concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Defendant Palmer was found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. The circuit court determined, and the appellate court agreed, that the maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee could be based upon the extended-term sentencing statute (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—2) and could include natural life (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8— 1(a)(1)). In order to commit an insanity acquittee under the extended-term sentencing statute, the acquittee must meet the statutory requirements under section 5 — 5—3.2(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code). That is to say, the court must find that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The trial court so found and sentenced defendant accordingly.
The majority • opinion holds that a trial court may not base a maximum commitment period for an insanity acquittee on the extended-term sentencing statute as an insanity acquittee cannot be conscious of his conduct “so that the requisite finding that the insanity acquittee’s offense be indicative of wanton cruelty can be made.” The majority reasons that an insanity acquittee is not criminally responsible for his conduct and, thus, he cannot be considered to have “consciously chosen to inflict pain or suffering.”
Contrary to the majority’s finding, an insanity acquittee’ s conduct can fall within the definition of “brutal,” “heinous” and “indicative of wanton cruelty.” None of these terms requires a specific mental state. These definitions are what the trier of fact perceives the crimes to be. That is to say, an objective standard. In this case, the trial court determined that defendant’s conduct fell within this descriptive language. Accordingly, I dissent in part, as above indicated, and otherwise concur.
CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.