dissenting:
As stated by the majority, “the issue is whether such an entity may conduct legal proceedings through a layman agent.” I differ with the majority in the interpretation of “conduct legal proceedings.” To reverse this case- solely because the forcible detainer complaint was prepared, signed and filed by a nonattorney agent is an example where, in the administration of justice, we can be imprisoned in a straight jacket of archaic formalism. Defendant does not challenge the finding of the trial court. In fact, rather than meet the substantive charges head-on, defendant adopted a formalistic objection which the court approves.
Now the case must go back to square one and an attorney must sign the complaint. How is the administration of justice helped, in a case of this type, by the continued adherence to this antediluvian principle? What prejudice or damage is there to defendant by the fact that James A. Floyd signed the complaint on behalf of his employer as “Agent for plaintiff?” What prejudice or damage is there to defendant by the fact that the “Notice of Termination of Tenancy” attached to the complaint was signed for plaintiff “By James A. Floyd, Director of Management?”
The majority relies upon section 11 of the attorneys and counselors act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 13, par. 11), the Practice of Law by Corporations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 32, par. 411 et seq.), and numerous appellate court cases. The supreme court has not addressed this precise question. The appellate court apparently first addressed itself to this question in 1966 in Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 215 N.E.2d 678.
Plaintiff correctly relies on Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771. As I read that case, the supreme court held that what was done by a real estate broker (completing blanks on a printed real estate contract) did not amount to the practice of law. Here, all agent Floyd did, on behalf of his employer, was fill in a printed form issued by the circuit court of Cook County (CCMD-21A) with the words hereafter underlined (the balance of the words are preprinted):
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Floyd never identified himself as an attorney. Floyd never appeared in court as an attorney. There is no claim that anyone other than an attorney ever appeared for plaintiff in court. Under these circumstances, I think the supreme court’s position in Quinlan & Tyson should prevail. I do not think that Floyd’s act constituted the practice of law, and if it did, certainly not the type of practice intended to be covered under either of the pertinent statutes. It is difficult to understand how the filling in of the blank spaces and words as underlined in the aforesaid illustration requires the skill peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law. Floyd, as plaintiff’s agent, initiated legal proceedings, but did not conduct them.
Defendant does not point out how she was harmed by virtue of agent Floyd signing the complaint rather than an attorney. In fact, the “Notice of Termination of Tenancy” which was attached to the complaint was signed on behalf of plaintiff by Floyd as “Director of Management.” Upon receipt of that notice, defendant requested a hearing, and the hearing officer ruled that the termination of defendant’s lease was justified.
II
Although not discussed in either the majority opinion or the parties’ briefs, it might be noted that the issue here involves the operation of the court system and the interpretation of papers filed in the court. This brings into consideration the court’s supervisory and administrative responsibility. The practice of law involves much more than the instant issue. When there is a question which involves the papers to be filed in a court proceeding, should not the determination of that question be left to judicial rules or discretion rather than to statutory mandate? (See People v. Jackson (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602.) In the absence of a judicial rule (no supreme court rule covers this question), then I suggest judicial discretion should apply. In effect, the trial court’s determination was the exercise of judicial discretion based on the record in this case and should be affirmed.
III
As to whether the Practice of Law by Corporations Act applied to municipal corporations, it might be pertinent to note that said act is codified in chapter 32 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Chapter 32 does not deal with municipal corporations, whereas chapter 24 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24) includes definitions of “municipal” (par. 1— 1 — 2(1)) and “corporate authorities” (par. 1 — 1—2(2)), and provides for the incorporation of areas into municipalities. Plaintiff is a municipal corporation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 67V2, par. 8). No one has pointed out any legislative intent to apply the Practice of Law by Corporations Act to municipal corporations. In City of Webster Groves v. Smith (1937), 340 Mo. 798, 800-01, 102 S.W.2d 618, 619, the Supreme Court of Missouri distinguished between a “corporation” and a “municipal corporation,” holding that each term has a distinct and commonly accepted meaning. I suggest the same is true in Illinois.
The record in this case does not demonstrate any harm to defendant, or how she was prejudiced by the complaint tiled in this case. I would affirm.