¶ 54. {dissenting). This case highlights a gap in our sentencing structure. The legislature provided that consecutive sentences of parole should be treated as one continuous period for pre-TIS cases. Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3). It likewise provided that consecutive sentences of extended supervision should be treated as one continuous period in TIS cases. Wis. Stat. § 302.113(4). However, a gap in the statutory scheme, created by a Governor's veto, leaves the statutes silent in regards to the hybrid situation presented in this case: how pre-TIS parole and TIS extended supervision are to be treated when the sentences are consecutive.
*406¶ 55. At first blush, the majority's approach appears acceptable. After all, what the parties need is to fill the gap. They need an answer and the majority has provided just that.
¶ 56. I cannot join the majority, however, because the statute is silent and the answer that the majority provides (1) is clearly contrary to legislative history; (2) may result in illegal sentences in excess of the statutory maximum; and (3) exposes defendants to serving longer periods behind bars upon revocation, contrary to a basic rule of construction for penal statutes.
I — I
¶ 57. The majority recognizes that the statutes are silent as to whether consecutive sentences of pre-TIS parole and TIS extended supervision are to be served as one continuous period. Majority op., ¶ 39. It also recognizes that the language of Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3) changed from the general requirement that "[a]ll consecutive sentences shall be computed as one continuous sentence" to the narrower requirement that "[a]ll consecutive sentences imposed for crimes committed before December 31,1999, shall be computed as one continuous sentence." Majority op., ¶ 46. It reasons that the use of the phrase "one continuous sentence" in both versions of the statute, together with the statutory silence, makes it reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended that consecutive sentences of parole and extended supervision should be viewed as one continuous period. Majority op., ¶ 47. Further, it reasons that Governor McCallum's veto message indicates an intent that supports the majority's conclusion. Majority op., ¶ 48.
*407¶ 58. The majority's view ignores the clear legislative history indicating that parole and extended supervision were intended to be treated as distinct periods. As passed by the legislature, 2001 Wis. Act 109 ("Act") did not leave a gap in the statutory scheme. Rather, it provided that § 973.15(2m)(c)2. would read:
2. If a court provides that a determinate sentence is to run consecutive to an indeterminate sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period of confinement in prison under the determinate sentence consecutive to the period of confinement in prison under the indeterminate sentence and the parole portion of the indeterminate sentence consecutive to the term of extended supervision under the determinate sentence.
2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142 (emphasis added).
¶ 59. Further, it provided that § 973.15(2m)(d)2. would read:
2. If a court provides that an indeterminate sentence is to run consecutive to a determinate sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period of confinement in prison under the indeterminate sentence consecutive to the period of confinement in prison under the determinate sentence and the parole portion of the indeterminate sentence consecutive to the term of extended supervision under the determinate sentence.
Id. (emphasis added). The underlined language, which ultimately was not included in § 973.15(2m), indicates that the legislature intended that in hybrid cases parole would be served consecutive to extended supervision, regardless of which sentence was handed down first.
¶ 60. The language of 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142 reflects the recommendations of the Criminal Penalties Study Committee (CPSC), which addressed the treat*408ment of consecutive determinate and indeterminate sentences. In its final report, the CPSC recommended that regardless of the order in which sentences are handed down, all confinement time should he served together, and extended supervision should always precede parole. It based this recommendation on the ground that extended supervision was intended to be stricter than parole. The report provides:
The committee recommends that in either sequence (indeterminate sentence followed by determinate sentence, or determinate followed by indeterminate), and regardless of whether the sentences are run concurrent with or consecutive to each other, all confinement time should be served together, either concurrently or consecutively in whatever sequence ordered by the courts; and extended supervision should always precede any parole time. This recommendation is based in the Committee's conclusion that [extended] supervision will involve stricter community supervision than currently available through parole.
Criminal Penalties Study Comm., Final Report on 1997 Wis. Act 283, Truth In Sentencing, at 102 (Aug. 31, 1999).
