dissenting:
As the majority notes, the seminal case is Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm’n, 115 Ill. 2d 524 (1987). In Belwood, the Illinois Supreme Court observed that claimants alleging repetitive trauma injuries must meet the same standard of proof applicable to other accidental injuries. Belwood, 115 Ill. 2d 524. Thus, claimants in repetitive trauma cases must allege and prove a single, definable accident. See Nunn v. Industrial Comm’n, 157 Ill. App. 3d 470 (1987). The accident date in such cases is the date on which the injury “manifests itself.” Belwood, 115 Ill. 2d at 531. The term “manifests itself’ indicates “the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant’s employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person.” Belwood, 115 Ill. 2d at 531. The test is objective, and each case should be decided from its own facts and circumstances. Three “D” Discount Store v. Industrial Comm’n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 43 (1989).
Under the applicable statute of limitations, Durand was required to file her claim within three years of her accident date. See 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 2000). Since she filed her application for adjustment of claim on January 12, 2001, the limitations period reaches back to January 12, 1998.
The Commission found that Durand’s injury manifested itself before that time. Under the first prong of Belwood, the Commission’s finding must be supported by evidence strong enough that prior to January 12, 1998, the fact of an injury would have been plainly apparent to a reasonable person in Durand’s situation. I see no such evidence in the record.
Although Durand mentioned general pain to her supervisor and a coworker before January 12, 1998, her description and understanding of the pain at that time does not accord with the Belwood standard. When she visited Doctor Escorcia in August of 2000, she described the pain as “on and off’ for the previous IV2 years. Moreover, she testified that in 1997 her pain “wasn’t real constant and real severe.” This evidence bespeaks intermittent discomfort; and the intermittent nature of the symptoms left Durand — according to her own testimony — unsure about whether she even had carpal tunnel syndrome. At most, she articulated a mere belief that she had the condition. Consistent with these facts, she never sought medical treatment until August of 2000 (well within the limitations period).
These circumstances are not such that the fact of an injury would be plainly apparent to a reasonable person. Indeed, the circumstances signal periodic discomfort leading to doubt about the existence of a distinct injury.
Since both prongs of the Belwood standard must be satisfied to fix an accident date, and the record contains no evidence establishing the first prong, the Commission’s decision should be reversed and the arbitrator’s decision reinstated. Although Durand had experienced symptoms prior to the limitations period, I agree with Commissioner Sherman’s observation:
“At best, the majority has used the date Petitioner became aware of a potential disability as the manifestation date. Their narrow interpretation penalizes her for giving her employer notice of a potential disability, for not immediately seeking medical attention, and for continuing to perform her regular work for the same employer, notwithstanding a suspicion that she might be developing work related carpal tunnel syndrome.”
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
DONOVAN, J., joins in this dissent.