This appeal arises out of a public lawsuit under IC 1971, 34-4-17-1 (Burns Code Ed.) brought by James D. McKesson for injunc-tive relief to prohibit the sale of General Obligation Bonds in the amount of $2,900,-000 for the construction of a new Porter County Fairgrounds Complex.
On February 19, 1980 a petition consisting of 89 counterparts proposing the issuance of the bonds was delivered to the Board of Commissioners of Porter County, and it was given to the Porter County Auditor for the purpose of certifying the signa-tors of the petition as owners of taxable real estate in Porter County, Indiana. On March 13, 1980 the Auditor executed her certification specifying that the petition consisted of 1,119 owners of real estate in Porter County. On March 17, 1980 the Board of Commissioners accepted the petition and certification and passed Resolution 80-7, recommending that the County Council of Porter County authorize an appropriation for the construction of the Fairgrounds Complex and finance it through the issuance of General Obligation Bonds in the amount of $2,900,000.
On April 8,1980 the Porter County Council held a public hearing, at which time citizens were given an opportunity to speak regarding the proposal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Porter County Council unanimously passed an Ordinance authorizing the additional appropriation and issuance of the bonds. A combined notice form was posted and published by the Auditor in the “Vidette Messenger” and “Porter County Herald” newspapers on April 17 and April 24, 1980.
On May 19, 1980 a remonstrance containing 34 counterparts was submitted to the Auditor which was against the issuance of the bonds. On May 27, 1980 additional counterparts of the remonstrance petition were submitted to the Auditor. On June 6, 1980 the Auditor certified that the remonstrance petition submitted on May 19, 1980 contained 896 signators who were owners of real property in Porter County. The Auditor refused certification of the counterparts filed on May 27, 1980, for the reason that they were not timely filed pursuant to IC 1971, 6-1.1-20^1 (Burns 1978 Repl.).
At the meeting of the Porter County Council on June 24, 1980, the Auditor’s certification of the remonstrance petition was presented to the Council. At that meeting, McKesson filed verified objections to the Auditor’s certification of both sets of petitions. The Council unanimously passed Resolution 80-5 stating that the certification was received and accepted, and declaring the remonstrance to be insufficient to prevent further proceedings toward the issuance of the bonds.
On June 13,1980 the Auditor’s certificate regarding the additional appropriation of $2,900,000 was sent to the State Board of Tax Commissioners along with the petition of the Auditor requesting approval of the issuance of Porter County’s “Building Bonds of 1980” in the amount of $2,900,000.
*424A hearing was held by the State Board of Tax Commissioners for the approval of these requests. On July 8, 1980 the additional appropriation was formally approved by Order No. 80641633A and the issuance of Building Bonds was approved by Order No. 80641633. On September 2 and 9, 1980 the Board of Commissioners of Porter County published notice that a sale of the bonds would take place on September 29, 1980.
On September 12, 1980 McKesson filed suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent the sale of the bonds. On September 26, 1980 the Porter Superior Court, by the Honorable Bruce W. Douglas, issued a temporary injunction blocking the bond sale and ordered the Auditor to perform a recount of signatures on the proponents’ petition and upon all counterparts of the remonstrance. On October 16, 1980 the rechecking process was completed by the Auditor and the result was filed with the court. As a result of the rechecking, the number of names the Auditor found to be certifiable on the proponents' petition amounted to 1,354 and the number of certifiable names on the petition of the remonstrators amounted to 1,087.
On October 28, 1980 the Honorable Bruce W. Douglas issued an order permanently enjoining the issuance of the bonds for the construction of the Porter County Fairgrounds Complex and any further proceedings thereon until May 27, 1981. Judge Douglas based his order on his findings that no evidence was presented as to whether or not notice was posted in three public places, as required by law, and that an additional 267 signatures certifiable on the remonstrance counterparts filed May 27,1980 plus 40 certifiable signatures from remonstrance counterparts the Auditor had disqualified, should in fact, be added to the sum of remonstrance signators bringing the total to 1,394.
The issues raised in this appeal are as follows:1
(1)whether the trial court erred in finding that notice had not been posted pursuant to law by the Auditor;
(2) whether the trial court erred in finding that the counterparts to the remonstrance petition filed on May 27, 1980, were timely filed and the certifiable names contained therein should be counted toward the total; and
(3) whether the trial court erred in finding that 40 certifiable signatures from remonstrance counterparts which had been disqualified by the Auditor should be counted toward the total.
