(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority that the “judge was not warranted in finding undue influence.” “As is often the fact in cases of this kind there was no direct evidence of undue influence, but its nature is such that it ‘may be exercised in indirect and underhanded ways difficult to be come at, *116and to be judged of only by their results.’ Hoffman v. Hoffman, 192 Mass. 416, 419.” Eddy v. Eddy, 281 Mass. 156, 158. The question here to be decided is whether the finding of undue influence made by the probate judge was justified by the evidence of the attendant circumstances. See Raposa v. Oliveira, 247 Mass. 188, 190.
There is no need to recite the evidence in detail. I think it sufficient to state the following: On March 31, 1959, the testatrix executed a will designating the respondent as a one-sixth residuary legatee. Within twenty-four hours, the respondent and her husband drove the testatrix to a stock brokerage firm where she transferred stock representing what appears to be approximately one-half the value of her estate into joint ownership with the respondent. During the next several months the testatrix proceeded to effect the transfer of almost the entire remainder of her estate, composed of various bank accounts and a bank savings certificate into a joint bank account with the respondent, thereby completely negating the will. Finally, the evidence of consciousness of guilt on the part of the respondent following the death of the testatrix was substantial, namely: her continued secret possession of the will; her buying of written releases from persons named in the will; and her prompt transfer of the bank account and stock into joint accounts with her husband.
“The value of the testimony of the witnesses . . . [depends] in great measure upon their appearance and their manner of testifying on the stand. . . . [W]e . . . [should] give full recognition to the advantage possessed by the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses.” Goddard v. Dupree, 322 Mass. 247, 248. I think it worthwhile to note that the judge, in at least one instance, considered the testimony of the respondent to be an “absolute falsehood.” 1
I am satisfied that the judge’s findings, supported by *117the evidence or the reasonable inference therefrom, justify his conclusion that the respondent exercised undue influence over the testatrix. Cox v. Wall, 343 Mass. 542, 543. I am not inclined to “second guess” his judgment and therefore would affirm the decree.
The respondent had testified that the testatrix had given her stock in joint tenancy prior to the date of the will.