concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the per curiam opinion *278adopted by the court. I write separately, however, because I believe that the per curiam, standing alone, may lead one to believe that the mere adoption of a plan formulated at the policymaking level of a law enforcement agency may be sufficient to permit the type of random stops conducted in the instant case. I believe there is more to this matter than merely the formulation of a plan.
An examination of the decisions throughout the United States, including those by the U.S. Supreme Court, indicates that there is much confusion and some facial inconsistency in the decisions regarding the constitutional validity of roadblocks. Some courts have concluded that it is not a violation of either the fourth or fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States for police officers, state or federal, to stop a motor vehicle without reasonable cause or an articulable reason. See, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981); State v. Smolen, 232 A.2d 339 (Conn. Cir. 1967); City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1950); Sowers v. The State, 146 Ga. App. 701, 247 S.E.2d 225 (1978); People v. Estrada, 68 Ill. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128 (1979); Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980); State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134, 647 P.2d 959 (1982); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). Other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have held to the contrary, declaring that, absent an articulable reason or the existence of reasonable cause, such stops violate the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973); State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); Koonce v. State, 651 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App. 1983); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); People v. Glover, 93 Cal. App. 3d 376, 155 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1979); State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980); State v. Marchand, *279104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). One may find a collection of most of these cases reported in Annot., 37 A.L.R.4th 10 (1985). See, also, Gardner, Searches and Seizures Of Automobiles And Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations In A Post-Ross World, 62 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
The answer as to whether any roadblock can ever be constitutionally established lies within the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In each case the question to be addressed is whether the search or the seizure is “unreasonable.”
It has long been held, and is considered to be well settled, that “under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments ... a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). One of those exceptions is what is frequently referred to as “the automobile exception.” See, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). The reason for this exception appears to be twofold. The courts have indicated that because of the mobility of the automobile, less stringent requirement should be imposed upon police officers seeking to search or seize an automobile. Courts have further indicated that persons are inclined to expect less privacy in an automobile than they would in their homes and therefore are not required to be given the same kinds of protection that the fourth amendment affords to persons in their homes. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), reh’g denied 400 U.S. 856, 91 S. Ct. 23, 27 L. Ed. 2d 94.
It is clear, however, that the mere fact that an automobile is *280involved does not eliminate the guarantees provided by the fourth amendment nor make every search or seizure of an automobile reasonable. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979):
An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. As Terry v. Ohio, supra [392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)], recognized, people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.
Moreover, the rules applicable to searches apply equally to seizures, both growing out of the prohibition contained within the fourth amendment. That stopping an automobile is a seizure and therefore must be reasonable under the facts of the case is without question. As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 653-55:
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated in this case because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-558 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 *281U.S. 873, 878 (1975); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of “reasonableness” upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order “ ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. .. .’ ” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978), quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Implemented in this manner, the reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against “an objective standard,” whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test. In those situations in which the balance of interests precludes insistence upon “some quantum of individualized suspicion,” other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not “subject to the discretion of the official in the field,” [citations omitted].
Therefore, the fact that one is in an automobile and does not have as great an expectation of privacy as one might have in the confines of his or her home does not totally eliminate the restrictions imposed upon the government under the fourth amendment.
While it is argued in this case, as in all other similar cases, that such stops are in the interest of traffic safety and therefore the government has an important interest, that factor alone is not sufficient. The interest of the members of the driving public, who are not violating the law, to be free of unreasonable seizures must also be a part of the balancing formula.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure — limited in magnitude compared to other *282intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable — at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials. To insist neither upon an appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular automobile nor upon some other substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion “would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches... .”
(Citation omitted.) Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979).
The mere fact that a citizen is out of his home and on the public street does not deprive that citizen of all of his fourth amendment rights. As observed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the fourth amendment right of privacy belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.
Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S. Ct. 788, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1967), reh'g denied 386 U.S. 988, 87 S. Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed. 2d 243. There is “no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967).
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court discussed in some detail how the balancing of the state’s needs, on the one hand, and the public right to privacy, on the other hand, should be balanced. In Brown the police attempted to stop an individual and obtain identification solely on the basis that he had walked away from another individual in an alley. In declaring such action inappropriate the U.S. Supreme Court said at 50-51:
“ ‘[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that person,’ id., at 16, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be ‘reasonable.’ ” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
*283The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878. Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. See, e.g., 422 U.S., at 878-883.
A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in a variety of settings has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 663. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-562 (1976).
The only exceptions to the general rule, absent exigent circumstances, appear to be those few cases involving individuals coming into this country at or near our borders and passing through permanent checkpoints. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976). The U.S. Supreme Court, in approving the action taken by the government in Martinez-Fuerte, supra, carefully pointed out that each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint operated by the Border Patrol. In upholding the validity of such stops at permanent checkpoints because of the government’s overriding interest in maintaining national *284security, the U.S. Supreme Court said at 558:
“[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.” [Citation omitted.]
