concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s findings regarding respondent’s conduct and the imposition upon respondent of a 4-year suspension from the practice of law with the conditions for readmission stated therein. In addition, however, I would order respondent to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and further condition his reinstatement to the bar upon satisfactory compliance with all reasonable recommendations of that evaluation.
FACTUAL RECORD
The majority opinion persuasively sets forth several instances that not only demonstrate respondent’s unfitness for the practice of law, but also seem to evidence an apparent mental instability in respondent. For example, in a letter to the referee dated July 24, 1998, respondent indicated that he would not participate in the disciplinary hearing before the referee. Respondent stated:
I have come to the conclusion that perhaps they only intend to trap me somehow by twisting my words if I take the stand, since their evidence is scanty, at best. I think they may be desperate at this point to get me on the stand so they might twist the truth.
Furthermore, they also might try to use their influence to cause further legal difficulties for me. I am not naive enough to think that the NSBA exists in a vacuum in Lincoln. I know full well the depths of this organization as I was once part of the legal community when I lived there several years ago.
My reasons for this should be obvious. I have certain political and personal enemies at the Bar Association who have pursued me ever since I walked out the doors of law school, who already started to attack my character at that point. These enemies cannot prove, and in the past three *507years have failed to prove anything against me, though I know they would like to. I do not know why, though I have my suspicions. I will not state those suspicions at this time, and will not name the individuals I believe are responsible.. ..
Be advised that I will not appear in Lincoln for this hearing if I am expected to take the stand against myself. I will adamantly oppose any requests or attempts to place my life in jeopardy at the hands of false accusers.
The line of thought expressed in respondent’s letter to the referee was also manifested in his reply to the formal charges filed against him. In response to the formal charges, respondent alleged that the Counsel for Discipline “has abused his authority in a way that smacks of fascism” and that he was “hiding behind his cloak of immunity as if he is somehow above the law and can never be sued for this reckless conduct in attempting to destroy my life.” In asserting his “counterclaim,” respondent speculated, “I believe this may have something to do with my latest divorce and the fact that. . . my ex-wife, who has been married three times, is personal friends with several members of the NSBA. . . .”
Respondent later reaffirmed his counterclaim, stating:
Respondent requests an injunction against the NSBA and that they be Ordered to Cease and Desist from contacting Respondent in any manner. Respondent requests that any immunity for these parties be lifted so that private civil suit can be brought against them for damage to Respondent’s business in the amount of $2000.00 per month since October 1997 when the first investigation was started, and for other emotional distress experienced by Respondent because he cannot sleep at night and has experienced severe physical symptoms as a result of being served by the sheriff for charges from the NSBA relating to innocent acts. Respondent has developed an ulcer as a result of this harassment, and considers the actions of [the Counsel for Discipline’s office] extreme and OUTRAGEOUS, because they have evidence in their possession that would tend to exonerate Respondent, but that they *508choose to ignore it. Respondent asks that [the Counsel for Discipline] be removed from his position at the NSBA and made to answer for his outrageous conduct and reverse discrimination. Respondent feels that if he had been a recognized minority, like a black, Hispanic or Asian, this would have been dismissed at the outset.
(Emphasis in original.)
Respondent also sent several letters directly to the Counsel for Discipline. In a letter dated April 15, 1998, respondent stated, “As attorneys, we trust that your office will at least investigate matters that come before it, even though we know there are myriad interpretations and even many more instances of abuse and unethical conduct that teems like maggots in this society.” In the same letter, respondent also attempted to explain his failure to contact or respond to contacts from Einspahr, stating:
The reason I did not discuss these matters with Jan over the phone is because of my negative experiences with women, and especially her, in the past when I talked to her on the phone. ... I would not discuss anything with Jan Einspahr because in my opinion, her belligerent, deceptive nature and her inability and unwillingness to compromise, w[ere] dangerous to my personal and professional position. I was equally, if not more, unwilling to speak with her about the matter until the day of trial and I tend to be quite assertive myself (not aggressive) (I’m a lawyer after all!).
