination.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 102(0.)
Plaintiffs admit that they are public officials for purposes of the Act. The majority, however, finds that section 5 — 102(C) prohibits a public official only from discriminating in regard to a public accommodation.
This reading makes most of the language in section 5 — 102(C) superfluous. Section 5 — 102(C) does not only forbid a public official from discriminating in an "accommodation.” The section goes on to prohibit discrimination in administering "advantage[s], facilities or privileges of the official’s office” as well as "services or any property under the official’s care.” The majority does not acknowledge this language. I would find that section 5 — 102(C) confers jurisdiction to the Department of Human Rights over discrimination claims against these "public officials” regarding educational "services” under the officials’ care at an institute of higher education. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.