On petition of the relator the District Court of Goodhue County was ordered to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued compelling it to enter a judgment in accordance with our opinion, John Wright & Associates, Inc. v. City of Red Wing, 254 Minn. 1, 93 N. W. (2d) 660. In that action relator as a taxpayer sought to enjoin the city of Red Wing, its council, and the T. B. Sheldon Auditorium Board, their successors in office, their respective agents, employees, and representatives, from operating, maintaining, or in any other manner using said auditorium as a motion picture show house or theater. The facts giving rise to this action may be found in that opinion. *102The district court in that proceeding granted a motion for summary judgment to the city of Red Wing and the T. B. Sheldon Auditorium Board, from which judgment the relator here appealed. This court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the matter (254 Minn. 10, 93 N. W. [2d] 666) “to the district court with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff upon such conditions as the court may direct, having in mind that the time when the injunction shall take effect may be extended to' permit the city and the auditorium board to adjust and terminate current contractual commitments in connection with the operation of the unauthorized business.”
The district court pursuant to the mandate of the supreme court, so far as is pertinent here, ordered:
“That judgment be entered for the plaintiff permanently enjoining the defendant, City of Red Wing, the City Council of the City of Red Wing, and T. B. Sheldon Auditorium Board from themselves, or any of them, engaging in the operation of the motion picture business in the T. B. Sheldon Memorial Auditorium.”
Further, in a memorandum attached to the order the district court stated that it was the understanding of that court that the question of whether or not the city and/or the T. B. Sheldon Auditorium Board may lease the auditorium to a third party was not before the trial court or the supreme court.
The relator claims that this order does not execute the mandate of the supreme court in that it does not enjoin the city or the auditorium board from leasing the auditorium. It contends that this issue was before the trial court and the supreme court and was decided in its favor.
Clearly this court has the power by writ of mandamus to compel compliance with its orders and directions upon the remand of a case to the trial court and where the remand of the case to the trial court is without any express directions the trial court is free to proceed in any manner not inconsistent with the opinion. State ex rel. Broderick v. District Court, 91 Minn. 161, 97 N. W. 581.
Here the remand of the case to the trial court was without any express directions, therefore we are presented with the single issue of whether the trial court proceeded in a manner which was inconsistent *103with our opinion. In deciding this question it is necessary to determine if the issue of whether the city of Red Wing or the T. B. Sheldon Auditorium Board could or could not lease the auditorium to one whose intention was to use it for showing motion pictures was presented to the court or decided under our former opinion.
Normally the matters in issue in a proceeding are those raised by the conflicting claims of the parties or asserted in the complaint and issue joined thereon. In re Trust Created by Will of Enger, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N. W. (2d) 694, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1048; Clements v. Constantine, 344 Mich. 446, 73 N. W. (2d) 889. This is particularly true when the appeal is from a judgment entered pursuant to an order granting summary judgment, which must be rendered on the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, together with affidavits showing no genuine issue as to any material fact. Rule 56.03 of Rules of Civil Procedure. The effect of a judgment is to be circumscribed by the issues, and if any matter appears in a judgment which is not pertinent to- the issues it may be rejected as surplusage. Hanlon v. Hennessy, 87 Minn. 353, 92 N. W. 1.
Upon an examination of the record here we do not find that the issue of authority to lease was before the court, nor can we find that it was raised anywhere in the pleadings. Relator’s complaint in the original action first refers to the then existing facts as follows:
“* * * during all times herein mentioned said Auditorium has been and is operated by said Board, by and with the knowledge, consent and acquiescence of said City, its Mayor and members of its Council, continuously, primarily and almost exclusively as. a motion picture show house * * (Italics supplied.)
Another allegation in the complaint states that the acceptance of the auditorium under the conditions expressed in the instrument of conveyance and the manner of operation of the auditorium as a moving picture house as alleged in the complaint has never been voted on or approved by the voters of Red Wing.
The complaint also alleges “That unless restrained and enjoined from so doing, said defendants will continue to operate said Auditorium in the manner aforesaid” and prays for judgment “That said City of Red *104Wing is without legal right, power or authority to accept and retain the gift of said real property, * * * for use as a motion picture show house or theatre or merchandising place, as described and alleged * * * and that its action and conduct in the past and at present in so doing is ultra vires.” Further, in the prayer for relief the relator requested that the defendants and successors in office and their respective agents, employees, and representatives be enjoined from operating, maintaining, or in any way using said auditorium as a motion picture show house or theater, but no reference is made to- lessees.
We are of the opinion that under the record the matter of whether the city or the T. B. Sheldon Auditorium Board may lease the auditorium to a third party was not before the trial court nor was it decided in our opinion, John Wright & Associates, Inc. v. City of Red Wing, supra. In other words, we held there that the use of the auditorium in the operation of a moving picture business was in excess of the municipal authority and the authority of the board created to manage the auditorium for the reason that the premises were not used for public purposes and that such activity was an unauthorized private com-merical business and had no relation to the purposes of a municipal corporation. Whether or not the city or the board may lease the auditorium to a third party for the purpose of operating a moving picture theater is another question which was not before us. Accordingly, the trial court did not proceed in a manner which was inconsistent with our opinion.
Writ denied.