. . . [T]he last thing I needed, or ever need again, is to be accused falsely by a woman (or anyone). Her excuse to the judge was that I didn’t answer the phone. I see no requirement for this anywhere, as this is what a court of law is for, and that is why I filed a petition IN COURT and not a request for a phone discussion! Important matters should NEVER be discussed over the phone. Nothing is ever, or rarely, resolved that way. (I have since sent Jan Einspahr a letter stating my new office policy that I will not speak with her on the phone or take her calls EVER again. Every conversation with her is counterproductive, as all she ever wants to do is argue and twist the truth.... *509I have been married twice before, and this seems to be counterproductive, to say the least. [)]
(Emphasis in original.)
Respondent, in the same letter, explained his failure to appear at the pretrial conference in the Hofmann matter, stating, “I did not attend the pretrial conference, nor would I fall into any unsuspecting trap that was not recorded by a certified court reporter. THIS IS MY RIGHT to be heard AT TRIAL, and not to have to waste my time on unproductive pretrial conferences!!”
Later in the same letter, respondent wrote:
I am tired of the liars and losers getting protection when it is so undeserved. I have spent my life trying to prove that I do not have to be poor, only to regrettably find myself in a messed up society where all one has to do is claim to be a victim, or prove that they are poor, and the rest of us are supposed to cater to them and pay their way in life. The truth has a way of surfacing. This is the TRUTH .... Do what you wish with it. I have lived my life by it, and am sick and tired of pulling others around. I only hope that this stops somewhere and we stop protecting those who don’t deserve so much as the time of day! . ..
... I will take this to a higher court and do whatever I have to do, and name whomever I wish so that this all comes to a halt, if I do not get the result I not only deserve, but that I expect, even if I lose every step of the way, because .. . that is just par for the course for me.
I have lost because it is the victims and the sad-sacks that get their way and win, who are so undeserving of anything, yet receive all they ask for. The government and other organizations are so generous with MY time and MY tax dollars that I would be a fool to continue in this profession when I am double taxed and tread upon. I always find myself writing discourses on why the truth should prevail. I guess I must devote all my attention to this foolishness. I might be angry at those who fail to do the right thing, but I cannot bring myself to it, as I have learned that most people don’t have a clue as to what is right or wrong anymore! It is like being angry at a child who has not yet *510developed the ability to reason. How could I possibly be angry at a child?
In other correspondence addressed to the Counsel for Discipline, respondent attempted to make a complaint about the attorney who had complained about respondent’s conduct in the Hofmann case. Respondent speculated that the complainant “has something to gain by removing me from practice in Norfolk as he is in direct competition for my business and he has alot [sic] more overhead than I do.” Respondent also speculated that the complainant might not be “aware that I have appealed a decision ... to the Intermediate Court of Appeals and the BIG NAMES of this town do not like me because I actually might win.” After the Counsel for Discipline evidently informed respondent that his countercomplaint had no merit, respondent wrote:
If this is not resolved to my satisfaction, then I may press a civil lawsuit against any and all of you who are involved. If you think you are immune from such a suit, think again. The US Supreme Court case of Jones v. Clinton makes it quite clear that immunity from civil suit while serving in any position of authority is an illusion. A complaint against your office, as well as a possible lawsuit against YOU will follow if I don’t get a reasonable answer BASED ON NEBRASKA LAW AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS- NOT YOUR OPINION.
Finally, respondent advanced his theory about discrimination based on his status as a descendent of “Germans from Russia,” as noted in the majority opinion. Respondent concluded that discussion by writing:
I will make a list of the injustices heaped upon the Germans from Russia by this government, including your treatment of me! . . . You have gone too far in your discrimination against me by exhibiting clear favoritism to ... members of the majority class without giving my complaints and requests equal attention, brushing them aside without proper explanation or proper investigation. A new minority class has emerged and I demand recognition, attention and equal protection under the law!!
