(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. A person is a person is a person ... ,1 and an illegal sale is an illegal sale is an illegal sale ...
GILBERT, Justice(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. By insulating the respondent, Rachel Paul, from any liability for her participation in illegally selling intoxicating beverages to minors, the majority opinion not only ignores the plain language of the Civil Damages Act, but also expands the term “social host” to include a person who admittedly made an illegal sale of intoxicating beverages.
The majority’s reasoning focuses on the lengthy legislative history of the Civil Damages Act. However, legislative history is only to be used as a tool for construing statutory language when the legislative language is ambiguous or not explicit. When the words of the law are clear and free from all ambiguity, “the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”1 The language of the Civil Damages Act clearly and unambiguously provides that a cause of action exists “against a person who caused the intoxication of [one who injures another person] by illegally selling alcoholic beverages.”2 The majority opinion disregards the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the judicially-created social host exception to this statute.
Paul collected approximately $190 and made a $70 profit by selling alcohol to 50 to 70 minors present at her father’s home on the night in question. Those sales were illegal: not only did Paul lack a liquor license,3 but Paul, herself a minor, sold alcohol to others under the age of 21.4 At oral argument, Paul’s counsel conceded that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages was an illegal sale under these facts.
While it is undisputed that Paul, herself a minor, illegally provided other minors with intoxicating beverages, the majority nonetheless insulates her from liability under the judicially-created “social host” exception to the Act. We have previously held that a social host is not liable under the Act.5 However, we have yet to define the term “social host,” and have previously applied the term only to situations where intoxicating beverages were given away. We have never held that the Act applies only to commercial vendors. Without defining the term social host *114or even analyzing whether Paul falls within that category, the majority summarily concludes that summary judgment is appropriate because Paul was a social host. For several reasons, I have difficulty with that conclusion.
First, the Act provides a cause of action against “a person who causes the intoxication of [one who injures another] by illegally selling alcoholic beverages.”6 As Justice Page’s dissent so eloquently reminds us, Paul is a person. Just a few short months ago, we addressed the definition of the phrase “other person” as used in reference to determine who is eligible to bring a cause of action under the Act.7 We held that the Act is to be liberally construed in order to further its purpose of suppressing “the illegal furnishing of liquor causing a person’s intoxication,” and thus that the phrase “other person” meant any person injured by an intoxicated individual.8 Yet today the majority ignores our recent holding and instead effectively holds that Paúl is not a “person” within the scope of the Act. It seems to me if we are to construe the' term “person” in a way that furthers the purpose of the Act, at a minimum that term should be construed to impose liability on a “person” such as Paul, who profited by illegally selling alcoholic beverages to a large number of minors. Any other interpretation of the word “person” destroys the plain meaning of this word in this remedial statute, and thereby violates our long established rule of interpreting an unambiguous statute in accordance with its plain language. 9
Even more troubling than the majority’s exclusion of Paul from the category of “persons” is the majority’s summary classification of her as a “social host.” While this might be an appropriate determination in other contexts, this classification is erroneous under the facts of this case. When we have previously applied the definition of “social host,” it has been limited to those giving away intoxicating beverages. In Cole, we emphasized the legislature’s removal of the word “giving” from the Civil Damages Act.10 We thus applied the term “social host” to a sister who gave alcohol to her brother, to an individual who provided free beer to a guest at a party where other guests contributed to the cost of the beer, and to an individual who served alcohol “gratuitously” to a guest at a wedding reception.11 Despite this limited holding of Cole, the majority’s use of the term today suggests that “social host” means anyone other than a commercial vendor. Considering the fact-specific nature of the Cady and Cole decisions, this construction of the term “social host” constitutes a major change in the law.
It is true that Paul did not have a liquor license and was not in the business of regularly selling alcoholic beverages out of her father’s home. The majority relies on dicta from Cady to conclude that because Paul is not “in the business of providing liquor,” she qualifies as a social host.12 However, this conclusion ignores the true holding of Cady and the consideration paid in this ease. In Cady, we held that an exemption applied to “a social host who happened] to receive some consideration from his guests in return for drinks he provided.”13 This phrase can not, and should not, be read to insulate all people except commercial vendors from liability. In Cady, we also specifically held that “no barter took place because no consideration was given in exchange for appellant’s liquor. * * * * Consideration requires the voluntary assumption of an obligation by one *115party on the condition of an act or forbearance by the other.”14
The facts of this case simply do not support the conclusion that Paul gave away intoxicating beverages and only “happened” to receive consideration from those present at her father’s home. Instead, she planned and organized this party, had an adult purchase kegs of beer and hired an adult to collect money and essentially serve as a bouncer for the party. Rather than merely accepting contributions from friends or relatives to cover costs, Paul gained a profit by charging strangers admission to enter the home. Paul admitted that she was personally acquainted with only 5 of the 50 to 70 people present. No one was permitted to enter or to partake of the beverages unless they paid this admission fee. Not only did Paul recoup her costs for the evening, she also profited $70, no small sum for a 17-year-old providing two kegs of beer to minors. Under these facts, I have difficulty reaching the conclusion that Paul was merely a social host who just happened to receive some consideration.
To ignore the simple and basic facts' of this case and hold that Paul is a social host is to offer other minors a consequence-free means of earning a profit while providing alcohol to friends and strangers alike.15 The facts before us are not analogous to a social situation such as a football party, card game, or weekend gathering where friends gather to socialize and, to help cover costs, the host accepts contributions from social acquaintances. Paul did not invite friends and acquaintances into her home with the intention of socializing; instead, she charged admission to strangers who came to her father’s home to drink intoxicating beverages. As' could be expected, one of these strangers who bought beer from Paul became intoxicated and severely injured another person. Insulating Paul from liability under these circumstances is a result likely unintended by the legislature and violative of the purposes of the Act. The majority opinion uses dicta from prior cases to override the plain language of this statute. It may well be that, in light of the majority’s holding, the legislature will amend the Civil Damages Act to address the liability gap resulting from this judicially-created immunity doctrine.
.See Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954).
. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1998).
. Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1998).
. Minn. Stat. § 340A.301, subd. 1 (1998).
. Minn. Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 1 (1998).
. Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Minn.1982).
. Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (emphasis added).
. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn.1998).
. Id.
. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1998); Peterson v. Halvorson, 200 Minn. 253, 255, 273 N.W. 812, 813 (1937).
. Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.1982). This removal followed our de-cisión in Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972), where we imposed liability on a 19-year-old who gratuitously provided two minors, including his younger brother, with intoxicating beverages. Id. at 120, 200 N.W.2d at 152.
. Cole, 314 N.W.2d at 837-38.
. See Cady, 315 N.W.2d at 596.
. Id.
. id.
. The notion that other minors might participate in similar activities with similar consequences is not unfounded. Paul herself admitted that the idea to charge admission came from other parties that she had attended at which admission was charged.