On Petition for Rehearing
Achor, J.Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing in which he asserts that this court, in its opinion as written, erred in two particulars.
First: That this court failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 7, §5 of the Indiana Constitution by failing to “give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record and the decision of the court thereon.” It is not that this court has presumed to disregard this constitutional provision, but since the provision is merely directive and does not involve any substantive rights of the litigants involved, we have given it a reasonable construction consistent with the obviously intended purpose thereof. Accordingly we have limited our discussion to the principal contentions in the case which, incidentally, were the issues discussed in oral argument. We intentionally omitted from our discussion those “questions arising in the record” which seemed frivolous, were not supported by substantial argument in the briefs or were so patently contrary to the well-established law of the state since a discussion thereof would merely constitute an unjustifiable encumberance of the reported decisions of the state without making any contribution to the general body of the law.
Strong precedent has been established supporting the position that this constitutional provision is to be given reasonable rather than a literal construction. As stated by this court in State ex rel Sluss v. Appellate Court of Indiana (1938), 214 Ind. 686, at 691-692, 17 N. E. 2d 824:
*689“the constitutional provision quoted above [Art. 7, §5] must have, however, a reasonable interpretation as well as a practical application. It is not to be presumed that the framers of that document intended that this court should be required to exhaust every subject that might be raised on an appeal, without regard to its importance in the determination of the cause.
“In the case of Willets v. Ridgway (1857), 9 Ind. 367, 369, 370, Perkins, J., speaking for this court, said:
‘It is true that the constitution, by an unwise provision, requires that this Court shall give a written opinion upon every point arising in the record of every case — a provision which, if literally followed, tends to fill our Reports with repetitions of decisions upon settled, as well as frivolous, points and often intoduce into them, in the great press of business, premature and not well considered opinions, upon points only slightly argued; yet it is a provision not to be disregarded, though merely directory, like that requiring the legislature to use good English. But though the provision is not to be disregarded, it is to be observed according to some construction, and should receive such a one as to obviate its inconvenience and objectionable character, as far as consistently can be done.’ ” [Our emphasis.]
Furthermore, in a more recent case, when confronted with circumstances very similar to those existing in the present case, this court in Appleby v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 544, at pp. 549-550, 48 N. E. 2d 646 [reh. den. 49 N. E. 2d 533], stated:
“The appellant’s motion for a new trial occupies forty-five (45) of the six hundred sixty-eight (668) pages of their printed brief. Sixty-six (66) separate and distinct legal propositions are presented for our determination. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that the framers of our State Constitution had any such situation in mind when they enjoined upon us the obligation to ‘give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record’ (Article 7, Section 5), or when they imposed upon the General Assembly the duty to *690provide for. the ‘speedy publication of the decisions’ of this court (Article 7, Section 6). At the risk of being charged with failing to meet our responsibilities, we feel obliged to limit our consideration of this case to what appear to be the principal contentions. We have pointed out in the past that one prejudicial error clearly presented is enough to accomplish a reversal by this court. Weer v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 217, 36 N. E. 2d 787, 37 N. E. 2d 537.” [Our italics.]
In other instances this court has applied the rule of reason to the above constitutional directive by providing that the court need not give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record, unless the parties have filed briefs and therein presented substantial argument regarding the issue so as to aid the court in making its decision regarding the questions presented by the record in such case. Furthermore, as above noted we have held that in reversing a case we need only discuss a single issue arising in the case which sustains the decision of this court.
In this case we have limited our consideration to those issues which we considered to be substantial questions and this we have endeavored to do in a comprehensive manner.
To demonstrate our reason for not discussing the other many specifications assigned as error, we make the following comment with regard to a few of such specifications, which are illustrative' of those asserted in appellant’s petition for rehearing. Appellant’s Proposition II, Point 1, urges that the trial court committed prejudical error by permitting State’s Exhibit No. 3 to be admitted in evidence. Appellant claims that this exhibit, which was a photograph of one of the automobiles involved in the collision, was erroneously admitted because the body of one of the decedents was hanging from the wreckage and therefore the exhibit was calculated only to inflame the jury and *691served no other purpose. In support of his contention, appellant cites the case of Kiefer v. State (1958), 239 Ind. 103, 153 N. E. 2d 899. However, examination of that case reveals that it does not support appellant’s contention but, rather, justifies the admission of the evidence since the picture was an unaltered part of the res gestae of the case.
Appellant’s Proposition II, Point .2, urges that the trial court committed error in permitting the state’s witness to describe a conversation which he had with a witness for the defense shortly after the accident and out of the appellant’s presence. Appellant claims error with regard to the admission of such evidence notwithstanding the fact that said testimony was admitted explicitly for the purpose of impeaching the defense witness, pursuant to the foundation which was laid in the cross-examination of said witness. The alleged error is contradicted by the well established law of this state as it has existed for 145 years.
In the early case of Shields v. Cunningham (1820), 1 Blackf. 86, at p. 87, this court stated:
“We consider this to be the correct doctrine: Where a witness has, at other times and places, made statements repugnant or contradictory to those delivered in Court, and relative to facts material to the issue, the adverse party has a right to prove that circumstance in order to discredit the witness, or diminish the weight of his testimony;...”
The credibility of a witness, party, or accused may be attacked by showing that at another time .and place he made an oral or written statement inconsistent or contradictory to his testimony. See: Pollard v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 62, 94 N. E. 2d 912. See also: Wigmore on Evidence §884, p. 376.
*692In the present case other specifications involved numerous instructions tendered by the appellant on the subject of mere negligence as related to the charge of involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. The court’s own instructions adequately covered this subject, and it was not therefore necessary for the court to read all of the appellant’s array of instructions which would have, if given, had the effect of over-emphasizing the subject of “mere negligence” as an element in the case.
Likewise, appellant complains that the court did not give numerous instructions on the subject of reasonable doubt. This subject was also adequately presented by the court’s own instructions. In fact, one of appellant’s instructions, which the court refused to give, was given verbatim by the court as one of his own instructions. The absence of any merit to these specifications is so patent that no discussion seemed necessary.
Furthermore, appellant’s Proposition II, Point 2, urges that the trial court erred in giving its instruction No. 2. True, appellant has engaged in a lengthy dissertation in his brief regarding this instruction. Although the instruction is subject to some rhetorical weakness, we cannot say that it was legally incorrect or that the jury was mislead thereby. As demonstrated in appellee’s brief, this instruction is supported by the case law of the state, and appellant has not favored us with a reply brief which refutes the conclusiveness of this authority.
As previously stated, the above specifications of error were not previously considered by this court in its opinion but were omitted because they were patently without merit, and although the constitution provides that the court “give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record” of *693such case, we are of the opinion that the law is so firmly established with regard to the specifications of error asserted by appellant that there is, in reality, no substantial question with regard to such specifications and, therefore, that within a reasonable construction of the constitutional directive it was unnecessary that the court encumber the opinion with a discussion of this voluminous subject matter.
Secondly: Appellant reasserts that the verdict against him is void for the reason that the implied finding of not guilty in the prior trial with respect to the charge of involuntary manslaughter requires the conclusion that appellant was also not guilty of reckless homicide, both of which offenses involved the same acts on his part. This issue was fully considered, and we believe correctly so, in the opinion as written.
Rehearing denied.
Arterburn & Myers, JJ. concur.
Jackson, C. J. & Landis, J. concur in the result.
Note. — Reported in 208 N. E. 2d 685. Rehearing denied 210 N. E. 2d 363.