(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent as to part of the majority opinion. While I agree with most of what the majority holds, I disagree with its conclusion that the answers of appellants Brown-Wilbert, Inc., and Christopher Chandler Brown (Brown-Wilbert) to the interrogatories of respondents Copeland Buhl & Company and Lee Harren (Accountants) were not sufficient to meet the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 544.42, subds. 2, 4 (2006). The specific details in Brown-Wilbert’s complaint citing the Accountants’ allegedly improper actions, together with the information in Brown-Wilbert’s timely answers to the Accountants’ interrogatories, which answers explicitly cross-referenced the complaint, provide a sufficient basis to conclude that Brown-Wilbert is entitled to have 60 additional days to cure any deficiencies in its efforts to meet the requirements of section 544.42, subdivision 2. Therefore, I would reverse *226the district court’s dismissal of Brown-Wilbert’s accounting malpractice count.
To provide context to my reasons for dissenting, a short review of the salient parts of the procedural history of the litigation is in order. This action stems from an earlier dispute between appellant Christopher Chandler Brown and his father, Jerry Brown, over the ownership of Brown-Wilbert, Inc. Christopher Brown eventually settled with his father in that dispute and became the sole owner of Brown-Wilbert, Inc. On March 10, 2004, Brown-Wilbert, Inc., and Christopher Brown initiated this action against the accounting firm of Copeland Buhl & Company and Lee Harren, one of the firm’s partners. At issue in the underlying action is whether the Accountants, who were employed by Brown-Wilbert, Inc., improperly sided with Jerry Brown in the latter’s attempt to “squeeze” Christopher Brown out of any ownership interest in Brown-Wilbert, Inc.
Brown-Wilbert’s complaint against the Accountants included four separate claims — (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) accounting malpractice, and (4) restitution of fees paid. No counsel’s affidavit of expert review accompanied the complaint, nor did Brown-Wilbert claim it could not obtain expert review before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the Accountants did not assert the lack of this first affidavit as an affirmative defense in their answer. The Accountants, however, did assert that Christopher Brown’s release of and agreement to indemnify his father Jerry Brown against any claims made by the Accountants barred any suit by Christopher Brown against them.
On May 18, 2004, the Accountants served Brown-Wilbert with interrogatories, including an interrogatory asking Brown-Wilbert to:
Set forth the following for each person whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial: (a) State the expert’s name, professional or business address and the employer’s name; (b) State the expert’s area of expertise and the basis for that expertise; (c) Provide a list of the expert’s publications, papers and treatises, speeches, lectures and seminars; (d) State the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; (e) State the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; (f) Give a summary of the individual grounds for each opinion; and (g) Set forth the author, publisher, title and date of publication of each learned treatise upon which the expert will rely in testimony.
The interrogatory did not specifically demand a counsel’s affidavit of expert review and did not reference the requirements contained in section 544.42.
Brown-Wilbert answered the interrogatories within 31 days — on June 18 — and in its answers identified two expert witnesses it had retained. The answers stated that each expert was expected to testify “as to the conclusions set forth in the Complaint, based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint,” and attached curriculum vitae for each expert. One vitae showed it had been e-mailed to Brown-Wilbert’s counsel on February 27, 2004 — about two weeks before service of the complaint — and the other had been printed out on June 17, 2004.
The Accountants did not object to Brown-Wilbert’s interrogatory answers as being deficient nor did they move to compel Brown-Wilbert to supplement its answers; rather, the Accountants waited until September 21, 2004, 195 days after service of the complaint, and then moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that Brown-Wilbert had failed to comply with *227section 544.42. Because more than 180 days had elapsed since the service of the complaint, the Accountants argued that Brown-Wilbert’s failure to serve the 180-day affidavit of expert identification (second affidavit) as required by section 544.42, subdivision 2(2), could not be cured. The Accountants also asserted that in their May 18 interrogatories they had made a demand on Brown-Wilbert for the first affidavit — counsel’s affidavit of expert review — required by section 544.42, subdivision 2(1), and that Brown-Wilbert had failed to respond to this demand. On October 15, 2004, a date within 60 days of the Accountants’ motion to dismiss, Brown-Wilbert supplied an affidavit of its counsel, attesting that the allegations of the complaint had been reviewed by the two experts and purporting to set out the opinions to which the experts were expected to testify.
The district court found that the Accountants’ May 18 interrogatory constituted a demand for counsel’s affidavit of expert review — the first affidavit. The court found that Brown-Wilbert did not provide the required first affidavit until October 15, 2004, which was outside the 60-day cure period provided for in the statute. Based on this finding, the court, apparently believing that each count of Brown-Wilbert’s complaint required expert testimony, dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
In addition to its dismissal based upon the first affidavit, the district court went on to state that Brown-Wilbert’s June 18 answers to interrogatories could not constitute the required second affidavit because they “fail to identify the experts, state their opinions, and state the basis of these opinions as required by statute.” The court also concluded that the October 15, 2004, affidavit of counsel could not satisfy the second affidavit requirement because the October 15 affidavit was served more than 180 days after the complaint was served. The court did not decide the effect of the release between Christopher Brown and his father. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, but it did affirm the dismissal of the accounting malpractice claim.
