dissenting:
I dissent. By its opinion the majority performs a statutory excision of proportions unprecedented in this jurisdiction and at the same time achieves a result contrary to the clearly demonstrated legislative intent. The magnitude of the deletion effected by the opinion is best demonstrated by setting forth the portions of section 11 — 6 which the opinion excises.
‘Any-e©ntigu©us-end-G©mpaet--ie-rat-ery,--n©-paFt-ef--whieh is~ÍHeluded-withÍR-eny--€ommunit-y--uRÍt-s€heel-distFÍGt-,-er other--ttnit--dlsirie-fcr-ha-vÍRg-a-populatioR--of--not--k-ss--fchaH 4-,000 — end-ROt—rater e — íhan—5-00;000—perseas—aad-an eqttatized-assessed-valuatieR-e£-net-kss-than-$i2-;000;000 may-be-ergaRiaed-iHío-a-eernntunit-yiiRirí-SGheel-distrie-fc-as provided™ira~this~Artiek-; *** or any contiguous and compact territory, no part of which is included within any community unit school district or other unit district, having a population of not less than 1500 and not more than 500,000 persons and an equalized assessed valuation of not less than $10,000,000 may be organized into a community unit school district as provided in this Article, if-the-speeial-pr-ecedure-later-set-£erth-in-4his-Seet-ieR-fer-a dietriet — below—4,-000—population— is — followed-by—the ■Superintendent-ef-Publie-Insbrue-íion-aRd-the-superinteRdent-ef-en-edueetional-servie-e-r-egion-c-ORtaiRiRg-the-greater pereent~©f--the-assessed-valtiaii©R-©£-the-pr©pesed-distriet tban-is-eontained-in-any-oíher-fegion-in-wbieh-assessed vrimtieft--e$~the--pr-epese^-distH<st--is~sit-uated.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 122, par. 11—6.
An examination of the development of the legislation governing the organization of community unit school districts demonstrates beyond question a legislative intent to eliminate small school districts and to encourage the organization of larger, stronger, economically sound districts, and in fact, from 1945 to 1957 the number of school districts in Illinois was reduced from 11,955 in 1945 to 4,951 in 1949 and to 1,849 in 1957. See Norman, “Legal Basis and Territorial Extent of School Districts,” 1958 U. Ill. L. F. 327.
The legislation providing for the organization of community unit districts was first enacted in 1947 (Laws of 1947, p. 1530; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 122, pars. 8—9 through 8—14) and has been amended at each subsequent session of the General Assembly. (See Laws of 1949, p. 1392; Laws of 1949, p. 1446; Laws of 1951, p. 277; Laws of 1951, p. 602; Laws of 1953, p. 275; Laws of 1955, p. 1846; Laws of 1955, p. 2138; Laws of 1957, p. 2083; Laws of 1959, p. 2053; Laws of 1961, p. 1956; Laws of 1963, p. 3059; Laws of 1965, p. 220; Laws of 1965, p. 2652; Laws of 1967, p. 2771; Laws of 1967, p. 3472; Laws of 1968, p. 417; Laws of 1969, p. 2741; Laws of 1969, p. 2749; Laws of 1969, p. 3023; Laws of 1970, p. 505; Laws of 1971, p. 1217; Laws of 1971, p. 1225; Laws of 1972, p. 1966, Public Act 77—2744, effective October 1, 1972.) As originally enacted it provided a minimum population requirement of 2000 and an equalized assessed valuation of $6,000,000 and it was not until 1957 that the section was amended to permit the organization of districts with a population of not less than 1500, provided a special statutory procedure was followed. The special procedure to be followed was set forth in section 10—13 of the School Code (re-enacted in 1961 as section 12—4). It should be noted that while the statute continued to permit the organization of a district with a population of not less than 2000 and an equalized assessed valuation of not less than $6,000,000, a district of less than 2000 population was required to have an equalized assessed valuation of not less than $10,000,000. In 1968 (Laws of 1968, p. 417) section 11—6 was am ended to provide that organization of a community unit district required a minimum population of 4000 and an equalized assessed valuation of not less than $12,000,00 but the provision for the organization of a district with a minimum population of 1500 and an equalized assessed valuation of $10,000,00 upon compliance with the special procedure was retained.
Although section 12—4 was repealed in 1965 (Laws of 1965, p. 225) section 11—6 continued to refer to the repealed section until 1967 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 122, par. 11—6), when the special procedure provision was amended, as follows: “However, prior to calling any such election for organizing any such proposed district that does not have 2000 or more population, the county superintendent of schools shall transmit to the Superintendent of Public Instruction a notice of the petition in-the-m-ann e-r- pr-e-vide d- in--s eet-km - 4 2—4-f-er-the-erganizartion of — a—community—high—sch-eoj—distriet, whereupon the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall prepare the notification or report r-equir-ed — b-y-said—seoti-on—1-2—4-, indicating whether or not he deems it possible for the proposed district to provide a recognized school program for a 12-grade district under conditions set forth in said section. The county superintendent shall cause a copy of such report to be published as in said section provided.” Laws of 1967, p. 2771.
The majority, after comparing P.A. 77 — 598 and P.A. 77 — 604, concludes that it was the legislative intent to make applicable to the organization of a community unit school district with a population of not less than 1500 and an equalized assessed valuation of not less than $10,000,000 the same procedures as govern the organization of a district of not less than 4000 population and an equalized assessed valuation of not less than $12,000,000. The majority fails to explain why, if this were the legislative intent, the latter category was retained in P.A. 77—604 and re-enacted in 1972 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 122, par. 11—6). By its opinion, despite the explicit statutory requirement that a community unit district have a minimum population of 4000 and an equalized assessed valuation of $12,000,000, a provision not repugnant to or inconsistent with any other language in the statute, the majority makes applicable to all districts an ambiguous exception made for a 1500 minimum population, provided an unstated “special procedure” is followed. As a result, despite a legislative history which shows a trend toward more stringent minimum requirements in order to encourage larger, stronger, economically sound school districts, the decision in this case will permit, without condition or exception, the organization of a unit school district with a population below that required for the creation of a high school district (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 12—1) and equal to. the minimum population requirement for the creation of a grade school district. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 11—1.) It is inconceivable that this was the legislative intent.
The majority justifies its action on the ground that “Substantial authority exists to disregard words in a statute in order to effectuate legislative intent.” It relies on Gage v. City of Chicago, 201 Ill. 93, in which the court deleted from a statute the single word “that”; and People ex rel. Simpson v. Funkhouser, 385 Ill. 396, which is not in point. Prior to this case, the view which had prevailed on this court is expressed in Niebling v. Town of Moline, 8 Ill.2d 11, in which the court, in order to reconcile a repugnancy, was asked to delete six words from a statute. Noting that the reconciliation of the repugnancy would require the deletion of 26 words, the court said “In Klein v. Department of Registration, 412 Ill. 75, two meaningless words were ignored by the court in construing the constitutional validity of the act. We are reluctant, however, to ignore almost one-half of the second paragraph of the act in question under the guise of construing the act. We believe that such procedure would amount to performing the legislative function of drafting legislation rather than the judicial function of statutory construction.” (8 Ill.2d 11, at 14-15.) Here the majority has excised a clearly stated statutory provision in order to give effect to an ambiguous provision which, without the excision, is vague and inconsistent, and has thereby lowered the minimum standards set by the General Assembly over a period of 26 years of amendatory legislation. I would hold that the provision for organization of a district of less than 4000 population and $12,000,000 equalized assessed valuation is vague, incomplete and invalid, and would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI joins in this dissent.