(dissenting in part; concurring in part). In 1955 plaintiff lost his left ring finger and part of his thumb in an employment-related accident. After healing plaintiff was unable to close his hand but was able to continue working in his trade as a cabinetmaker.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a foreman in 1966. On March 29, 1966 he sustained another injury to his left hand, losing part of his index finger. The combination of injuries rendered plaintiff unable to continue in his trade. He is now employed in a non-skilled position where he can effectively use his left hand.
On December 6, 1966 plaintiff had a hearing before a workmen’s compensation referee. In his findings of fact the referee said the injuries resulted in plaintiff’s sustaining "the industrial loss of the use of his left hand”. In his decision he relied on Sorensen v Grand Rapids Metalcraft, 333 Mich 709, 53 NW2d 590 (1952) and stated that he could not charge the defendant for the conditions which did not wholly result from this injury. The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the referee’s reliance on Sorenson but modified his award.
The Court of Appeals granted leave in order to confront "the question of continuing validity” of Sorensen, 39 Mich App 370, 372; 197 NW2d 511 (1972). The Court said Sorensen judicially created an apportionment rule where "the employer pays *320only for the claimant’s specific member loss in his employment” (p 375). In affirming the appeal board’s decision, the Court specifically declined either to overrule Sorensen or expand coverage of the Second Injury Fund.1 In refusing the latter action, the Court stated this avenue to be "a legislative function, not a judicial one” (p 378).
Our Court granted leave to appeal on July 31, 1972. The parties were "directed to cover in their briefs the question as to whether or not compensation, if granted, would be paid to the plaintiff by the Second Injury Fund,” 388 Mich 755. I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Apportionment of Liability Between Employers
Plaintiff contends that Sheppard v Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich 577; 83 NW2d 614 (1957) and Coombe v Penegor, 348 Mich 635; 83 NW2d 603 (1957) undercut if not overrule Sorensen. He notes that Sorensen has not been discussed or cited by our appellate courts since it was decided in 1952. He argues that placing full responsibility for the loss of a hand on the current employer is in accord with sound public policy. Plaintiff concedes that on' its face the Second Injury Fund does not apply to his situation.
Defendant says Sorensen stands unaffected by Sheppard or Coombe and should be followed. Also, as a matter of public policy, it is argued that if full responsibility becomes the rule, the willingness of employers to hire handicapped or previously injured workers will be dampened. Defendant agrees with plaintiff as to the inapplicability of the Second Injury Fund.
*321The plaintiff in Sorensen had lost the thumb and two fingers of his left hand in a 1919 accident. In 1949 another mishap resulted in almost total amputation of the remaining fingers. Plaintiff was awarded compensation based on the loss of a hand. This Court reversed and remanded for entry of an award based on the loss of the two fingers. The Court said "the ultimate disability or loss was occasioned by the results of 2 injuries acting in conjunction” (p 712). In such cases the defendant was held "liable only for the specific loss caused by injury sustained in his employ and not for the disability resulting from that and some previous injury” (p 712).
The Sorensen decision drew support from Winn v Adjustable Table Co, 193 Mich 127; 159 NW 372 (1916). Plaintiff there had\previously lost three fingers of his right hand but was able to work as a carpenter by using his thumb and third finger. While employed by the defendant, another accident resulted in the loss of plaintiff’s third finger.
Subsequent to the injury plaintiff reached an agreement with defendant’s insurer concerning compensation for the loss of the finger. After 19 of 20 payments were made, plaintiff sought to have the agreement set aside. The Industrial Accident Board did so. It also found plaintiff to be totally incapacitated and allowed him to recover compensation.
This Court reversed the order of the board saying that action "was an attempt to meet a situation not provided for by the statute, and neither the Industrial Accident Board nor this Court has any power to do that” (p 132). The Court felt plaintiff’s present injury did not produce total disability:
*322"The injury must be treated simply as the loss of the third finger, for which the claimant is specifically compensated by the terms of the statute. The agreement entered into by the parties was in accord with this provision and must stand.” (p 132.)
On rehearing, 193 Mich 132, 163 NW 906 (1916), the Court was more explicit in stating why it disagreed with the award:
"The award was based upon the finding that the injury, 'together with the previous loss of other members of the same hand,’ produced a total incapacity. In making the order it did, based upon this finding, the board was in error.” (p 133.)