The Court went on to further note at 559:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints near our borders are consistent with the fourth amendment and need not be authorized by warrant, it has consistently *285emphasized that the stop must be at a permanent location having all of the characteristics of a permanent location located near our borders. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the practice of the Border Patrol’s randomly searching automobiles more than 25 air miles north of the Mexican border, notwithstanding the fact that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances “within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, ” as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. The Attorney General’s regulations had defined “reasonable distance” as “within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States.” In declaring such action in violation of the fourth amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra at 269, said: “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.”
The basis for this view as to what is reasonable and what is unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution is not new. It had its inception more than 50 years ago in the case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925). In that case Carroll had been convicted of transporting 68 bottles of bonded whiskey and gin in violation of the National Prohibition Act, a matter which was of as much concern to the government in 1925 as drunk drivers are to the government in 1985. In holding that the government could not stop and search an automobile absent some articulable reason or reasonable cause, Chief Justice Taft said for the Court at 153-54:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. *286But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
This notion was repeated some 50 years later in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979), when the U.S. Supreme Court said:
Accordingly, we hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The majority in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, did, by way of dictum, attempt to modify its holding by saying at 663:
This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.
(Emphasis supplied.) Whatever may have been the purpose of that dictum, it did not change the results in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, nor does it change the requirements of the fourth amendment.
When one examines the U.S. Constitution in light of the manner in which it has been interpreted over the years in cases of this nature, including Delaware v. Prouse, supra, one must conclude that the offhand suggestion by Justice White that roadblock-type stops at less than permanent facilities (if that is what Justice White meant, and it is not clear) of all cars would satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment, absent evidence of probable cause or exigent circumstances, does not seem to stand the balancing test required by the fourth amendment and appears to be inconsistent with the holding of *287the case itself. See State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985).
Even those state courts which have approved such stops have imposed strict requirements on the police in an effort to effect what they perceive to be a reasonable balance between the rights of the citizen and the needs of the government.
The Iowa Supreme Court in 1980 set out what is believed to be a minimum requirement to pass constitutional muster when, in the case of State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980), it said:
Where there is no consent, probable cause, or 7erry-type reasonable and articulable suspicion, a vehicle stop may be made only where there minimally exists (1) a checkpoint or roadblock location selected for its safety and visibility to oncoming motorists; (2) adequate advance warning signs, illuminated at night, timely informing approaching motorists of the nature of the impending intrusion; (3) uniformed officers and official vehicles in sufficient quantity and visibility to “show . . . the police power of the community;” and (4) a predetermination by policy-making administrative officers of the roadblock location, time, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral criteria.
On that basis the Iowa Supreme Court, in the Hilleshiem case, declared a roadblock stop similar to that conducted in the instant case to be in violation of the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and sustained the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the roadblock.
One is inclined to believe, however, that when requirements such as those suggested in Hilleshiem are imposed, the end result is not very likely to produce many, if any, drunk drivers. Therefore, balancing the right of privacy of the citizen against the interests of the government in apprehending drunk drivers, one might conclude that no temporary roadblock created to apprehend drunk drivers is ever permissible.
In reaching that conclusion we are fully cognizant of the serious problems that drunk drivers pose to the public. We must, however, address that problem squarely and honestly, *288and not by ignoring the requirements of the Constitution. According to what little evidence is available, the roadblock in the instant case did little to aid the police in apprehending drunk drivers. Although the police conducted biweekly roadblocks for 50 weeks preceding the roadblock in question, no evidence was produced which established that a single driver was arrested for drunk driving prior to the evening in question. On the basis of that record it is difficult to find that the interests of the state outweigh the fourth amendment right of the citizen.
While we recognize that a drunk driver behind the wheel of an automobile poses a serious threat to society, we should not ignore the provisions of either the fourth amendment or the declarations of the U.S. Supreme Court in such matters. If the police may stop citizens at random on the pretext of checking identification, what is to stop the police from halting persons in a parking lot as they approach their automobiles? And if such a seizure is permitted, what is left of the fourth amendment?
The issue presented in cases of this nature is not whether persons who violate the law by operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants should be permitted to go free. To be sure, they should not. The question is whether citizens may be stopped at 1 a.m. to display their operators’ licenses and automobile registrations, absent any articulable reason or reasonable suspicion that they have violated the law. While we are aware of the problems which drunk drivers pose to all citizens, we are further aware of the hazards which may be imposed upon the public if the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not adequately enforced. Justice Jackson, soon after his return from the Nuremberg trials, wrote:
“These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” [Citation omitted.]
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274, 93 S. Ct. *2892535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973).
And in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886), the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 years ago,said:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
It may very well be that no set of rules which permits transitory roadblocks of the type here can ever satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment.