also dissenting:
At issue in this appeal is whether the two-year limitation period in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a) (West 1992)) or the one-year limitation period in section 8 — 101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 (West 1996) (Tort Immunity Act)) applies to medical malpractice actions brought against local governmental entities and/or their employees. The plurality opinion holds that the one-year limitation period provided in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act is more specifically applicable. The plurality’s conclusion that section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act is the more specific statute represents an unwarranted and unprecedented departure from our well-established jurisprudence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Based upon the plain language of the two statutes at issue, arguably either provision could apply to plaintiffs’ claims. Section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act is applicable to “civil actions” against local governmental entities and/or their employees, whereas section 13— 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to “actions for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital.” However, the two statutes conflict because section 13 — 212(a) permits a two-year period of filing limitation, whereas section 8 — 101 allows a one-year limitation period. Therefore, as the plurality correctly observes, the linchpin determination in this matter is which of these two conflicting statutory provisions should control. The decision hinges upon which of the two provisions is more specifically applicable to the cause at bar.
It is a long-established rule that “ ‘[wjhere there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail.’ ” Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195 (1992), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954). This is true “especially where the particular provision is later in time of enactment.” (Emphasis added.) Bowes, 3 Ill. 2d at 205; see also Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection District, 163 Ill. 2d 275, 282 (1994) (when choosing between two statutes in direct conflict, “the more recent enactment generally will prevail as the later expression of legislative intent”).
Traditionally, in determining which of two statutes is more specifically applicable to a particular matter, most courts have looked primarily to the nature of the plaintiffs cause of action and the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff. For example, in Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., this court held that the limitations period for acts or omissions relating to construction (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 13 — 214(a), (b)) is more specific than the limitations period for personal injury actions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13 — 202) because the former concerns only construction-related activities. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 196. Similarly, in Bertolis v. Community Unit School District No. 7, 283 Ill. App. 3d 874, 880 (1996), the appellate court determined that the limitations period for personal injury actions brought by minors that accrued during minority (735 ILCS 5/13— 211 (West 1994)) governed the plaintiffs claim because it more specifically addressed the plaintiff and the nature of the plaintiffs injury than section 8 — 101. Also, in Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook, 242 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442 (1993), the court held that the limitations period for actions brought against a body politic relating to acts or omissions in construction (735 ILCS 5/13 — 214(a) (West 1994)) is more specific than section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act because the statutory action against a body politic is restricted to claims arising from construction activities. See also, e.g., Walsh v. Barry-Harlem Corp., 272 Ill. App. 3d 418, 426 (1995) (holding section 13— 212(a), the statute of limitation at issue in the case at bar, to be more specifically applicable than the limitations period contained in the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1992)) because section 13 — 212(a) applies only to medical malpractice actions); Desai v. Chasnoff, 146 Ill. App. 3d 163, 167 (1986) (holding section 13 — 212(a) more specifically applicable than the limitations period in the Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1 — 101 et seq. (West 1992)) because the former applies only to a particular type of claim and the latter applies to all breaches of contracts for sale).
Applying this traditional, well-established analysis to the cause at bar, it is clear that section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is the statute which is more specifically applicable. Section 13 — 212(a) more narrowly defines the plaintiffs, their injuries, and the nature of their claims, specifying that the cause of action must involve damages for “injury or death *** arising out of patient care.” The provisions of section 13 — 212(a) stand in sharp contrast to the far broader and more generic language of section 8 — 101, which applies to a “civil action” for “any injury.”
The conclusion that section 13 — 212(a) is more specifically applicable to the cause at bar is further supported by the fact that section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted subsequent to- section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 13 — 212 was enacted in 1982 (735 ILCS Ann. 5/13 — 212, Historical & Statutory Notes, at 366 (Smith-Hurd 1992)), nearly two decades after section 8 — 101 was enacted in 1965 (745 ILCS Ann. 10/8 — 101, Historical & Statutory Notes, at 882 (Smith-Hurd 1993)).1 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. E.g., State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247 (1990). It is well established that in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, “[i]t is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full knowledge of all previous enactments.” Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d at 247-48; see also, e.g., DeGrand v. Motors Insurance Co., 146 Ill. 2d 521, 526 (1992); Spina v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 301 Ill. App. 3d 364, 376 (1998); Chicago Osteopathic Medical Centers v. City of Chicago, 271 Ill. App. 3d 165, 171-72 (1995). Inasmuch as section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted subsequent to section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act, we may, pursuant to well-settled rules of construction, presume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the limitation period in section 8 — 101, and may further presume that the legislature chose, in enacting section 13 — 212, to enlarge the period in which a cause of action may be brought against the specified defendants engaged in providing health services.