¶ 61. The CPSC clearly viewed parole and extended supervision as having important differences, and that it made a difference which was to be served first. By following the CPSC's recommendation that parole follow extended supervision in hybrid cases, the legislature agreed that parole and extended supervision had important differences.
¶ 62. Despite the CPSC's recommendation and the legislation reflecting that recommendation, Governor McCallum vetoed the language in the Act providing that parole should follow extended supervision in consecutive determinate and indeterminate sentences. In *409his veto message, he notes that the consecutive periods of parole and extended supervision are to be served in the order that the sentences are imposed.
I am partially vetoing these provisions because they needlessly complicate existing procedures and place an administrative burden on the Department of Corrections that could lead to increased errors in sentence calculation and offender litigation. Consecutive sentences are currently served in the order they are handed down from the court, which means parole is generally served before extended supervision. These provisions require that when sentences are to be served consecutively, sentences with extended supervision are served first. If an offender has a sentence with a parole provision and receives a consecutive sentence with an extended supervision provision, the extended supervision must be served first, requiring the shifting of the dates for serving the first sentence. The dates for serving all other sentences will need to be adjusted, resulting in an increased potential for errors and litigation if an offender is held longer than the sentence that was imposed.
Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs 02-2 (Supplement): Executive Vetoes of Bills Passed by the 2001 Wisconsin Legislature from May 3, 2002, through August 16, 2002, August 2002, at 54.
¶ 63. Nothing in Governor McCallum's veto message can be construed as intending that consecutive sentences of parole and extended supervision are to be served as a single continuous period. Rather, the intention is clear that consecutive sentences of parole and extended supervision should be served, one after the other, in the order that they are handed down. As the court of appeals notes, the Governor's veto message contemplates that the periods are distinct, such that "parole is generally served before extended supervision."
*410¶ 64. Nevertheless, the majority ignores the clear legislative history and determines that this gap, this utter silence, somehow makes it reasonable to view consecutive sentences of parole and extended supervision as one continuous period. Majority op., ¶ 47.
¶ 65. I disagree with the majority's view that the Governor's veto message regarding the order in which consecutive periods of parole and extended supervision are served demonstrates "an intention not to change the practice of how consecutive sentences were then being handled." Majority op., ¶ 48. It is correct that the message demonstrates an intention not to change the practice regarding the order in which consecutive sentences are served. However, the Governor's statement that parole is generally served before (rather than continuous with) extended supervision illustrates that he understood that the periods are distinct.
¶ 66. In sum, the statutes are silent on whether to treat parole and extended supervision as distinct or continuous. The CPSC viewed consecutive sentences of parole and extended supervision as distinct and the legislature passed a bill that reflected the CPSC's view that the periods were distinct. Additionally, the Governor's veto message supports the view that the periods are distinct. Such a record cannot support the majority's interpretation that there was any intention that parole and extended supervision were to be treated as one continuous period in cases such as this.1
*411r-H f — ( HH
¶ 67. It is not simply the legislative history that leads me to diverge from the majority's view. I am particularly concerned that the majority's interpretation may expose defendants to illegal sentences. If a court imposes a sentence in excess of the maximum authorized by law, it is an illegal sentence. Wis. Stat. § 973.13. Although this case does not represent an illegal sentence, the majority's analysis allows for illegal sentences in other cases. Let me explain.
¶ 68. Suppose a defendant has a pre-TIS sentence and a TIS sentence to he served consecutively (as here). Further suppose that on his pre-TIS case, the defendant was sentenced to three years incarceration and five years parole. In his TIS case, he is convicted of burglary and is sentenced to a determinate sentence of seven years confinement and five years extended supervision. Burglary is a Class F felony with a maximum imprisonment (confinement plus extended supervision) of 12.5 years.