*511Respondent’s filings in this court also reflect upon his mental fitness to practice law. In his findings, the referee stated that respondent “remains generally unrepentant.” In his brief, respondent stated that “[r]epentance appears to be more in keeping with religious sentiments that have no place in a Court of law.” Respondent continued to argue in his brief:
Thus, for Attorney to repent indicates an improper impingement of religious ideas upon the state’s responsibility to decide cases without religious interference. . . . That repentance seems to be more of an Inquisitional idea that has no bearing on fact finding and truth and will not help to resolve these complex issues is obvious.
Even if a formal repentence [sic] were made, this case would remain controversial, and a decision would still need to be made by this Court. ... If this court finds wrongdoing and orders repentence [sic], Attorney is prepared to do so. Until that time, that Attorney should have earlier begged the forgiveness of anyone is absurd. It has never been Attorney’s attitude that he should grovel on his knees begging the forgiveness of others when they question his motives and principles, else he might have lived his entire life on his knees begging repentance.
Taken as a whole, respondent’s behavior reveals a current incapacity to practice law by reason of a probable mental illness or disability. Many of respondent’s written submissions demonstrate significant irrationality, and his tone shifts during the course of a single letter from defiance and hostility to outright despair. However, because nobody has specifically complained of respondent’s mental status and respondent has not raised a mental illness defense in his pro se pleadings, we are left with a record devoid of competent medical evidence that would assist us in the ultimate determination of reinstatement in this cause. Nonetheless, based on the record before us, we have the power and obligation to order a psychiatric evaluation as a condition of reinstatement. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that it would be appropriate to order such a psychiatric evaluation in this case.
*512APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Neb. Ct. R. of Discipline 11(A) (rev. 1996) provides, in relevant part:
Upon a complaint that a member is incapacitated from continuing the practice of law by reason of physical or mental illness, or because of addiction to drugs or intoxicants, the appropriate Committee on Inquiiy, with the assistance of the Counsel for Discipline, may prepare, verify and submit to the Court an application for the temporary suspension of the member from the practice of law.
It is further provided in Neb. Ct. R. of Discipline 11(C):
The Court shall take or direct, consistent with fundamental fairness and due process, such action as it deems necessary and proper to determine whether the member is incapacitated from continuing the practice of law, including a direction for an examination of the member by such qualified medical experts as the Court shall designate at the cost of the Respondent.
While neither the Committee on Inquiry nor the Counsel for Discipline requested a stay of the disciplinary proceedings in order to proceed under rule 11, see Newton v. State Bar of California, 33 Cal. 3d 480, 658 P.2d 735, 189 Cal. Rptr. 372, (1983) (disciplinary proceedings stayed in order to proceed under rule relating to mental illness), the rules of discipline relevant to this proceeding allow us to provide a remedy that will shed light on respondent’s future fitness to practice law and protect the public in doing so. Neb. Ct. R. of Discipline 10(N) (rev. 1996) provides that after hearing, “The Court may disbar, suspend, censure or reprimand the Respondent, place him or her on probation, or take such other action as shall by the Court be deemed appropriate.” (Emphasis supplied.) The record before us supports the propriety of ordering a mental health evaluation as a condition of reinstatement.
The Supreme Court of Colorado faced a similar situation in People v. Fagan, 745 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1987) (en banc). In that case, the grievance committee recommended that the respondent undergo a psychiatric evaluation as a condition of reinstatement to practice, even though the initial complaints against *513the respondent were based on accusations of neglect and not mental illness. The court stated:
This recommendation is based on the respondent’s erratic behavior which we find was manifested, in part, by his conduct of the cases leading to the disciplinary action and, in part, by his conduct during the disciplinary proceedings. The hearing board observed that, at times, [respondent] performed normally and effectively but, at other times, he functioned without noticeable expression or affect and was rambling and disorganized. There also is evidence in the record that the respondent exhibited threatening conduct toward the deputy disciplinary prosecutor.