Our court has now held that the district court erred when it concluded that the Accountants’ May 18 interrogatories constituted a demand for the first affidavit and we have concluded that no such demand was made until the Accountants’ September 21, 2004, motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we have concluded that Brown-Wilbert’s October 15, 2004, affidavit of expert review was timely and Brown-Wilbert’s failure to provide this first affidavit cannot constitute the basis for a dismissal. I agree with this result.
But I disagree with the result of the next step of the majority’s analysis. More particularly, I disagree with how the majority answers the question of what are the standards for the second affidavit, i.e., what information is sufficient to minimally satisfy the statute’s 180-day requirement and thus entitle a plaintiff to a notice of any deficiencies and an additional 60 days to meet the statutory requirement. Here, the majority rejects a meaningful good faith attempt standard, which standard was articulated by the federal district court — albeit in dicta — in House v. Kelbel, 105 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1053 (D.Minn.2000). Instead, the majority adopts a very narrow standard that is designed only to avoid “the dismissal of meritorious claims over minor technicalities.” (Emphasis added.)
I conclude that there is great potential for unfairness and unduly harsh results that will follow the implementation of the majority’s narrow standard. Here, I can only repeat what I said in Lindberg v. *228Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572 (Minn.1999), a case involving medical malpractice actions and the affidavit requirements of Minn.Stat. § 145.682 (1998). In Lindberg, I noted that
the majority fails to acknowledge our direction in Sorenson for courts to use measures less drastic than procedural dismissal in those borderline cases where there has been some meaningful disclosure and there is an absence of prejudice. See Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.1990). It is important that we continue to acknowledge there are borderline cases where the application of the statute will not be uncomplicated and unambiguous and where the border will be indeterminate rather than sharp and clean. In those cases, we must continue to evaluate the degree of prejudice caused by inadequate disclosures and in those borderline cases where prejudice is absent, apply less drastic alternatives than procedural dismissal. This approach preserves “the primary objective of the law [] to dispose of cases on the merits.” Id. at 192.
Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 579 (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring).
In Lindberg, we dismissed the plaintiffs medical malpractice action; but I find it interesting and instructive that after we decided Lindberg and, seven months later, reached a similar result in Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843 (Minn.2000), the legislature passed a 60-day curative provision for medical malpractice actions that is similar to the curative provision contained in Minn.Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6 (2006). See Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 403, § 1, 2002 Minn. Laws. 1706, 1706-07 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6 (2006)). I interpret this legislative action and the parallel existence of section 544.42, subdivision 6, as a sure sign that the statutory provision for a curative supplemental affidavit exists not only to address “minor technicalities,” but rather to effectuate legislative intent and judicial policy to dispose of cases on their merits. I believe the legislative action is an acknowledgment and acceptance of our admonition in Sor-enson that courts are to consider and utilize less drastic alternatives than dismissal when a plaintiff has identified experts and given some meaningful disclosure of the expert’s testimony. Accordingly, by applying a meaningful good faith standard, I would conclude that Brown-Wilbert is entitled to submit a supplemental affidavit under section 544.42, subdivision 6; that it has done so with its October 15, 2004, affidavit; and that this case should be remanded to the district court for a decision on its merits.
The result that I would reach does not, however, completely allay my concerns with the majority’s holding. Even applying its narrow standard, I conclude that, as applied to the facts here, the majority’s holding is too harsh. I conclude that, even when using the standard articulated by the majority, Brown-Wilbert is entitled to relief. Moreover, the result reached by the majority of our court today provides a good example of why the majority’s standard as applied will result in the harsh results I alluded to earlier.
I agree with the majority’s position that Brown-Wilbert has not fully complied with section 544.42, subdivision 4, but I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Brown-Wilbert’s answers to the interrogatories with their cross-reference to the complaint do not sufficiently identify an “accounting standard of care, state how Accountants deviated from that standard of care, or allege how that deviation caused injury.” While Brown-Wilbert’s complaint may not be held up as a model for good pleading, it is factual, detailed, often read*229ing like a novel, and quite explicit in its articulation of what the Accountants allegedly did wrong and how they acted improperly.