Applying these traditional rules of analysis, two panels of our appellate court, in Lanxon v. Magnus, 296 Ill. App. 3d 377 (1998), and Cleaver v. Marrese, 253 Ill. App. 3d 778 (1993), and one federal district court, in Murry v. Sheahan, 991 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1998), have considered the precise issue presented in the matter at bar. All three courts found section 13 — 212(a) to be more specific than section 8 — 101, and held that section 13 — 212(a) provided the applicable statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions against governmental entities and/or their employees.
Without explanation or citation to authority, the plurality departs from these long-established rules by shifting the focus of the specificity inquiry exclusively to the “nature of the defendants.” 188 Ill. 2d at 194. In so doing, the plurality obviates any assessment of the nature of the plaintiffs claim and the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff. Indeed, it is only by altering the focus of the analysis that the plurality can escape the conclusion that section 13 — 212(a) is the more specifically applicable statute to the matter at bar.
It is significant that the plurality provides no citation to any authority supporting its proposition that the specificity of a particular statute must be determined solely upon examination of the category of the defendants. Those courts which have considered the relevancy of the category of defendants covered under a particular statute have done so as part of the court’s overall specificity analysis. For example, in Wheatley v. Chicago Transit Authority, 289 Ill. App. 3d 60, 65 (1997), the appellate court found section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1994)) to be more specific than section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act because the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act is only applicable to personal injury claims and only applicable to claims against the CTA. See also Heneghan v. Sekula, 181 Ill. App. 3d 238, 242 (1989) (section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is more specifically applicable than the limitations period for contribution actions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 13 — 204) because section 13 — 212(a) applies to a specific type of claim and to a specific category of defendant). The plurality’s sole focus upon the category of defendants in determining a statute’s specificity appears unprecedented.
The plurality finds that section 8 — 101 controls because it “specifically applies to defendants which are local entities and the employees of those entities which are a more specific category of defendant within the broader group of any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital described in section 13 — 212(a).” 188 Ill. 2d at 195. Not only is the plurality’s analysis misdirected, but its logic is flawed. The critical inquiry is which of these two conflicting statutes is more specifically applicable to this particular cause of action, namely, plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims. I submit that section 13 — 212(a) controls, because it narrows, or makes more specific, the class of defendants as those individuals and entities directly involved in patient care. In contrast, section 8 — 101 sets forth an extremely broad category of defendants, and encompasses all governmental entities and their employees. Contrary to the plurality’s conclusion, the health care providers and hospitals governed by section 13 — 212(a) constitute a subset within the broader, all-encompassing “local government entity” category identified in section 8 — 101.
The plurality’s newly conceived approach in determining the specificity of conflicting statutory provisions needlessly upsets long-established principles and may result in uncertainty among members of the bench and bar regarding which analysis should be employed. Further, the plurality opinion leaves many questions unanswered: Is the category-of-defendants approach meant to completely replace the traditional rules of specificity analysis? The plurality decision appears to completely foreclose consideration of the nature of a plaintiffs claims and the type of injury sustained in determining the specificity of a statutory provision. If the plurality’s intention was only to supplement, rather than replace, the traditional modes of analysis, then when and under what circumstances is the defendant-category approach to be employed? The plurality opinion implies, but does not state, that this approach will be utilized when a provision of the Tort Immunity Act conflicts with another statute. If this is the intended rule, it would be beneficial to the bench and bar to make this clear.
In light of the overwhelming authority supporting the conclusion that section 13 — 212(a) is more specifically applicable to the claims at bar, there is considerable cause to question the basis of the plurality’s contrary decision. Review of the content of the plurality opinion reveals that, at its essence, this is a policy-driven decision aimed at achieving a particular result. The plurality’s conclusion that the one-year limitation period contained in section 8 — 101 is more specifically applicable to the matter at bar is supported, almost entirely, by reliance upon the legislative purpose in enacting the Tort Immunity Act. The plurality correctly observes that the purpose of the Act is to protect local public entities and their employees from liability arising from the operation of government, and, to this end, affords them greater protection than nongovernmental entities and their employees. The plurality also correctly notes that the purpose of the shorter limitations period in section 8 — 101 was to encourage early investigation into claims and to lessen the financial exposure of local government. Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2d 288, 293 (1976).
Important policy considerations may be attendant to decisions dealing with municipal liability under the Tort Immunity Act. However, in the matter at bar, the plurality misses the critical fact that applying the limitation period contained in section 13 — 212(a) to municipal hospitals and their employees would not adversely affect the public interests protected by the Act, especially by section 8 — 101. The plurality’s holding that section 8 — 101 more specifically applies does not serve to immunize local government defendants from medical malpractice liability, nor does the holding alter the standard of liability applicable to medical malpractice actions. The ruling serves only to limit the time within which any medical malpractice action for injuries against a municipal hospital or any of its employees may be brought. However, all statutes of limitation serve the primary purpose of preventing extended exposure to potential liability by encouraging early investigation into claims during a period when witnesses and other evidence are available and conditions have not materially changed. See Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450, 457-58 (1990). Therefore, the application of the two-year limitation period of section 13 — 212(a) to all medical malpractice actions would not undermine the intention of the legislature.
