dissenting:
May Phillippart is dead because ADM’s driver, Howard Dobson, made the supremely careless decision to leave his tanker truck in a no-parking zone on a busy street by Springfield’s most dangerous intersection near 10 schools, including Phillippart’s, just as classes were letting out. Dobson had no compelling reason for parking where he did. The location just happened to be near his home, and he wanted to take a shower and make some phone calls.
There was no question as to the illegality of Dobson’s actions. He left his truck directly in front of a “No Parking” sign, which he admits that he saw and read. Nor was there any genuine issue as to the danger Dobson created. Expert testimony established that the vehicle presented a major obstruction to traffic and was a hazard to pedestrians who wanted to cross the street. This appraisal was supported by those present on the scene when Phillippart was fatally injured. For the motorists and pedestrians who were forced to maneuver past Dobson’s truck, the risks were readily apparent. From the materials before us, it appears that the only one oblivious to the danger was Dobson himself.
My colleagues’ decision to defy the jury’s verdict and exonerate Dobson and ADM is indefensible. Although it is true that Phillippart was jaywalking at the time she was struck, jaywalking does not strip a pedestrian of the law’s protection. Contrary to ADM’s contention, every motorist has a duty of care to pedestrians, notwithstanding the rights and responsibilities that may be imposed under other provisions of the Vehicle Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 11 — 1003.1. Consistent with this provision, the courts in Illinois have long recognized that a pedestrian is not barred from recovery as a matter of law for failing to cross a thoroughfare in a marked crosswalk. See Newton v. Meissner, 76 Ill. App. 3d 479, 490 (1979); Moore v. Checker Taxi Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 588, 591 (1971).
Plaintiffs theory was that Phillippart was justified in crossing outside of the marked crosswalk because the location of Dobson’s truck obscured her view of traffic and made use of the crosswalk unsafe. Although my colleagues draw a different conclusion based on the evidence, they misconstrue the facts. Contrary to their characterization, Phillippart’s view of traffic was not entirely obstructed at the point of her attempted crossing. Phillippart could still assess westbound traffic by looking around the front of Dobson’s truck, and that location actually provided a better view of the eastbound lanes than she would have had at the crosswalk. Under these circumstances, crossing the street at the front of the truck rather than behind it at the crosswalk was, on balance, the safest course for Phillippart to have taken. That is what the evidence showed and that is what the jury found. To the extent that Phillippart should have maintained a closer lookout before stepping into the traffic lane, her lack of due care was reflected in the jury’s apportionment of comparative fault. It is not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the jury’s. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1992).
If the jurors who heard and decided this case ever read the majority’s disposition, I feel certain that they will be as surprised as I was by what my colleagues have made of the facts and the law. Seeing their findings and conclusions so readily disregarded, they are apt to wonder why they even bothered to report for service. I cannot blame them. Their work, their attention, their adherence to the law have all been rendered meaningless, and for no legitimate reason.
ADM Trucking is a division of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, an international agribusiness, the self-styled “supermarket to the world.” Phillippart was a high school student. In focusing on Phillippart’s conduct rather than on the carelessness of ADM’s driver and his flagrant violation of the law, what the majority is ultimately saying is that a teenager should be held to a higher standard of care than a multinational corporatian. This perverse conception of justice has been expressed before. See, e.g., Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110 (1995). I still cannot accept it.
The majority’s position stems, I think, from an antiquated and misguided deference to the demands of private industry. Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that corporate enterprise must be given precedence over human welfare in order to flourish. If the success of Illinois commerce depends on enabling multinational corporations to maim and kill schoolchildren with impunity, we are lost.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.