Id. at 253.
The court noted that proceedings in that case had not been initiated under the terms of the Colorado disciplinary rule that explicitly dealt with attorneys suffering from mental illness. Id. Nonetheless, the Colorado court found that it could order a mental evaluation as part of its disposition of the case. Id.
The court noted that an attorney suspended for more than 1 year was required, as part of a reinstatement proceeding, to demonstrate that the attorney met all the requirements set forth for initial admission to the Colorado bar, including a demonstration that the applicant is “ ‘mentally stable.’ ” Id. at 254. The court thus determined that the appropriate penalty in that case was a suspension of 1 year 1 day and that prior to reinstatement, the respondent was required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation in order to demonstrate his mental stability. Id. See, also, In the Matter of Wallace W. Rogers, Jr., 263 Ga. 314, 431 S.E.2d 366 (1993); Attorney Griev. Com’n v. Draper, 307 Md. 435, 514 A.2d 1212 (1986); In re M., 59 N.J. 304, 282 A.2d 37 (1971); In re Richard F. Crist, 258 Or. 88, 481 P.2d 74 (1971) (en banc).
Similarly, this court has held that an applicant for reinstatement to the bar must otherwise be eligible for admission to the bar as in an original application for admission. See State ex rel. Sorensen v. Goldman, 182 Neb. 126, 153 N.W.2d 451 (1967). The Nebraska rules relating to the admission of attorneys provide that an applicant must have the ability to conduct oneself reliably, communicate clearly, reason and analyze information, comply with deadlines, and conduct oneself professionally and *514in a manner that engenders respect for the law and the profession. See Neb. Ct. R. for Adm. of Attys. 3 (rev. 1996). It is specifically provided that further inquiry is required where there is evidence of mental or emotional instability. Neb. Ct. R. for Adm. of Attys. appendix A (rev. 1996).
Taken together, these requirements appropriately empower us to order a respondent to submit to a psychiatric evaluation as a condition of reinstatement to the bar. In order to meet the requirements for reinstatement, a respondent at that time must demonstrate his or her mental fitness for the practice of law, and we would be precluded, as in this case, from properly evaluating a respondent’s mental condition without competent psychiatric evidence on the subject. Compare State ex rel. NSBA v. Barnett, 243 Neb. 667, 501 N.W.2d 716 (1993) (respondent placed on conditional probation based on recommendation of psychiatric report).
We have set forth similar conditions in disciplinary cases where respondents suffered from substance abuse. In State ex rel. NSBA v. Miller, 225 Neb. 261, 404 N.W.2d 40 (1987), we suspended the respondent for 2 years, and conditioned his reinstatement after suspension on his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous; his abstention from alcohol and drugs; and his completion of courses in legal ethics, accounting, and office management procedures. Similarly, in State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Erickson, 204 Neb. 692, 285 N.W.2d 105 (1979), this court suspended the respondent for 1 year and conditioned his reinstatement in part on an affirmative showing that he had controlled his problem of alcoholism. I see no reason to distinguish the case of an attorney that is likely suffering from a mental illness or disability from our established precedent regarding attorneys afflicted by substance abuse.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, while I concur in the imposition upon respondent of a 4-year suspension from the practice of law, I would, in addition to the conditions already imposed for readmission, also order respondent to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Based upon the results of the psychiatric evaluation, this court should condition respondent’s reinstatement upon satisfactory compli*515anee with all reasonable recommendations in the evaluation, such that respondent demonstrates the level of character and fitness to practice law enumerated in Neb. Ct. R. for Adm. of Attys. 3(a) through (d) and (j) (rev. 1998).
Hendry, C.J., joins in this concurrence and dissent.