More particularly, Brown-Wilbert’s complaint alleges that the Accountants:
(1) did not bring critical issues to the attention of Christopher Brown;
(2) did not act independently and acted contrary to the interests of Brown-Wilbert’s majority stockholder — Christopher Brown;
(3) improperly singled out Christopher Brown for investigation in order to “squeeze Chris out of [Brown-Wilbert]”;
(4) improperly favored the interests of Jerry Brown;
(5) were complicit with Jerry Brown in permitting Jerry Brown to improperly convert corporate assets for his own use;
(6) assisted the improper activities of Jerry Brown, overlooked key facts when conducting annual audits, and did not disclose those key facts to Christopher Brown;
(7) conspired with Jerry Brown to force Christopher Brown into insolvency so Christopher Brown would be forced to sell his interest in Brown-Wilbert, Inc.;
(8) provided Christopher Brown with inaccurate and misleading financial data and other information in an effort to get Christopher Brown to sell to Jerry Brown at a low price;
(9) joined with Jerry Brown in denying Christopher Brown access to corporate documents and changing the locks to the Brown-Wilbert building so that Christopher Brown was “locked out of his company”;
(10) in essence, improperly advised Christopher Brown that he had “resigned his position as President of [Brown-Wilbert]” which would trigger application of the terms of a buy-sell agreement;
(11) “threatened” Christopher Brown with adverse financial consequences if he did not accept Jerry Brown’s buyout offer;
(12) withheld corporate information that was essential for Christopher Brown to make any buyout decision;
(13) although prohibited by several corporate documents, arranged with Jerry Brown to replace one bank with another bank as Brown-Wilbert, Inc.’s, prime lender; then used the refinancing arrangement in an effort to force Christopher Brown to make an early repayment of an “off balance sheet” loan; and then promised the new bank, without Christopher Brown’s knowledge or consent, that Christopher Brown’s interest in Brown-Wilbert, Inc., would be bought out or, in the alternative, Christopher Brown would pledge his shares in Brown-Wilbert, Inc., to the new bank;
(14) provided Christopher Brown with inaccurate and misleading information, overstated the amounts owed by Christopher Brown to Brown-Wilbert by almost $60,000, and manipulated documentation relating to Christopher Brown’s corporate debt;
(15) acted as if it was part of Brown-Wilbert’s management team with Jerry Brown despite the “duties the Accountants owed to Chris as [Brown-Wilbert’s] majority shareholder”;
(16) “led the way in mismanaging [Brown-Wilbert]” and did so in the form of “excess expenses, increased leverage, lost profits, and lost value” in an amount to be proven at trial;
(17) improperly accepted personal payments from Jerry Brown;
(18) made false statements in court that adversely affected Christopher Brown’s interests;
*230(19) accepted forged documents and utilized them to the detriment of Christopher Brown; and
(20) had a duty to Brown-Wilbert and its majority shareholder Christopher Brown and breached that duty, which breach constituted a breach of the standard of care expected of accountants in similarly-situated metropolitan areas.
Brown-Wilbert then answered the Accountants’ May 18 interrogatories as follows:
Set forth the following for each person whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial:
(a) State the expert’s name, professional or business address and the employer’s name;
Rob Tautges, Tautges Redpath, Ltd., * * * William R. Legier, Le-gier & Materne * * *
(b) State the expert’s area of expertise and the basis for that expertise; Both experts are Certified Public Accountants, among other things. Mr. Legier is also a Certified Fraud Examiner. See the curriculum vitae and related materials for each attached hereto.
(c) Provide a list of the expert’s publications, papers and treatises, speeches, lectures and seminars;
For a partial list, see the attached documents. Plaintiffs will supplement this Answer as necessary. Discovery is continuing.
(d) State the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; Both experts have been recently retained. Mr. Tautges’ firm, Tautges Redpath, Ltd., serves as the current Certified Public Accountant for Brown-Wilbert, Inc. Both experts are expected to testify as to the conclusions set forth in the Complaint, based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiffs will supplement this Answer as necessary. Discovery is continuing.
(e) State the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify;
Both experts have been recently retained. Mr. Tautges’ firm, Tautges Redpath, Ltd., serves as the current Certified Public Accountant for Brown-Wilbert, Inc. Both experts are expected to testify as to the conclusions set forth in the Complaint, based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiffs will supplement this Answer as necessary. Discovery is continuing.
(f) Give a summary of the individual grounds for each opinion; and
Both experts have been recently retained. Mr. Tautges’ firm, Tautges Redpath, Ltd., serves as the current Certified Public Accountant for Brown-Wilbert, Inc. Both experts are expected to testify as to the conclusions set forth in the Complaint, based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiffs will supplement this Answer as necessary. Discovery is continuing.
(g) Set forth the author, publisher, title and date of publication of each learned treatise upon which the expert will rely in testimony.
For a partial list, see the attached materials. Discovery is continuing.
(Italics added.)
Brown-Wilbert’s answers to interrogatories were submitted in a timely manner 100 days after its action was commenced and within 31 days after the Accountants’ interrogatories were served; its supplemental affidavit was submitted within 60 days of the Accountants’ motion to dismiss. *231Further, the answers identified two expert witnesses, cited to a complaint that was factually detailed, identified numerous allegedly improper acts by the Accountants that caused Brown-Wilbert damage, and made several conclusions on causation. The answers also stated that the experts were “expected to testify as to the conclusions set forth in the Complaint.” Thus, I conclude that when the majority focuses on a narrow standard dealing with minor technicalities to dismiss Brown-Wilbert’s action, it has lost sight of the proper focus of section 544.42.
While Brown-Wilbert was by no means in perfect compliance with the requirements of section 544.42, I conclude that Brown-Wilbert has sufficiently met the standards for its second affidavit — the affidavit of expert disclosure — to be minimally sufficient to satisfy the 180-day requirement. Therefore, even under the narrow standard articulated by the majority, I would conclude that Brown-Wilbert was entitled to submit a supplemental affidavit under section 544.42, subdivision 6, that it has done so, and is entitled to a remand for a trial on the merits.