(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. No one quarrels with Lois’s right to petition for modification on the basis of changed circumstances. If she claimed facts amounting to a change of circumstances then she would be entitled to a hearing and a chance to prove her claims. But I disagree that Lois has been denied her “day in court” as the majority claims.
There have been previous days in court for Lois in this dispute and they have unquestionably come at great expense to her and to Jon. In these unfortunate and often bitter disputes I don’t think it is asking too much to require factual allegations which would suffice as a change of circumstances before putting a former spouse to the expense of appearing to defend against them.
The trial court recognized this by allowing an “amendment to the amended and substituted application for modification.” Since Lois was thereafter unable to come up with any specific factual claims amounting to changed circumstances I do not believe the trial court erred in its ruling.
The trial court’s language in observing it has “essentially considered this matter on its merits taking the strongest view of the evidence in favor of the petitioner”, is criticized by the majority. I agree the trial court had no evidence to consider, in its “strongest view” or otherwise. Still Lois was not harmed because she did not plead facts which even if taken as true would entitle her to the relief she sought.
Lois listed nine complaints.
(1) Lois asserts there was an increase in Jon’s income. Under the original decree Lois gets ten percent of Jon’s additional adjusted, income over $16,500. Accordingly it cannot be said the $20,160.95 she claims Jon now earns was beyond the contemplation of the trial court.
(2) In its earlier ruling on Jon’s application to modify and Lois’s counterapplication to modify the trial court found Lois was unemployed. Thus her allegation of present unemployment is not a change of circumstances.
(3) Lois asserts circumstances have changed by reason of termination of child support. However the original decree provided for termination of the child support in September of 1974. Payments were terminated before that date because the parties’ only child completed high school one year early and, supported by Jon, went to Europe. Termination of child support was obviously contemplated by the trial court when it fixed the alimony amount.
(4) Lois complains premature loss of child support caused her to be in a serious financial plight. But the child support payments in the original decree were contemplated support for the child not for Lois.
(5) Lois details circumstances of serious financial difficulties which require her to obtain food stamps, leave her unable to meet her bills, compel her to obtain loans, and show she incurs more expenses than her total monthly income. However it must be remembered Lois’s unemployment was a prior circumstance existing at the time of the prior decree. By the original decree Jon assumed all predissolution debts of the couple except the house mortgage. Lois received the home subject to assumption by her of the mortgage. While Lois’s claims reveal a tragic story they do not establish a change of circumstances.
(6) Lois complains she has experienced health problems and is required to take medication. But she alleges no unusual health care costs nor any condition which prevents her from working.
(7) Lois complains she has applied for many jobs without success. The majority seizes on Lois’s health problems and her unsuccessful job applications in its holding she was entitled to a hearing. The majority believes it may have appeared at a hearing that she was unemployable. I do not think it is the business of the court to indulge in such speculation when Lois herself did not. She makes no claim that she was unemployable.
(8) Lois complains of the rising cost of living. However this is not always a change of circumstances. In Meara v. *256Mears, 213 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Iowa 1973) we noted inflation works both ways. In Page v. Page, supra, 219 N.W.2d at 553 we noted inflation may affect the party with less income more than the party with the greater income. But no hearing was necessary to show the cost of living has continued to rise. Lois did not allege anything to indicate Jon’s or Lois’s economic positions have been notably affected by inflation since the date of the prior decree.
(9) Finally Lois complains she has exhausted all unemployment compensation benefits and does not qualify for any further ones. Exhaustion of such benefits must have been anticipated by the trial court at the time of the prior decree. Unemployment benefits have always been known to be temporary in nature.
Lois did not allege any facts which if proven would have entitled her to a modification. If Lois can prove facts which amount to changed circumstances surely she can allege them. I think it was proper for the trial court to sustain Jon’s motion to dismiss.
I would affirm.
MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, J., join in this dissent.