(dissenting). The majority opinion's conclusion that the protective-placement provisions of section 55.06, Stats., apply to a person who has not been protectively-placed is not supported by either the statutes or the cases. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Agnes T. is not being "protectively placed" — nor is she being "admitted" to any facility; she is continuing to live where she has lived voluntarily for almost twenty years. Unlike someone who has been committed involuntarily under chapter 55, she is as free to leave the nursing home today as she was before the guardian was appointed. The appointment of the guardian does not change this simple fact. Indeed, section 880.33(7), Stats., specifically recognizes the distinction between the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person and the protective placement of that person:
A finding of incompetency and appointment of a guardian under this subchapter is not grounds for involuntary protective placement. Such placement may be made only in accordance with s. 55.06.
Thus, if Agnes T. should, contrary to what others believe is her own best interest, attempt to leave the facility, protective-placement procedures can be started, subject to all of the appropriately-required protections. Mere continuation of Agnes T.'s voluntarily-assumed living arrangements, however, is not warrant for imposition of procedures deemed unnecessary by the legislature. In fact, the majority remands this matter for a determination of whether Agnes T. is in need *374of protective placement. If the answer is "yes," presumably she will be "placed" where she currently lives. If the answer is "no," presumably she will be permitted to continue to live where she currently lives. In any event, annual review of her living arrangements and whether they are "the least restrictive" is currently required by section 880.38(3), Stats.
The legislature has determined the level of protection needed by persons in Agnes T.'s position. A review of a finding of incompetency and of the need for guardianship may be had under section 880.34(4), Stats.:
A ward who is 18 years of age or older, any interested person acting on his behalf, or his guardian may petition for a review of incompetency. Upon such a petition for review, the court shall conduct a hearing at which the ward shall be present and shall have the right to a jury trial, if demanded. The ward shall also have the right to counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if he is unable to obtain counsel. If the ward is indigent, counsel shall be provided at the expense of his county of legal settlement.
As noted, annual review is required by section 880.38(3), Stats., when, as with Agnes T., a guardian of the person has been appointed:
A guardian of the person of an incompetent appointed under s. 880.33 shall make an annual report on the condition of the ward to the court that ordered the guardianship and to the county department designated under s. 55.02. That county department shall develop reporting requirements for the guardian of the person. The report shall include, but not be limited to, the location of the ward, the health condition of the ward, any recommendations regarding the ward and a statement of *375whether or not the ward is living in the least restrictive environment consistent with the needs of the ward. The guardian may fulfill the requirement under this subsection by submitting the report required under s. 55.06 (10).
Absent an involuntary commitment under chapter 55, State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Community Services Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985), the sole case-authority relied upon by the majority, does not apply here. We are judges, not legislators; we should keep within the limits of our rightful authority. As Sir Francis Bacon cogently observed centuries ago in his essay Of Judicature, we must remember that our "office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law."