¶ 69. The law of course provides that periods of incarceration and confinement, even though they may be imposed as consecutive sentences, are to be served as one continuous period. Wis. Stat. §§ 973.15(2m)(c)2. and (d)2. All agree with this premise. Where we part ways is that the majority interprets the gap in the statutory scheme to allow for pre-TIS parole and TIS supervision, even though imposed consecutively, to be served as one continuous period.
¶ 70. In the majority's view, when a person is released from the confinement portion of a determinate sentence served consecutively with an indeterminate sentence, he or she is automatically on extended super*412vision. Majority op., ¶ 42. Thus, a person serving consecutive periods of parole and extended supervision will be on extended supervision from the moment he or she is released from confinement and will finish serving extended supervision at the moment he or she completes both parole and extended supervision.
¶ 71. In other words, in the above hypothetical, the continuous period of extended supervision could be up to ten years (five years of parole plus five years extended supervision). Allowing for extended supervision for up to ten years, in addition to the period of confinement of seven years, would result in a sentence that is far in excess of the statutory maximum for a Class F Felony (12.5 years). The net result of the majority's analysis is that in many instances treating the period of extended supervision as continuous with the period of parole will result in illegal sentences.
IV
¶ 72. Even if the majority opinion is contrary to clear legislative history, and may result in illegal sentences, what difference does it make whether parole and extended supervision are two separate periods or combined into one continuous period of supervision? After all, the total length of combined sentences will remain the same.
¶ 73. What difference does it make that in August 2001, when Thomas was released from prison,2 he was placed solely on parole to be followed by a consecutive period of extended supervision rather than being placed on both at the same time?
*413¶ 74. The difference in result lies in the fact that if he was not placed on extended supervision upon release from prison, then his extended supervision could not have been revoked when he was taken into custody on February 2, 2004, due to an alleged parole violation. If parole and extended supervision are two separate consecutive periods, then his extended supervision had not yet commenced.
¶ 75. As a consequence, if he were serving only parole at the time of revocation, then the period of exposure to being placed behind bars is far less than if he were serving one continuous period of parole and extended supervision. At oral argument, the State made the representation that at the time of revocation Thomas had two years, 15 days left to serve on his parole. Thus, the potential exposure for prison time based solely on revocation of parole was two years, 15 days. In contrast, he had eight years remaining on his extended supervision at the time of the February 2, 2004, revocation. If parole and extended supervision are treated as one continuous period, then his potential for prison time upon revocation is increased by an additional eight years.
¶ 76. The interpretation of the majority, which provides for greater potential time served behind bars upon revocation, is not only contrary to the clear legislative history but is also contraiy to a basic rule of construction regarding penal statutes. It is fundamental that "[p]enal statutes are generally construed strictly to safeguard a defendant's rights unless doing so would contravene the legislative purpose of a statute." State v. Baye, 191 Wis. 2d 334, 340, 528 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1995). Reading the requirement that consecutive sentences of parole and extended supervision should be *414treated as one continuous period into a statutory gap violates this precept.
V
¶ 77. In sum, because the majority opinion ignores clear legislative history, may often result in sentences in excess of the statutory maximum, and subjects defendants to greater periods of confinement contrary to a basic rule of construction for penal statutes, I cannot join the majority.
¶ 78. Rather, I would determine that Thomas, who was serving consecutive sentences, was serving parole and had not yet been released to extended supervision. He therefore could not have had his extended supervision revoked under Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(am). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 79. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.
The majority also relies on the continued vitality of Ashford v. Division of Hearings and Appeals, 177 Wis. 2d 34, 501 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1993), for its determination. Majority op., ¶ 47. I do not dispute the holding of Ashford. Rather, Ashford concerned the treatment of consecutive periods of parole that, according to the statute, were to be treated as one continuous sentence. Id. at 39-40. Here, the statute is silent as *411to how to treat periods of parole served consecutively with periods of extended supervision. Thus, Ashford is inapplicable.
Thomas was released after having served in the Challenge Incarceration Program. Neither party contends that his participation in that program or its effect on his sentence bears upon the legal issues presented.