In its well-reasoned opinion in Lanxon v. Magnus, the appellate court outlined compelling policy interests militating against imposing the shorter time limitation of section 8 — 101 to medical malpractice actions. First, the court noted that due to the very nature of a medical malpractice claim, it is often not readily apparent to the injured party that he or she has a cause of action. Lanxon, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 383. In addition, medical malpractice actions usually involve complex issues which require compliance with certain requirements prior to the filing of the claim. For example, plaintiffs must obtain an affidavit from a physician (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622 (West 1996)) certifying that the plaintiff’s claim is meritorious. Lanxon, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 383. Finally, the Lanxon court noted that the fact that a facility is a municipal hospital may not be immediately apparent or known to an individual injured in such a facility. Therefore, it may not be known to an injured party, until it is too late, that the claim would be governed by a shorter statute of limitation due to the status of the hospital as a public entity. In sum, the court in Lanxon concluded that “[bjased upon the unique nature and procedural requirements of claims arising out of patient care, we find no reason to hold municipal hospitals to a lesser standard than any other hospital.” Lanxon, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 383. The court held that the two-year statute of limitation in section 13 — 212(a) should apply.
With some recognition of the fundamental flaws in the legal analysis employed in the plurality opinion, one of my colleagues, as a means of salvaging the result achieved in this case, has attempted to ameliorate the unfairness inherent in the decision. However, this also is of no avail. In his special concurrence, Justice Heiple acknowledges the plurality’s legal analysis is “unpersuasive *** to the extent that section 8 — 101 is more general than section 13 — 212(a).” Justice Heiple, citing to this court’s decision in Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 151 Ill. 2d 257, 266 (1992), attempts to defend the plurality’s result on the basis that section 8 — 101 presents “one of those instances where ‘the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.’ ” 188 Ill. 2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring). However, scrutiny of the Stone case reveals that the conclusion that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling in this instance is also unsupportable.
In Stone, this court addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff had to name the Director of Employment Security as a defendant in his complaint seeking judicial review of a decision finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits. Resolution of this issue required this court to interpret two different statutes: section 1100 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 520) and section 3 — 107 of the Administrative Review Law (the Review Law) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 — 107). Section 1100 of the Act provided that any decision made by the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security was reviewable only in accordance with the Review Law, and, further, that the Director shall be deemed to be a party to any action on judicial review. Section 3 — 107 of the Review Law provided that all persons who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall, for purposes of judicial review, be made defendants. In Stone, the plaintiff argued that because the Director was not a party to the proceedings before the administrative agency, plaintiff was not required to name the Director in his complaint for judicial review.
We began our analysis in Stone by noting that, “[a]s a starting point, we look for the intent of the legislature in the language of the statute.” Stone, 151 Ill. 2d at 261. Having concluded that the two statutes conflicted, this court observed that “ ‘[generally, specific statutory provisions control over general provisions on the same subject.’ ” Stone, 151 Ill. 2d at 266, quoting Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 57 (1990). However, this court held that “the more specific statute does not control where ‘it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.’ ” Stone, 151 Ill. 2d at 266, quoting 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 51.05, at 174 (5th ed. 1992). Examining the statutes at issue in that case, we observed that, pursuant to section 3 — 102 of the Review Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 — 102), the legislature specifically provided in the statute that the Review Law would take precedence over other statutory modes of review. Therefore, this court held that because the Review Law itself stated that when its provisions are expressly adopted no other statutory mode of review is to be employed, it was clear that the legislature did not intend that the Director be named in a complaint seeking judicial review of a Board decision. Stone, 151 Ill. 2d at 266-67. In the case at bar, unlike Stone, the legislature did not include explicit instructions within the statutory language of the Tort Immunity Act to determine precedence in the event of conflicting provisions.
Also, the Sutherland treatise on statutory construction provides that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with the subject more specifically, the latter will prevail, unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 51.05, at 174 (5th ed. 1992). Again, this rule supports the conclusion that section 13 — 212(a) should govern the matter at bar. As stated, not only is section 13 — 212(a) more specific than section 8 — 101, there also is no indication that the legislature intended that section 8 — 101 trump the two-year limitation period provided for medical malpractice actions in section 13 — 212(a).
In sum, I believe that section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is the more specifically applicable statute in the case before us. Contrary to the plurality, I believe, as does Justice Harrison, that Lanxon and Cleaver were correctly decided and should not be overruled. The judgment of the appellate court should be reversed in this matter.
JUSTICE RATHJE joins in, this dissent.
Although both statutes have been amended in recent years, the amendments did not remedy the conflict between these statutes as they relate to the limitations provisions for medical malpractice claims brought against municipal hospitals and/or their employees.