As noted above, plaintiff claims Sheppard and Coombe impliedly overrule Sorensen. These cases reflect the confusion caused by the 1943 amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The real issue in those cases was whether the.injuries were "accidental” so as to justify compensation.
Despite plaintiff’s reasoned interpretation of Sheppard and Coombe, I cannot agree that those cases overrule Sorensen either directly or by implication. They do not speak to the problem faced in Sorensen. They tell us when a compensable injury occurs. In the instant case there is no argument concerning the occurrence of a compensable injury.
Our obligation herein is to determine whether defendant is to compensate plaintiff for the specific loss occasioned while he was in its employ or . whether Sorensen is to be overruled and defendant charged with full responsibility for plaintiff’s loss of the industrial use of his hand. In the best interest of all parties, I would decline to follow the latter course and would reaffirm the Court created policy set forth in Sorensen.
*323A comprehensive discussion of the problem faced in the instant case is found in 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 59. After reviewing the various full responsibility and apportionment rules, the author reaches this conclusion in § 59.31:
"While at first glance it might appear that the apportionment rule favors the employer and non-apportionment the employee, in practice the non-apportionment rule proved the worse of the two evils from the standpoint of the handicapped worker. As soon as it became clear that a particular state had adopted a rule requiring an employer to bear the full cost of total disability for loss of the crippled worker’s remaining leg or arm, employers had a strong financial incentive to discharge all handicapped workers who might bring upon them this kind of aggravated liability.”
The Court of Appeals after citing this passage said that "[i]n addition to the Sorensen decision, then, public policy also dictates against adopting the 'full responsibility’ rule argued for by plaintiff” (p 377).
I agree.
Any advantage gained by the particular plaintiff in requiring the last employer to bear full responsibility for the effect of separate injuries (one of which occurred during employment by another) is far outweighed by the potential adverse effect on the opportunity of previously injured and handicapped workers to obtain and retain gainful employment. Many employers are small or relatively so and are active in employing handicapped people. The additional financial responsibility not only for injuries incurred in their own establishments but for those previously incurred would be especially discouraging to a broad hiring policy. The *324same reaction can be anticipated from the larger employers.
Therefore, a focus on the situation of all previously injured workers rather than on any particular fact situation indicates that the policy of Sorensen remains persuasive.
Second Injury Fund
The Michigan statute providing for the Second Injury Fund said at the time of the instant case, in part:
"If an employee has at the time of injury permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye and at the time of such injury incurs further permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye, he shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and shall be paid, from the funds provided in this section, compensation for total and permanent disability after subtracting the amount of compensation received by the employee for both such losses.”
There is little question that the Second Injury Fund in principle should (but does not) extend to such cases as the present one. As was said in Whitt v Ford Motor Co, 383 Mich 726, 730-731; 178 NW2d 917 (1970):
"The purpose behind the legislative creation of the Second Injury Fund under § 8a is expressed in Verberg v Simplicity Pattern Company (1959), 357 Mich 636 [99 NW2d 508], at p 643:
" 'Clearly, the purpose of the above statutory provision was to enhance the prospects for employment of certain handicapped persons who had previously sustained specific losses, so that they and their families would have a means of livelihood. The statute made it *325certain, as an inducement to an employer to employ such persons, that in employing a handicapped person he would be required to pay no more if such handicapped person should suffer further injury than he would have been required to pay for such further injury had the person not been handicapped in the first place.’ ”
Also see Larson §§ 59.31, 59.32 and Note, Workmen’s Compensation—Encouraging Employment of the Handicapped in Michigan: A Proposal for Reform of the Michigan Second Injury Fund, 67 Mich L Rev 393 (1968).3
However, the fact remains and cannot be avoided that the language of the statute does not encompass the type of injury sustained in the present case. Further, no reasonable interpretation can place plaintiff within its coverage. All parties recognize this. We could not award plaintiff monies from the fund unless we were willing to assume amendatory legislative powers. This we should not do.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
T. E. Brennan and Swainson, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.At that time found in MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1). The provision is now to be found at MCLA 418.521; MSA 17.237(521).
The notewriter, at pp 394-395, said, the theory is "that the protection afforded by the fund will eliminate any economic disincentive to employing handicapped workers which employers would have under the rule of strict nonapportionment.”