We find that the trial court did err in each issue presented on appeal and the order of the trial court granting the permanent injunction should be reversed.
In his order of October 28, 1980 Judge Douglas found as follows:
“That Indiana Code 6-1.1-20 — 4 also re-queres [sic] that the Notice be posted in three public places in the political sub-division which decides to issue the bonds. There has been no evidence submitted to the Court to show that this Notice was posted, nor to show, if it was posted, when it was posted. Owners of property that may wish to remonstrate also have thirty (30) days to remonstrate from the time the Notice was posted. There being no evidence in this case concerning the posting, the Court must rule against the Defendants on this particular point for only the Defendants would know if and when the Notice was posted.
“For these two reasons, either one of which would be sufficient, the Court does now consider the remonstrating petitions filed May 27, 1980, as timely filed.”
It is true that no evidence was presented by either party tending to prove that notice was posted in three public places. No evidence was presented concerning posting for the simple reason that posting was never at issue in this case.
The complaint filed by McKesson on September 12, 1980, stated as follows:
“8. That Notices of the Determination to Issue Bonds were prepared, posted and published which were intended to give *425notice to both those who might object to such action and to those who might wish to remonstrate against such action, which notices were published as a single advertisement in the Vidette Messenger and The Porter County Herald, said publications being on April 17, 1980, and April 24, 1980.” (Emphasis added.)
McKesson again stated in his affidavit in support of complaint for injunction:
“13. That the notice given was posted and prepared two (2) times... . ” (Emphasis added.)
The defendants in their answer to the complaint fully admitted rhetorical paragraph 8 of the complaint. Where a fact has been expressly admitted by the pleadings, it need not be proven. O’Neal v. Deveny (1963), 135 Ind.App. 446, 194 N.E.2d 413; Walters v. Cantner (1945), 223 Ind. 263, 60 N.E.2d 138. In Rimer v. Stanz (1951), 122 Ind.App. 178, at 185, 101 N.E.2d 428, at 431, this Court said:
“Admissions made in a pleading are denominated solemn admissions or admissions in judicio, and are not required to be supported by evidence. Such admissions are taken as true against the party making them without further controversy. “In fact, admissions in the pleadings cannot be either proved or disproved on the trial, but must be accepted for whatever they amount to in legal effect, without reference to any other evidence that may be adduced.”
Even if the issue of posting had been disputed at trial the trial court, in its finding, placed the burden of proof upon the wrong party. The burden of proof would have been upon McKesson to show that the requisite posting was not done. Kinzel et al. v. Rettinger et a1. (1972), 151 Ind.App. 119, 227 N.E.2d 913. In the present case, McKesson presented no evidence at trial pertaining to the posting of notice, or lack thereof.
Therefore, it is contrary to law for the trial court to place the burden of proof regarding posting on the defendants. It is also contrary to law for the trial court to base its order for a permanent injunction on the finding that no evidence was presented at trial on an issue which was admitted in the pleadings and not in dispute. On this issue, the trial court is reversed.
Judge Douglas also found that the remonstrance counterparts filed on May 27, 1980, were timely filed and should have been certified by the Auditor.
The combined notice form was published first on April 17, 1980 and again on April 24,1980. On May 27,1980 the attempt was made to submit additional counterparts of the remonstrance petition. The Auditor refused certification of those counterparts for the reason that they were not filed within 30 days of the first publication date. In so doing, the Auditor was correct.
The notice which was published, made no mention of a 30-day-time limitation for filing remonstrances. Rather, it stated:
“Remonstrances against the issuance of said bonds may be filed with the County Auditor by owners of taxable real estate in said County in the manner and within the time provided by I.C. 6-1.1 — 20-[4].”
Therefore, any taxpayer would have to refer to the statute to find the 30-day-time limitation for filing his remonstrance. That same statute explicitly says that only one notice need be published.
The published notice also advises taxpayers that objections may be made pursuant to IC 1971, 6-1.1-20-5. Again, they would have to refer to the appropriate statute and that statute would put them on notice that publication must occur twice.
McKesson was well aware of the dual purpose of the notice since he admits in paragraph 8 of his complaint that the notices published were intended to give notice to both those who might object to the action and to those who might wish to remonstrate against the action. Therefore he must have been aware of the dual publication. Yet, he was put on notice that the remonstrance provision of the statute required only one publication, and should have known the 30 days would run from the date of the required publication.
