(dissenting) — I must respectfully dissent, for *1161I feel, as did the trial court, that the best interests of these children will be served by placing them together in a home with their mother and grandmother. I am greatly concerned with the slight consideration apparently given to this important aspect by the majority. It is agreed that the primary consideration in eases of this kind is the welfare and best interests of the children, but we are not of the same mind as to what that is in this instance. York v. York, 246 Iowa 132, 136, 67 N.W.2d 28.
The majority seem to concede that there is evidence of a material and substantial change in circumstances sufficient to justify a court’s exercise of its power to modify custodial care, yet, with little more than a reluctance to change the status quo and a suspicion or fear that the mother will not continue her obviously successful attempt to rehabilitate herself, they decide the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the change. The rule, as I understand it, requires a rather strong showing to rebut the presumption in favor of the mother’s custody of small children. Bell v. Bell, 240 Iowa 934, 938, 38 N.W.2d 658, and citations. Also, while it is true our review is de novo, considerable weight, where justified in the record, is given the trial court’s decision. Ash v. Ash, 248 Iowa 1310, 1313, 85 N.W.2d 530; Stillmunkes v. Stillmunkes, 245 Iowa 1082, 1086, 65 N.W.2d 366, and cases cited; Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 1347, 72 N.W.2d 445; Justice v. Hobbs, 245 Iowa 707, 708, 63 N.W.2d 882; Watters v. Watters, 243 Iowa 741, 742, 53 N.W.2d 162; Joiner v. Knieriem, 243 Iowa 470, 481, 52 N.W.2d 21, 27, 28, and citations; Durst v. Roach, 245 Iowa 342, 344, 62 N.W.2d 159, 160.
The record clearly indicates the trial court carefully and deliberately weighed the matter. We have repeatedly -said the trial court is often in a much better position than we to solve such a perplexing problem, and I think that pronouncement was never more applicable. Here the court visited with these children in his chambers in addition to seeing and hearing the witnesses. Its finding, then, should not be disturbed without compelling reasons, and I find none. Finken v. Porter, supra, 246 Iowa 1345, 1347, 72 N.W.2d 445, and citations, Joiner v. Knieriem, supra, 243 Iowa 470, 481, 52 N.W.2d 21, and citations, *1162and Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa 419, 116 N.W. 608, refer to the trial court’s discretion on matters of this nature.
It is not a question as to whether the present homes of these children have been unsatisfactory. They have, according to the record, been good, and although there is some evidence that the Squires refused to permit the little girl to visit or show affection for her mother when they occasionally met, and the Huebbes have not been sending the boy to Sunday school, yet there is no serious contention that these custodial arrangements have not been satisfactory or disclose circumstances which in themselves would warrant a change. On the other hand, we have held, “If the present custodians are schooling the child to hate the [parent] * * * the welfare of the child might require a change of custody * * Shepard v. Gerholdt, 244 Iowa 1343, 1347, 60 N.W.2d 547; Albertus v. Albertus, 178 Iowa 1124, 1127, 160 N.W. 830. We said in Paintin v. Paintin, 241 Iowa 411, 415, 416, 41 N.W.2d 27, 29, 16 A. L. R.2d 659: “It is not shown the mother * * * has attempted to turn them against their father * * inferring at least that such an act might be sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody.
Here the change of circumstances alleged, and I think proven by a preponderance of the evidence, was that plaintiff, the mother of these children, in addition to securing a suitable dwelling place for them, has done a wonderful job of rehabilitating herself since May 1955, when custody of the children was denied her, and has gained the respect of others in the community over a substantial period of time. It should also be pointed out that in its 1955 order the court contemplated this change and reserved jurisdiction to make further orders as the welfare of the children “shall dictate.” If she has done that well without the compulsion she would naturally have when her retention of the children’s custody would be at stake, I can see no justification in the majority’s fear that she will abandon her firm resolution to live a moral, sober and upright life. A man of the cloth believes her. The trial court believes her. Why should we doubt her?
The other reason given for reversing the trial court, a reason which seems to be getting more than its fair share of *1163weight, is this court’s reluctance to change custody of children if their present situation is satisfactory. Lursen v. Henrichs, 239 Iowa 1009, 33 N.W.2d 383; McKay v. Ruffcorn, 247 Iowa 195, 203, 73 N.W.2d 78. Status quo maintenance as applied here is that if there is any chance of error by the move, do not do it. I think such a rule is very bad. There is always a- chance of human failure, but we should weigh the benefits for the children and give them consideration along with any detriments. This is not a ease where these children, who know their real mother and have visited in her home, will be rudely transplanted to a new and strange environment. Nothing but pleasantness should be anticipated by this change. The facilities offered in the mother’s home are quite adequate.
The compelling argument in favor of the trial court’s decision, I feel, is well pointed out in Shepard v. Gerholdt, supra, at pages 1348 and 1349 of 244 Iowa, page 550 of 60 N.W.2d where Justice Thompson said, “There was * * * a very material factor concerning welfare which the court stressed —the affection between the two sisters * * * and the benefit to Diana from living with the elder girl. * * * We agree with the able and long-experienced trial court that the welfare of Diana will be best promoted by a modification which permits her to live in the same home with her sister.”
I hope we have not changed this view, and feel that one of the paramount considerations the courts should consider is that it is for the best interest of the child to be brought up in a home with his brothers or sisters. It should be considered in the same category as the benefit a child gets from a good mother’s love and care. Joiner v. Knieriem and Durst v. Roach, both supra. It should be presumed beneficial to the child’s welfare.
It is true each cáse must be decided upon its own facts, but they are not here unfriendly to plaintiff’s case. There is no other child in either of the defendants’ homes. The Thein children are just now reaching the age when a brother-and-sister relationship becomes important, i.e., the school age. They need the companionship of each other. In their mother’s home they will have that, plus their mother’s love and care, and an *1164adequate and proper religious training. They will not only be sent to Sunday school, but will be taken to the church next door by their mother and grandmother.
I think these factors, when carefully weighed, justified the trial court’s conclusion that it would be for these children’s best interests to be together in one -home, to receive the same love and care from a repentant mother, and to receive the same religious training to prepare them for their family responsibilities of the future.
While I would affirm, I would delete the provision granting defendants the privilege of having the children for two months each summer, for that provision might have the effect of upsetting rather than securing their family discipline and unity. I would prefer to express appreciation for the devotion of these foster parents in other manners than by such a court order. Their unselfish devotion to' the child should receive compensation in some other manner than the granting to them of any possessive right in the child. I am sure these children themselves will remember and take care of that gratitude later.
I would modify and affirm.
Hays, J., joins in this dissent.