(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s termination of appellant’s parental rights to his son, RFF, pursuant to subsection 39(1) of the Adoption Code, MCL 710.39(1); MSA 27.3178(555.39)(1).
The Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq.; MSA 27.3178(555.21) et seq., establishes procedures to safeguard and promote the best interests of the adoptee and to provide for speedy resolution of disputes concerning a putative father’s rights where placement of a child for adoption is sought. In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216, 228-229; 273 NW2d 35 (1978); In re Lang, 236 Mich App 129, 136; 600 MW2d 646 (1999). The Adoption Code also provides substantive standards for determining when it is appropriate to terminate a putative father’s parental rights. In re Barlow, supra. Section 39 of the Adoption Code, MCL 710.39; MSA 27.3178(555.39), creates two categories of putative fathers and provides different standards for terminating the rights of each:
(1) If the putative father does not come within the provisions of subsection (2), and if the putative father appears at the hearing and requests custody of the child, the court shall inquire into his fitness and his ability to properly care for the child and shall determine whether the best interests *212of the child will be served by granting custody to him. If the court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the child to grant custody to the putative father the court shall terminate his rights to the child.
(2) If the putative father has established a custodial relationship with the child or has provided substantial and regular support or care in accordance with the putative father’s ability to provide such support or care for the mother during pregnancy or for either mother or child after the child’s birth during the 90 days before notice of the hearing was served upon him, the rights of the putative father shall not be terminated except by proceedings in accordance with section 51(6) of this chapter or section 2 of chapter XIIA.
At issue in this case is whether the trial court erred, first, in concluding that appellant’s parental rights should be evaluated under subsection 39(1) and, second, in concluding that it was in the best interests of RFF that appellant’s parental rights be terminated. I would hold that the trial court erred in finding that under the circumstances of this case appellant did not come within the provisions of subsection 39(2).
Amendment of subsection 39(2) was one of the July 1996 recommendations of Lieutenant Governor Binsfeld’s Children’s Commission. The commission contended that a putative father who had not established a custodial relationship with the child should have provided “substantial and regular” care or support to the child in order to be accorded subsection 39(2) status in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. The commission objected that the term “support” might be broadly interpreted so as to apply to circumstances where no child support was paid by the putative father until the Family Independence Agency (fia) sought to establish paternity, or to cir*213cumstances where the child support is paid involuntarily and only because of the entry of a court order. As a result, the commission urged the adoption of language that would require willing, substantial, and regular participation by the putative father. Report of the Binsfeld Children’s Commission, pp 83-84 (1996).
Senate Bill 415 was introduced in the Michigan Senate in April 1997, reflecting this recommended change to subsection 39(2). The bill passed the Senate in June 1997, 1997 Journal of the Senate 917 (No. 53, June 11, 1997), and was immediately thereafter referred to the Michigan House Judiciary Committee, 1997 Journal of the House 1211 (No. 55, June 12, 1997) . The bill was amended in the House Judiciary Committee on March 10, 1998, with the insertion of the language “in accordance with the putative father’s ability to provide such care OR support,” qualifying the “substantial and regular” language added to the statute by the Senate. 1998 Journal of the House 410 (No. 23, March 10, 1998). The amended bill passed the House 106 yeas and 0 nays and returned to the Senate, 1998 Journal of the House 605 (No. 32, March 31, 1998) , which concurred in the House amendment 31 yeas, 0 nays, 5 excused, 1 not voting, 1998 Journal of the Senate 569 (No. 30, April 15, 1998). Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I would conclude that the House amendment effectively codified the multifactor approach for determining case by case whether the putative father has provided reasonable care and support under the circumstances of the case set forth in In re Gaipa, 219 Mich App 80; 555 NW2d 867 (1996).
The majority relies on the Senate Fiscal Agency’s analysis found in Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 415, *214August 26, 1998, to support its conclusion that subsection 39(2) as amended does not address the circumstances presented by this case. In my view, this particular bill analysis is not persuasive evidence of the Legislature’s intent when it amended subsection 39(2).
