(dissenting). Under its police power a state may suppress that which it deems a public evil. In this regard its power to regulate personal and property rights goes beyond the prevention of fraud or deceit, and includes all acts or things which affect the public health, safety or welfare. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § .175; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 270. While the legislature need not select the best means possible, there must be a reasonable relationship between the evil with which it is concerned and the means availed of to minimize it. Mundell v. Graph, 62 S.D. 631, 256 N.W. 121; City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 74 S.D. 217, 50 N.W.2d 797; Norwood v. Parenteau, 75 S.D. 303, 63 N.W.2d 807. Consequently, our review of such matters must be confined to the question of legislative power and not the wisdom of its action.
While the objects which those here supporting the law claim to have motivated its adoption are interesting they are beside the point. In State ex rel. Payne v. Reeves, 44 S.D. 568, 184 N.W. 993, this court said: “It is not for the court to inquire or determine whether a state of facts existed calling for the enactment of the legislation in question. That is for the exclusive consideration of the Legislature. If under any possible state of facts the act would be constitutional and valid, the court is bound to persume that such condition existed.” As was written in Stavig v. Van Camp, 46 S.D. 472, 193 N.W. 731, “the constitutionality of a statute must be determined from those matters which *534appear upon its face, and from those matters of which ■the.- court .may take judicial notice.” .
As I read the act, so far as here pertinent, the legislature excluded from its operation schools with financial support from churches, religious or fraternal organizations, a state or one of its political subdivisions. With these beyond the operation 'of the law its proscriptions apply to schools like the one here involved which exist to make a profit and a few private schools which get outside financial support from sources other than those designated. Whether it could include in the same class schools of the second type is not here presented. City of Dell Rapids v. McShane, 37 S.D. 86, 156 N.W. 789; Torigian v. Saunders, 77 S.D. 610, 97 N.W.2d 586. Because defendant did not represent that kind of an institution he may not urge that their inclusion in a class with the others is improper.
I do not believe our legislature felt that the practices with which it was dealing were indulged in by schools supported by any government. If it had intended to exempt only schools supported by our governmental units it could have made that clear by using the phrase “this state” rather than “the state”. Had such been its purpose there would have been no need to add the clause “or by any of its political subdivisions”, because our subdivisions are without authority to operate schools except that our school districts provide the public elementary and secondary school system. In statutory construction literal interpretation must. give way. to legislative intent.
One of -the most - important decisions a person makes is-choosing the training which "is to prepare him for his future field • of endeavor. If his choice puts him into an area not suited to his talents he is frustrated and the public welfare suffers. Ordinarily after such discovery he can, without too much loss, be directed into a field better -suited to his abilities. However, this is much less likely if he has paid or obligated himself to pay a sum without limitation for the training he' --has- chosen. -From the act *535it is apparent that the legislature wanted the prospective student freed -of this handicap at least until he had been in contact with the chosen school or training. This,- I think, is the evil which- the legislature was interested in.
Schools such as the one here involved limit the training which they provide to a few fields, oftentimes only one,, and generally they are vocational in nature. Their curriculums hold little hope for a misdirected student to escape his dilemma. Also they are in the business to make money for their owners, and human nature being what it is, there are always some who go beyond the bounds of propriety to be commercially successful. After all, financial gain is their reason for being.
These schools increased in number under the educational program of the G. I. Bill of Rights and with that discontinued Competition among them for students increased. It seems- to me that the legislature could reasonably conclude that under these circumstances credulous and uninformed persons had been sold an educational pig in a poke, only to discover after getting to the chosen school that it was not suitable or that their talents were in other fields of endeavor. For many of them it was then too late —they had purchased sight unseen.
Concerning the appropriateness of the means adopted to suppress the evil our inquiry is a narrow one. Regarding the police power this court in State v. Central Lumber Company, 24 S.D. 136, 123 N.W. 504, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 804 said: “the legislative department of the state, within well-known and well-defined limitations, is the sole judge as to when and how that power is to be exercised.” Its problem is a practical one, not legal. Along the same line this court in American Linseed Oil Company v. Wheaton, 25 S.D. 60, 125 N.W. 127, 41 L.R.A.,N.S., 149, wrote: “When a subject is within proper police power, it is for the Legislature to say what the remedy shall be.” In State ex rel. Sharpe v. Smith, 58 S.D. 22, 234 N.W. 764 we find the principle stated thus: “if the field is a proper one for the exercise of the *536police power, what the Legislature sees fit to do in that field in the nature of police regulation is very largely in its discretion.” Adherence to this rule is necessary to make empty the charge that constitutional interpretation is a reflection of the social or economic theories of the judges.
Rules have been laid down for our guidance in determining whether the means adopted are unreasonable or arbitrary. In Norwood v. Parenteau, supra, appears this pronouncement, “debatable questions as to the reasonableness are not for the courts but for the Legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment.” To me this means that if different minds might differ as to the reasonableness of the means, the law must be upheld. “It is enough if it can be seen that in any degree, or under any reasonably conceivable circumstances, there is an actual relation between the means and the end.” Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288. This act clearly satisfies these requirements.
That many reputable schools not contributing to the evil with which the lawmakers were concerned would also be subject to the law may be unfortunate, but does not make it invalid. See Norwood v. Parenteau, supra. That case held reasonable a regulation which limited a newspaper advertisement by an optometrist to a maximum size of one column inch. The $25 limitation in this act is certainly no more vulnerable. In fact I think the legislature could properly have denied them the right to collect any amount in advance. It was for the .legislature to say if and to what extent the harshness of the primitive doctrine of letting the “buyer beware” should be limited.
I am authorized to state that SMITH, J., joins in this dissent.