(dissenting). After a careful review of the entire record I am unable to agree with the majority opinion that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial has been preserved. I will discuss several of the factors which, in combination, lead me to this decision.1
The defendant, over his objection, was tried jointly with a codefendant.2 The codefendant pleaded guilty (in the absence of the jury) to murder in the second degree at the conclusion of the evidence. The trial then resumed with only the defendant De Christoforo present. The judge stated, “Mr. Foreman, madam and gentlemen of the jury. You will notice that the [co]defendant Gagliardi is not in the dock. He has pleaded ‘guilty,’ and his case has been disposed of. We will, therefore, go forward with the trial of the case of Commonwealth vs. De Christoforo. The arguments will be held at two o’clock this afternoon.”
During the course of the prosecutor’s closing arguments to the jury he made certain remarks which are conceded to have been improper.3 An issue raised by these remarks is *545whether they were so prejudicial in nature in the circumstances of the case as to require a new trial. There are two subdivisions to this issue: 1. Should the judge have immediately instructed the jury at the time the remarks were made? 2. Were the instructions given by the judge to the jury during his general charge sufficient to overcome the prejudicial harm to the defendant? If there exists a reasonable doubt as to the resolution of these questions it must be resolved in favor of the defendant.
In accordance with our statutory authority and responsibilities we must examine improper remarks of the prosecution in the context of the entire case. G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
The jury should have been given explicit instructions that they were to draw no inference as to De Christoforo’s innocence or guilt from the elimination of the codefendant from the case. Announcing to the jury merely that the codefendant had pleaded guilty, without more, had the probable effect of leading to surmise and speculation in its deliberation. In such circumstances failing to give explicit instructions diminished significantly the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial verdict.
De Christoforo, left as the sole defendant, and without appropriate instruction to the jury, found himself in a precarious position. It was in this setting that the prosecutor made improper remarks in his closing argument to the jury.
As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, the prosecuting attorney “is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its ob*546ligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 585, 591; People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 650, 678-679.
It must be emphasized that the highly prejudicial nature of the prosecutor’s statement to the jury can be fully assessed only in context with the fact that the jury already knew that the codefendant had pleaded guilty. The jury had received no clarifying instructions as to this turn of events. In the circumstances, the prosecutor’s argument may have left an inference with the jury that both defendants had offered to plead guilty to a lesser charge than first degree murder, and that the district attorney had accepted the codefendant’s offer but rejected De Christoforo’s offer. Even if the defendant had offered to plead to a lesser offence, this fact would have been inadmissible. Indeed, its admission would constitute fatal error. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220; State v. Abel, 320 Mo. 445. In the present case, however, there is nothing to suggest that the defendant or his attorney had at any time negotiated for a guilty plea or conceded the defendant’s guilt.
Furthermore, shortly after making the first improper statement, the prosecuting attorney compounded the original impropriety by stating his personal belief as to the guilt of the accused.4 It is, of course, a well established rule that an attorney may not properly state his personal belief in argument to the jury. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. *547368, 374. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 294 Mass. 379, 391. See Betts v. Randle, 236 Mass. 441, 444; Doherty v. Levine, 278 Mass. 418, 419. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has stated, “To permit counsel to express bis personal belief in the testimony (even if not phrased so as to suggest knowledge of additional evidence not known to the jury), would afford him a privilege not even accorded to witnesses under oath and subject to cross-examination. Worse, it creates the-false issue of the reliability and credibility of counsel. This is peculiarly unfortunate if one of them has the advantage of official backing.” Greenberg v. United States, 280 F. 2d 472, 475 (1st Cir.). See Harris v. United States, 402 F. 2d 656, 657-659 (D. C. Cir.); Hall v. United States, 419 F. 2d 582, 586 (5th Cir.). The statement by the prosecutor of his personal belief in the defendant’s guilt compounded the serious harm resulting from the prosecutor’s earlier improper statement, for the statements taken together might lead to an inference that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of the defendant’s guilt by reason of the defendant’s unsuccessful attempt to plead to a lesser crime. The cumulative effect of the remarks of the prosecutor with no adequate and corrective instructions, coupled with the jury’s knowledge without clarifying instructions that the codefendant had pleaded guilty at the close of the evidence, seriously prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Moreover, the judge in his final instructions failed to correct the harmful effect of the improper argument. It is the rule of this Commonwealth that the jurors are generally expected to follow instructions to disregard matters withdrawn from their consideration. Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 645. Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 613. However, there have been persuasive opinions that correcting instructions cannot overcome serious prejudicial effect. What was stated by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 453, constitutes a practical and realistic appraisal of *548the situation. “The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” There are circumstances in which the prejudicial effect is of such proportions that it cannot be corrected by instructions to the jury.5 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 135, the court stated: “QTjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Moreover, corrective instructions must be sufficiently strong to accomplish the purpose of counteracting the adverse effect of the prejudicial remarks or evidence. Heina v. Broadway Fruit Mkt. Inc. 304 Mass. 608, 611. Commonwealth v. Crehan, infra. See London v. Bay State St. Ry. 231 Mass. 480, 485-486; Strieker v. Scott, 283 Mass. 12, 14-15.