First, the bill analysis states on its face that it “was prepared by nonpartisan Senate staff for use by the Senate in its deliberations and does not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.” Thus, while the analysis may constitute legislative history, it cannot be considered evidence of legislative intent sufficient to satisfy our duty to interpret legislative enactments in accordance with the plain meaning of specific language of the statute. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). Second, the August 26, 1998, bill analysis, completed after the bill was enrolled, is nearly identical to a bill analysis completed on June 20, 1997, just after the bill first passed in the Senate, but well before the House amendment of the bill. See Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 415, June 20, 1997. Nothing in the bill analysis relied on by the majority acknowledges or gives any meaning to the statutory language added by the House that requires inquiry into the putative father’s ability to provide support or care.
Third, to the extent legislative analysis reports should be considered by this Court in determining legislative intent, all the legislative analysis concerning SB 415 should be considered. The House Legislative Analysis Section prepared an addendum to the June 20, 1997, Senate Fiscal Agency analysis of SB 415, which states in relevant part:
*215The House Judiciary committee amended the bill to require that the assessment of whether a putative father’s support or care was “substantial and regular” be measured in accordance with his ability to provide support or care. [House Legislative Analysis, SB 415, March 11, 1998.]
Nothing in the language of the statute or the available legislative analysis suggests that a judicial determination that a putative father who, because he is unaware of the birth mother’s pregnancy is unable to provide support or care, is inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the amendment of subsection 39(2). The House legislative analysis lends credence to the idea that the House amendment was intended to address the due process concerns identified in the Senate Fiscal Agency analysis. The fact that no legislators voted against SB 415 at final passage further supports this notion. Indeed, in construing a statute, courts should presume that every word has some meaning and should avoid any construction that would render a statute, or any part of it, surplusage or nugatory. Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992). The construction I urge gives meaning to the phrase added by the House amendment, is consistent with common sense, and avoids unreasonable consequences. In re Dawson, 232 Mich App 690, 696; 591 NW2d 433 (1998).
The trial court found that appellee’s concealment of the pregnancy and the type and quality of counseling received from the counseling agency was irrelevant to appellant’s ability to provide support.1 I would reverse and remand for specific factual findings regarding *216appellant’s ability to provide substantial and regular support or care for appellee or RFF, including findings regarding whether appellant could provide any support and care, much less substantial and regular support and care, where he learned about the imminent birth of RFF only three weeks before delivery; whether the circumstances under which appellant was told about the pending adoption suggested that adoption was a fait accompli, adversely affecting the timing of his attempt to provide care or support to RFF; whether placement of RFF in the custody of the adoptive parents immediately after his birth, making any contact with RFF extremely difficult, also affected his ability to provide care or support to RFF; and whether the counseling provided by the adoption agency may have misled appellant about his legal obligations if he was to decide to seek custody of RFF.2
*217Even if appellant does not come within the provisions of subsection 39(2), I would still reverse the trial court’s order. While I generally agree with the statement of the facts set forth in the majority opinion, several significant facts not mentioned by the majority lead me to the firm and definite conviction that the trial court made a mistake. The record establishes that appellant and his parents were quite shocked to learn that appellant was soon to be a father and that appellee had made plans to place the baby for adoption. When appellee advised appellant that she was pregnant and would be placing RFF for adoption, she told appellant that her motivation in placing RFF for adoption was her intention to attend college in the fall. Appellant did respond by indicating that he had planned to attend the Marine Corps boot camp that summer, but the record reflects that appellant stated this in a sarcastic manner and not in an apparent acquiescence to appellee’s adoption decision. Nevertheless, appellant and his parents worked to gather information that would enable him to make a reasonably informed decision about whether to agree to appellee’s plan under the circumstances.
