dissenting.
At the crime and arrest scene, Officer Cannoy read appellant his Miranda rights and asked whether appellant understood what he was hearing. Appellant responded that he did. Cannoy took appellant to the station house, arriving there a half hour after the field advisement of rights. There, two rings were removed from appellant’s pockets, a wedding ring and a high school ring. At the time, appellant and Cannoy engaged in a “back and forth,” “general” conversation during which appellant declared that the wedding ring had been given to him and that he had been wearing it for a month or so. Cannoy was unable to remember whether appellant’s *1193statement was in response to a question or not.
Appellant objected to the introduction of his statement concerning the wedding ring on the basis that there had been no showing of a waiver of the right to remain silent and to have counsel present during interrogation. In Richardson v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 497, this Court reiterated that the burden was upon the State to establish that an actual event constituting a waiver of rights occurred. In furtherance of that burden, the prosecution in Richardson proved that the defendant had been advised of his rights, had said he would make a statement, and had signed a written waiver. Here there was no such proof nor its functional equivalent. The proof here was, by contrast, insufficient to warrant a rational trier of fact in concluding that appellant made an actual choice to forego his right to remain silent before being engaged by Officer Cannoy in this “back and forth” conversation regarding the contents of his pockets. It was therefore error to admit the statements. The evidence as a whole is sufficient to convict, and I would therefore order a new trial.