concurring in result.
We are not here concerned with whether or not the South Carolina dissolution decree and support order is entitled to full faith and credit. The validity of that support order is not in issue. The only issue before us is whether the custodial parent may be barred by the doctrine of laches from collection of a support arrearage which has accrued over a period of time under a South Carolina decree.
Instead of a full faith and credit question, we merely have an issue as to whether we must look to South Carolina common law, i.e. the doctrine of laches, when application of that law in Indiana would violate the public policy of this state. I conclude that we are not obligated to do so.
Here, the South Carolina support order was registered in Marion County, and in her petition Angela alleged an arrearage of $34,504 plus interest which she sought to enforce and collect. The trial court in Marion County was not authorized to modify the South Carolina support decree but was authorized only to confirm the South Carolina decree as it existed when registered. See Beach v. Beach, 642 N.E.2d 269, 279 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). However, when confirmed, Indiana, as the state of registry, may effect a modification with respect to the manner of enforcement of the foreign support order as confirmed. Id.
Thus, in determining the manner in which the South Carolina support order is to be enforced, the Indiana trial court in this case might have accorded comity to the law of South Carolina and utilized the doctrine of laches to bar Angela’s attempted collection of the arrearage or, as it did, could choose to not apply the doctrine of laches. However, it is unnecessary to reach the issue decided by the majority opinion, i.e., that Kevin failed to establish that Angela’s laches resulted in prejudice to him.
Here the trial court rejected Kevin’s laches argument as was its prerogative. The rationale for such rejection is firmly grounded upon the public policy of Indiana. That policy is enunciated in Knaus v. York, 586 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind. Ct.App.1992) which held, “[T]he doctrine of laches simply does not apply to child support cases. This court will not penalize *137a child for his or her parent’s delay in pursuing child support.”
In this regard, the right of support is that of the child, not that of the custodial parent. The custodial parent merely acts as the trustee for the child for whose benefit the support order was entered and has no right to waive or otherwise interfere with the child’s right to such support. In re Marriage of Truax, 522 N.E.2d 402, 407 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. This principle is one of long standing in Indiana. Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 201, 102 N.E.2d 764 (1952); Ort v. Schage, 580 N.E.2d 335 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); Pickett v. Pickett, 470 N.E.2d 751 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984).
If we were to bar Angela’s claim on behalf of her minor son,2 it would seem to be equivalent to permitting the custodial parent’s action or non-action to deny the child’s rightful claim for support from Kevin. To do so would contravene the public policy of this state.3 Accordingly, the Indiana court was at liberty to reject the application of South Carolina’s laches doctrine. See Schaffert v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 687 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997); Maroon v. State Dep’t of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); 16 Am.JuR.2d Conflict of Laws § 24 (1988).
There is another, albeit related, basis for affirming the trial court’s refusal to apply South Carolina’s laches defense. In Indiana the doctrine of laches is held to be premised upon grounds of public policy. State ex. rel. Peoples Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Washington v. Dubois Circuit Court, 250 Ind. 38, 234 N.E.2d 859 (1968), upon reh’g. Thus the overriding public policy which inheres in a child’s right to support must also inhere in a decision whether or not to apply the equitable defense of laches. The courts of this state have determined that the public policy considerations relative to child support trump any policy considerations favoring application of the laches doctrine.
The equitable doctrine of laches is not the equivalent or the mirror image of a statute of limitations. However, it is fair to say that the two concepts are first cousins and that various considerations overlap between the two limiting principles. See 27A Am.JüR.2d Equity §§ 148, 194 (1996). Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to hold that like a statute of limitations, application of the doctrine of laches is procedural rather than a matter of substantive law. See Lee v. Estate of Cain, 476 N.E.2d 922 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (holding that because limitation statutes are procedural in nature, the law of the forum state is applicable). Aside from, but certainly consistent with public policy considerations, the law of Indiana concerning application of the doctrine of laches would control.
I would affirm upon grounds that the doctrine of laches is simply not applicable to the case before us.
. The child was bom in June 1984 and thus at the time Angela brought her suit to enforce the South Carolina support order in Indiana was sixteen years of age.
. At least seventeen other jurisdictions, Alabama, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin also hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to collection of past due child support. See cases collected in John C. Williams, J.D., Annotation, Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as to Bar Recovery of Arrearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support, 5 A.L.R.4& 1015 (1981).