Terry Budek, the pregnancy counselor with Family and Children’s Service of Midland (the adoption agency handling the adoption), sent a letter to appellant before RFF’s birth in which she described her position as one “to support all members of the birth family.” The letter further stated that she was there to provide services including advice about “birthparent rights and choices . . . free of charge.” Appellant also *218testified that Ms. Budek discouraged him from seeking legal advice and that, in response to an inquiry about the expenses for care of RFF and his willingness to pay what he could, she told him that the costs were being taken care of by the adoptive parents.
When appellant went to the adoption agency to consent to the adoption, Ms. Budek was not in the office. A volunteer working at the reception desk in the office connected appellant and his mother with Ms. Budek by telephone. Ms. Budek told appellant’s mother during this telephone contact that RFF had been bom, and appellant’s mother relayed this information to him. When appellant learned through this telephone contact that RFF had been bom, he became upset and began to cry. Appellant acknowledged that he refused to sign the adoption consent at that time, but the complete record establishes that his refusal was at the behest of the agency receptionist who suggested that appellant go home and think about his decision further.
In deciding it was not in the best interests of RFF to grant custody to appellant, the trial court relied heavily on its determination that appellant was not sufficiently mature to raise RFF and would be heavily relying on his parents for up to several years. Significantly, however, the trial court consistently sustained on the basis of relevancy objections to testimony from appellant’s dentist, aunt, and pastor about their observations and knowledge of appellant’s maturity and ability to handle responsibility, even though they had known appellant for long periods. I believe this was error that prevented appellant from making a complete record about his ability to parent RFF under the difficult circumstances presented here.
*219In this regard, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s reliance on Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457; 547 NW2d 686 (1996), is misplaced. The Supreme Court’s decision noted that from the time Ms. Ireland and Mr. Smith’s child (Maranda) was bom in 1991 (both parents were in their mid-teens at the time), to Ms. Ireland’s enrollment in the University of Michigan in the fall of 1993, Ms. Ireland’s mother and grandmother “provided nearly all the necessary support.” Ireland, supra at 459.3 The Court acknowledged that following her enrollment in college, Ms. Ireland would likely continue to reside with her mother as well as on campus at the University of Michigan. Id. The Court also acknowledged the likelihood that she would change residences at the university and that she would move again after completing her studies. The Court pointedly stated that “[s]uch changes, normal for a young adult at this stage of life, d[id] not disqualify Ms. Ireland for custody.” Ireland, supra at 465.
I agree wholeheartedly with this sentiment and believe it applies in this case. “ ‘The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents ....’” In re Boursaw, 239 Mich App 161, 176; 607 NW2d 408 (1999), quoting Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). This Court reviews hundreds of cases annually in which parental rights have been terminated only after multi*220pie services (i.e., parenting classes, drug treatment, job training) have been provided over multiple months to the parents by the fia. In this case, similar services were offered appellant by RFF’s grandparents, blood relatives. Given the circumstances of this case, including the concealment of the pregnancy and the “counseling” provided by the adoption agency, appellant’s fundamental liberty interest to parent should not evaporate because he will not be the model parent in the first years of RFF’s life.
For the reasons stated above, I would reverse.
At the June 25, 1999, hearing during which the trial court found that appellant was a subsection 39(1) putative father, the trial court stated:
*216The trial court’s written opinion concerning the best interests findings, dated July 22, 1999, refers to In re Dawson, supra at 690, in which this Court concluded that subsection 39(2) as written before the amendment at issue in this case did not account for a situation in which the mother conceals the pregnancy from the putative father, and then states “[t]his court reached the same conclusion . . . .”
The trial court’s opinion states that by finding it was not in the best interests of the child to award custody to appellant, it was aware that “it *217appears we are favoring a birth mother who lied, and an adoption agency which poorly handled the pre-adoption matters.”
The Court of Appeals decision in Ireland v Smith, 214 Mich App 235, 240; 542 NW2d 344 (1995), similarly noted that after Maranda’s birth, “[b]oth parties continued in high school with apparently normal pursuits, including sports, cheerleading, dating, and partying . . .