In the instant case, the judge did not instruct the jury at the time the improper argument was made nor did he call for an immediate retraction. See Commonwealth v. Cabot, 241 Mass. 131. In his final instructions to the jury the trial judge made the routine observation that arguments of counsel are not evidence: “Consider the case as though no such statement was made.” In the circumstances of this case the instructions were far from sufficient to overcome the serious damage done. “It was the duty of the judge to emphasize the fact that the argument had been grossly improper;- to point out in plain, unmistakable language the particulars in which it was unwarranted and to instruct the jury to cast aside in their deliberations the improper considerations that had been presented to them, using such clear and cogent language as would correct the obviously *549harmful effect of the argument. This was not done.” Commonwealth v. Cabot, 241 Mass. 131, 150-151. London v. Bay State St. Ry. 231 Mass. 480, 486.
The majority opinion notes that if defence counsel had requested immediate instructions at the time of the improper remarks the judge would have given them and that “[Tjn the absence of a suitable request the defendant cannot now successfully argue that an immediate instruction to the jury was necessary to erase the prejudicial effect of the remark.” In a capital case where a man’s life may be at stake, and in view of the requirements of G. L. c. 278, § 33E (as amended through St. 1962, c. 453), this view of the majority is untenable. The trial judge has the ultimate responsibility (as we have on review) of guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial. In the circumstances of this case it was the judge’s obligation immediately, with clear and unmistakable language, to instruct the jury that the prosecutor’s arguments were grossly improper. Moreover, he should have ordered their retraction by the prosecutor. Even though defence counsel may not have moved for immediate corrective instructions, his objections to the remarks were sufficient to require immediate action by the judge. The prosecutor’s comments were so prejudicial in nature that the judge should have acted sua sponte. In the total circumstances of the case nothing less could have safeguarded the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
The remarks of the prosecution in this case were far more prejudicial than the newspaper publicity of the defendant’s criminal record in the Crehan case.6 The prosecutor’s argument in the instant case permitted or perhaps even suggested an inference that the defendant had conceded his *550guilt and was merely hoping for something a little less than a verdict of murder in the first degree. This diminished his chance for a fair trial to a far greater degree than would have the publication in a newspaper of his criminal background. Unlike a newspaper, the prosecutor ostensibly speaks with the authority of his office. The prosecutor’s “personal status and his role as a spokesman for the government tend[ed] to give what he . . . [said] the ring of authenticity . . . tend[ing]. to impart an implicit stamp of believability.” Hall v. United States, 419 F. 2d 582, 583-584 (5th Cir.). The prosecutor’s remarks probably called for a mistrial. In any event the judge’s failure to instruct the jury adequately and with sufficient force to eliminate the serious prejudice to the defendant constitutes fatal error. Moreover, the judge's routine final instructions to the jury were far from sufficient to correct the error. By then the defendant’s position had so deteriorated that his chances for a fair deliberation of his fate by the jury were virtually eliminated.
For these reasons I believe that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. I would grant a new trial.
I disagree also with the majority ruling concerning the defendant’s right to inspect the grand jury minutes. I make no further comment on this issue except to express my concurrence with the viewpoint of Spiegel, J., in his dissenting opinion.
There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the defendant’s motion for a separate trial.
The prosecutor: “I am sure you will have no trouble at all reaching a verdict in this case. I don't know what they want you to do by way of a verdict. They said they hope that you find him not guilty. I quite frankly think that they hope that you will find him guilty of something a little less than first-degree murder.” Defendant’s counsel: “I object to that.” The jud/he: “I don’t think — .” Defendant’s counsel: “That is not fair argu*545ment.” The judge: “No.” Defendant’s counsel: “That isn’t so.” The prosecutor: “Let’s talk about murder in the first degree.”
At the hearing on the motion for a mistrial the judge maintained that irrespective of its absence in the official transcription, he had stated, at the time of the improper remarks, in response to the defendant’s objection, “No. This is improper argument.” However, this statement does not appear in the official transcript of the evidence. See G. L. c. 233, § 80. If the court stenographer did not hear the judge’s statement it is reasonable to assume that the jury did not. Moreover, as it will be urged later, if these instructions were in fact given they were far from adequate.
“I honestly and sincerely believe that there is no doubt in this ease, none whatsoever. I honestly and sincerely believe that you people feel that way.”
Error was found in Commonwealth v. Cabot, 241 Mass. 131 (that defendant’s defence was a technical one), and in Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 69-70 (that an unfavorable inference should be drawn from the defendant’s failure to call witnesses where theie was no evidence that the defendant had ■witnesses he could call). Worcester Telegram & Gazette, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 578. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 356 Mass. 598, 603-604.
In Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, during the trial certain newspaper articles implied that each defendant had a criminal record. “On this assumption some action by the judge was required to overcome the possibility of prejudice. The judge recognized this and, rejecting the argument for a mistrial, decided that immediate instructions were not required and that a general caution in the charge would be adequate.” This court further stated, “Postponing any instruction until the charge, however, risked an adverse effect in the interval.” Judgments were reversed.