concurring in result only.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case, but I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that under our present law, “suspension of that attorney from the practice of law in a particular court is not among the court’s available punishments for contempt.”
The Indiana Constitution and the Rules adopted by this Court now provide that this Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline and disbarment of attorneys charged with misconduct. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Ind.R.Adm. & Dis. 23, § 1. Nevertheless, this Court has long applied a firm rule that “[t]he orderly procedure of the trial court should be left to the sound legal discretion of the court trying the cause.” State ex rel. Rooney v. Lake Cir. Ct., (1957) 236 Ind. 345, 140 N.E.2d 217, cited with approval in State ex rel. White v. Marion Sup. Ct., (1979) Ind., 391 N.E.2d 596.
In 1853 this Court stated:
“To protect itself against gross violation of decency and decorum, is a necessary incidental power of a Court. They have the right to punish in this way such misconduct as is alleged in this case on the part of an attorney. It is a power to be exercised at the sound discretion of the judge and this Court can interfere only where it is shown to have abused its discretion.”
Brown v. Brown (1853) 4 Ind. 627.
This Court held in Beamer, Attorney General v. Waddell, (1943) 221 Ind. 232, 240, 45 N.E.2d 1020, 1022:
“To summarize we hold that every court of general jurisdiction possesses plenary power to discipline the members of its own bar and those practicing before it; that by necessary implication the Act of 1931 vesting exclusive jurisdiction in this Court over admissions to the bar, and the rules adopted pursuant thereto, render all attorneys of this state amenable to the jurisdiction of this court as effectually as if they were admitted by it; and that for the reasons heretofore stated, the Act of 1937, giving Circuit and Superior courts jurisdiction of disbarment in certain cases, is not exclusive. The act of 1937 is, therefore, construed as providing a cumulative procedure for disbarment by circuit and superior courts which in no way circumscribes the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Act of 1931.”
*907I think we should hold that it is still the law that the power to suspend lawyers from his particular court is a necessary incidental power of a court to enable a judge to control proceedings in his court, even though original and exclusive jurisdiction to discipline, suspend and disbar attorneys from the practice of law rests in this Court, and that trial courts nevertheless retain inherent power to suspend attorneys from their particular courts when such attorneys violate accepted standards of decency, decorum and ethics.
GIVAN, C. J., concurs.