dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the denial of Everett's motion for summary judgment, because I agree with the trial court that Everett did not demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment. In part, the trial court denied Everett's motion because there exists a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the estoppel claim. The designated record reveals a dispute as to whether the Taylors were led to believe that they were purchasing coverage for the risk that they would, at some point in the conduct of their farming operation, engage in an error or omission. The failure herein to secure evidence of appropriate worker's compensation coverage is a classic example of a negligent omission.
I agree with the majority that Indiana adheres to the general rule that the doe-trine of estoppel is not available to create or extend the scope of coverage of an insurance contract. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Recticel Foum Corp., 716 N.E.2d 1015, 1028 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. denied. However, an exception exists when an insurer misrepresents the extent of coverage to an insured, thereby inducing the insured to purchase coverage which does not in fact cover the disputed risk. Id.
According to the Taylors' complaint, "Jake] Owens learned and knew that the Taylors wanted 'all risk' coverage, to particularly include coverage for any invitee, licensee, contractor, or employee of contractor who may come upon the Residence and/or Farm" and "Owens assured the Taylors they were fully covered for all risk under the Policy." (App.21-22.) In support of its motion for summary judgment, Everett designated the Affidavit of Shirley Mock, wherein she averred that Everett does not write worker's compensation poli*282cies of insurance and could not have written such a policy for the Taylors.
Whether a worker's compensation policy could have been written misses the point. In this instance, the Taylors are not claiming the need for a worker's compensation policy. Rather, they are making a claim for their negligence in failing to request proof of insurance from the painting contractor. As a result of this negligent omission, they are now secondarily obligated to pay the employee according to the worker's compensation schedule. Thus, it is a question of fact whether the policy was represented to be the "all risk" coverage that included the Taylors' negligent omission for which they believe they are insured. As the trial court correctly observed, "Ms. Mock's Affidavit does not deal with the assurances of Owens which is the basis of the estoppels [sic] claim that ties Everett to this case under agency principles." (App.19.)
The logical assumption when reading a worker's compensation insurance provision is that it pertains to a relationship between an employer and an employee who is injured in the course and seope of his employment. As a Monday morning quarterback, I can conceive of an interpretation of the exclusionary language that encompasses the little known and onerous statutory provision relied upon by Everett; however, from the perspective of a business operator seeking the advice of their insurer to provide "all risk" coverage, the oblique exclusionary language does not correlate with the insured's expectation of coverage because it does not inform the insured who has no employees of the enormous exposure identified herein.
It seems eminently reasonable to me that purchasers of a "Farm Personal Liability Coverage" policy represented to be a comprehensive policy for their farming operation needs would have relied upon professional representations and believed they were receiving coverage for negligent errors and omissions in the conduct of their farming operation. Nonetheless, at this juncture, we need not resolve any disputed issues of material fact. See Estate of Jerome Mintz v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. et al., 903 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind., 2009) (reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of Gruber, a "servicing agent" who allegedly gave certain reassurances to the insured, and observing "whether Gruber's actions proximately caused the Mintzes' injuries is highly fact sensitive and more appropriately left for resolution by a fact-finder than resolved by summary disposition").
I believe that the Taylors are entitled to their day in court and would affirm the trial court's denial of Everett's motion for summary judgment.