dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing the review panel’s determination concerning Griffin’s average weekly wage. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-126 (Reissue 2004) defines “wages” in two respects relevant to the case before us.
The first definition in § 48-126 — “the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in *736force at the time of the accident” — simply takes a weekly salary, or a monthly or annual salary converted to its weekly equivalent, and utilizes that amount. Thus, if Griffin’s weekly salary at the time of the accident had been $1,258 (the amount he testified that he earned the first week under the different wage arrangement), § 48-126 would have recognized that amount as his “wages.”
However, § 48-126 recognizes a different method of calculation where (1) the employment is “continuous” and (2) “immediately prior to the accident the rate of wages was fixed by the day or hour or by the output of the employee.” The majority concedes that both of these conditions are satisfied, but nevertheless declines to apply the method of calculation dictated by the statute in that event.
Based upon the majority’s “plain reading” of § 48-126, it characterizes as “incongruous” the inclusion of the period in which Griffin’s rate of wages was a weekly salary. Nevertheless, the majority acknowledges that the Nebraska Supreme Court did “just that” in Mutchie v. M. L. Rawlings Ice Co., 122 Neb. 297, 240 N.W. 267 (1932).
The majority justifies its decision by attempting to distinguish the instant case from Mutchie, asserting that the character of Griffin’s employment was not the same under the different wage schedules. While I agree that the “character of employment” was important in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mutchie, I contend that the majority misinterprets that phrase in the context of § 48-126.
In Mutchie, the “character of employment” was the employee’s “making deliveries [of ice] and doing common labor.” 122 Neb. at 298, 240 N.W. at 267. Prior to August 23, 1930, the employee was paid a weekly salary and evidently worked solely for the employer. However, after August 23, the employee was paid 30 cents an hour for delivering ice for the employer “afternoons, evenings and Sundays” and also worked “forenoons” as an independent contractor using his brother’s truck. Id. at 302, 240 N.W. at 269. While the present memory of the “ice business” described in Mutchie, 122 Neb. at 298, 240 N.W. at 267, applies only to persons of middle age or older, and while the working times and wage rates in Mutchie differ considerably from modem norms, it is clear from the Supreme Court’s opinion that the employee’s *737work schedule after August 23 was considerably different from the schedule in effect prior to that date. The Supreme Court necessarily looked to the nature of the work, rather than the change of schedule, in determining that the employee was engaged in the “same character of employment.” Id. at 301-02, 240 N.W. at 269.
In the instant case, the majority treats the increase in Griffin’s working hours as a change in the character of his employment. I disagree. Just as the Nebraska Supreme Court in Mutchie considered the employee’s functions — delivering ice and providing common labor — as the same character of employment before and after the change in schedule, I view Griffin’s employment as a truckdriver during his period of service as a “co-driver” as constituting the same character of employment as his performance as a truckdriver when he was labeled a “company driver.” The evidence does not support a change in the nature of Griffin’s function, but only a change in the number of hours he worked. The decision in Mutchie shows that the statute requires that Griffin’s amount of wages be determined by the alternative method applicable to continuous employment where the rate of wages is fixed by the output of the employee.
Although the majority does not characterize it as such, it appears that the majority views Griffin’s work as a “co-driver” to be an entirely separate employment than his service as a “company driver.” The majority’s implicit approach conflicts with settled law defining “continuous employments” under § 48-126. In Newberry v. Youngs, 163 Neb. 397, 401-02, 80 N.W.2d 165, 168 (1956), the Nebraska Supreme Court held:
[T]he term continuous employments in section 48-126 . . . relates to the contract of hiring and is applicable to those situations where the relationship of employer and employee is a continuing one. It does not depend in its application on the number of hours an employee works in a day or the number of days an employee works in a week. Those questions go to the matter of the performance of the contract and not to the nature of the contract.
In the case before us, Griffin was employed by DMI as a truckdriver. During the time that Griffin was designated a “co-driver,” DMI and Griffin enjoyed the relationship of employer and employee. That relationship did not change when DMI *738changed Griffin’s title to “company driver.” The “nature of the contract” did not change when Griffin’s title changed. Within the meaning of § 48-126, Griffin’s time of service as a “co-driver” and his period of employment as a “company driver” constituted a single period of continuous employment.
Where the employment was continuous and the rate of wages immediately prior to the accident was fixed by Griffin’s output, § 48-126 requires us to determine his weekly wages by using his “average weekly income for the period of time ordinarily constituting his . . . week’s work, and using as the basis of calculation his . . . earnings during as much of the preceding six months as he .. . worked for the same employer.”
I attribute importance to the use of the word “income” in the phrase “average weekly income.” That word connotes a broader scope than “wages” or “salary” and is sufficiently comprehensive to include both “wages” and “salary.”
My analysis is not driven by the result, nor do I believe that the majority’s interpretation is result oriented. Naturally, the parties having a financial interest in the outcome of the case may be influenced by the resulting effect of the alternative approaches. In Mutchie v. M. L. Rawlings Ice Co., 122 Neb. 297, 240 N.W. 267 (1932), the court’s calculation worked to the benefit of the employee, because his wages were higher during the earlier period than at the time of his accident. In the case before us, the same method of calculation works to the benefit of the employer, because Griffin’s earnings were lower during the earlier period.
This potential result has been apparent for over 70 years, ever since the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Mutchie. When judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked a legislative amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s interpretation. Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 258 Neb. 568, 604 N.W.2d 396 (2000). I recognize that the entire objective of wage calculation is to arrive at a fair approximation of the claimant’s probable future earning capacity. See 5 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 93.01[1][e] (2005). If I felt free to do so, I would depart from the interpretation in Mutchie.
However, it is the function of the Legislature through the en - actment of statutes to declare what is the law and public policy *739of this state. In re Claims Against Atlanta Elev., Inc., 268 Neb. 598, 685 N.W.2d 477 (2004). Indeed, the Legislature has already provided in § 48-126 for an adjustment of the employee’s wages if “such method of computation does not fairly represent the earnings of the employee,” but limited that adjustment to employees engaged in seasonal employment or employment dependent upon the weather. The Legislature has not chosen to provide an exception to authorize the result sought by Griffin in the instant case. I do not believe that this court can properly depart from the settled meaning of the statute. In my opinion, because the character of Griffin’s employment did not change during the period of his continuous employment, § 48-126 requires the result reached by the review panel on this issue.
I agree with the majority opinion concerning its resolution of the other issues presented by this appeal.