*426In this case, the Auditor published more notice than was necessary for compliance with IC 1971, 6-1.1-20-4, but that does not change the tolling of the filing limitation. As this Court has expressed before, there is a great need for finality. Manner of Annexation, etc. (1978), Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 481. If this Court were to decide otherwise, the process could be continued ad infinitum.
The trial court’s ruling being in error, the 267 certified signatures on the May 27 remonstrating petitions, should be deducted from the total, causing the remonstrance to be insufficient.
Upon finding that his ruling allowing the 267 certified signatures on the May 27 remonstrance counterparts to be added to the total, brought the total to 1,354, a sum which tied the number of qualified signatures in favor of the bond issue, Judge Douglas proceeded to go even further with his order. The Porter County Auditor refused to certify the names on page 2 of Remonstrance Counterpart 14, pages 1 and 2 of Remonstrance Counterpart 19 and Remonstrance Counterpart 32A. Yet, the trial court ordered the certifiable names contained in those counterparts to be added to the sum, bringing the total to 1,394, and defeating the petition of the proponents.
McKesson alleges that this Court is at a disadvantage due to the fact that this appeal is based upon a partial transcript. However, this Court finds itself at no disadvantage, since we have before us the same evidence the Auditor had before her in making her certification decisions.
In his order of September 26, 1980, the trial judge found that the standards used by the Auditor in carrying out her duty of certification were sufficient. He then ordered her to re-evaluate and recertify both the petitions for the bond issue and the remonstrances. At that time he gave her criteria to follow in completing the task. Yet, in his order of October 28, 1980, he took it upon himself to change her certification results. The law of restricted judicial interference seems well and properly settled, yet it was not followed in the case at hand. Public Service Comm. v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co. (1953), 232 Ind. 332, 112 N.E.2d 751.
Page 2 of Remonstrance Counterpart 14 was contained within Remonstrance Counterpart 9. However, the verification affidavit attached to Counterpart 9 stated that it was to verify Counterpart 9 and made no mention of verifying page 2 of Counterpart 14.
The same situation occurred with respect to Remonstrance Counterpart 13. Pages 1 and 2 of Counterpart 19 were attached to page 1 of Counterpart 13. However, the attached verification affidavit stated that it was to verify Counterpart 13 and made no mention of verifying pages 1 and 2 of Counterpart 19.
IC 1971, 6-1.1-20-3 requires that each petition be “verified under oath." “Verification” is defined in Indiana case law as including both the actual swearing to the truth of the statements by the subscriber and also the certification thereto by the notary. Gossard v. Vawter (1939), 215 Ind. 581, 21 N.E.2d 416.
It is clear that since no verification affidavit referred to page 2 of Counterpart 14 or pages 1 and 2 of Counterpart 19, these counterparts were not properly verified pursuant to the statute and the names on those pages should not have been counted toward the total.
The Auditor also refused to certify the names on Remonstrance Counterpart 32,2 on the grounds that they were not properly verified. The trial court admitted these names, saying that the document did not need to be notarized.
As discussed previously, the statute required the petitions to be verified. In Indiana, this means both the actual swearing to the truth of the statements by the subscriber and also the certification by a notary or other officer authorized by law to administer oaths. The actual jurat on Counterpart *42732 bears no signature identifying the notary public. The jurat on the affidavit in question was insufficient for its purpose. Gossard, supra; Pappas v. State (1979), Ind. App., 386 N.E.2d 718.
Therefore, the trial court’s finding was contrary to law and the Auditor was correct in denying the certification of the names contained in Remonstrance Counterpart 32, since they were not properly verified.
The 40 names which Judge Douglas added to the total of the remonstrators, were added improperly and should be deleted. Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument, he had been correct in ruling that the counterparts filed on May 27, 1980 were timely filed, which they were not, the remonstrance still fails. For such a result would bring both totals to 1,354 names; a tie. IC 1971, 6-1.1-20-4 requires a greater number of owners of taxable real property to sign a remonstrance in order to defeat the proposal. In this case, they would be one signature short.
Reversible error being present, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants-appellants.
Reversed and remanded.
GARRARD, J., concurs. STATON, J., concurs in result with opinion.. The issues have been restated in a more efficient order.
. This counterpart is referred to as 32A in the order and the briefs filed. However, the record shows it as 32, with the unexplained notation of (32A) in the lower right hand comer.