dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the Protective Order issued against Hill is void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to the failure of service. Because I believe the service attempted by the Rameys was reasonably calculated to inform Hill of the pending petition for protective order, I believe that the Protective Order was valid and the trial court properly denied Hill's motion for relief from judgment.
Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Merkor Mgmt v. McCuan, 728 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Thus, we will reverse the judgment only if it goes against the logic and effect of the facts or the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Id. Further, we will not reweigh the evidence, and we give the trial court's order substantial deference. Id. I note that the case relied upon by the majority was in a procedural posture opposite from that presented here. In Mills, the trial court had granted the defendant's motion for relief from judgment, and thus we were required to give deference to the trial court's grant of relief, In this case, we have the opposite situation: the trial court denied the motion for relief, and thus, we owe that determination deference on appeal. I therefore do not believe that the result in Mills is dispositive of the issue before us.
Personal jurisdiction over a party can be obtained by any method of service which comports with due process. Gourley v. L.Y., 657 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). "The minimal requirements of due process require only that notice be served in a manner reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the pending action." Id. Trial Rule 4.15 reflects these minimal requirements: "[njo summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him...."
In this case, the trial court found, and there was evidence to support the finding, that the Rameys believed, at the time the petition for protective order was filed, that Hill lived at the address to which they addressed service. Hill did at that time and continues to receive mail at that address, despite no longer residing there. Moreover, there was no evidence, including Hill's own testimony, that Hill told the Rameys he had moved from that address. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the sheriff's act of leaving a copy of the summons and petition at Hill's last known address, followed by mailing copies to the same address, was sufficient service. See TR. 4.1(A)(8) and (B). Pursuant to our standard of review, I cannot say that such determination was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
I would also note that I believe the legal reasoning of the most recent case from this court to deal with the issue of service, despite reaching the opposite conclusion, supports my position. Kelly v. Bennett, 732 N.E.2d 859 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). In Kelty, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for medi*514cal malpractice against the defendant, and requested that the summons and complaint be served upon the defendant by Sheriff at his office address. The Sheriff left copies of the summons and complaint at the office address and also mailed copies to that address. The defendant did not answer the complaint within the required thirty days, and a default judgment was entered for the plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court denied. This court reversed the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs' means of service were insufficient pursuant to Trial Rule 4.1 because
the prescribed means of service at a business address are: personal service, registered or certified mail, or some other means of mailing with a written ac-knowledgement of receipt. Service by Sheriff under the circumstances would have been appropriate only if [the defendant] or his agent had been personally served or if a copy of the summons and complaint had been left at his dwelling house or usual place of abode.
Id. at 861. We noted that Trial Rule 4.15 "does not operate to render service sufficient despite noncompliance with Trial Rule 4.1. 'Trial Rule 4.15(F) only cures technical defects in the service of process, not the total failure to serve process." Id. at 862 (quoting LaPalme v. Romero, 621 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Ind.1993) (footnote omitted)). I acknowledge that the facts of Kelly are different from those presented here, in that the service in Kelly was to be effected upon a business address, as opposed to a private address. However, as stated above, I believe the legal reasoning of Kelly is equally applicable to this case. Here, service was effected in substantial compliance with Trial Rule 4.1 by leaving a copy of the summons and petition at what the Rameys believed to be Hill's dwelling house followed by sending copies to Hill's last known address. This is not, as the majority suggests, a purely subjective standard, in that the evidence supported the Rameys actions: Hill had lived at that address, he still received mail at that address, and he had not told the Rameys that he had moved from that address. I believe this is exactly the situation for which Trial Rule 4.15 was designed, and thus, I believe Trial Rule 4.15 is appropriately applied in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's denial of Hill's motion for relief from judgment.9
. I note that I concur with the majority regarding the lack of notice regarding modification of Hill's child visitation arrangement.