dissenting and concurring in result.
I respectfully dissent as to Issues II and III. I fully concur as to Issue IV, but concur only in result as to Issue I.
Visitation (Majority’s Issue II.)
I disagree with the majority and find that the trial court’s visitation order did indeed constitute a manifest abuse of discretion. The majority accurately states the applicable standard of review on this issue, as well as the long-recognized tradition of Indiana courts in protecting the rights of non-custodial parents to visit their children. A noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights in Indiana. Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-24(a).. “This language gives rise to the presumption that visitation will be in the child’s best interest unless it is shown that the parent ‘might endanger the child’s physical health or impair his emotional development.’ ” Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. Unless the custodial parent rebuts that presumption, the non-eustodial parent is entitled to visitation. Id. While it is true that a parent’s right to visitation may be denied or restricted if the trial court finds that such visitation might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair his or her emotional de*83velopment, parents cannot be deprived of visitation with their children merely because some preconceived danger exists when precautionary measures are available. Id. at 965.
The trial court’s restrictive visitation order deprived Marianne of contact with her six year old daughter for an initial sixty day period. This no-eontact period was followed by a three month period during which visitation was restricted to only two hours every other Saturday from 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. According to the record, Marianne is currently only allowed six hours of visitation every other week. This draconian denial of any meaningful relationship between Marianne and her daughter has effectively served as a termination of Marianne’s right to visitation with M.S. and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Parents cannot be deprived of all visitation with their children merely because some possibility of danger exists. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 965. “The level of danger must be examined and appropriate precautions taken. Id. Only in this way can both the parent’s visitation rights and the child’s health and welfare be fairly and fully protected.” Id. In the present case, the trial court’s visitation order required that all visits between Marianne and M.S. be supervised. The order also required Marianne to attend and complete a parenting program as a condition precedent to visitation and specifically prohibited her from discussing the divorce or any court matters with M.S., subject to the contempt powers of the court. By imposing the requirement of supervision and the parenting program, the trial court cautiously and effectively protected M.S. from any perceived possible harm to her emotional health. However, the trial court went too far by requiring a sixty day no-contact period followed by the unduly restrictive visitation schedule outlined above. In so doing, the trial court effectively terminated Marianne’s right to visitation with M.S.
Further, by forbidding Marianne and Edward from having any discussion of the divorce or any court matters with M.S., the trial court intolerably invaded M.S.’s right to receive parenting from both her parents. The parental divorce is a significant life event for a child. When Marianne, in following the court’s order, refuses to allow M.S. to talk to her about what is happening to her family, she is forced to send a message through silence that may be more harmful than a forthright response.9 The child surely knows her parents do not like each other. To require both parents to send the message that they do not want to discuss these events with M.S. is devastating. The requirement of supervised visitation is adequate to avoid possible future negative events. The child should be allowed to develop and process her own understanding of the divorce and the court should not stand in the way of her seeing the imperfections of both parents.
Because the evidence in this case did not rationally support the result, a manifest abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to issue a new order giving Marianne reasonable visitation with M.S.
Attorneys’ Fees (Majority’s Issue III)
Likewise, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly awarded Edward all of his attorneys’ fees. Pursuant to Ind.Code § 31-l-11.5-16(a), a trial court “may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding ... and for attorney fees.” (emphasis added). However, as the majority correctly states, easelaw has added an additional requirement that the trial court, in making such an award, must consider the resources of the parties, their economic condition, the ability of the parties to engage in gainful employment and to earn adequate income and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 567 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (emphasis added). Moreover, an *84award of attorney’s fees cannot rest solely on a determination by the trial court that the case is unmeritorious or malicious. Id.
The record reveals that the trial court awarded Edward virtually 100% of his attorneys’ fees for “obtaining child support for this minor child and for their efforts in protecting the minor child from the conduct of Marianne Lawrence Spolnik.” (R. 1347). The trial court also specifically found that Mr. Saint’s attorney fees were “earned by Mr. Saint in obtaining child support for the minor child and defending Marianne’s baseless claims in this case.” (R. 1348). The trial court offered no other explanation for its findings and there is no evidence that the trial court considered the parties’ economic resources in arriving at its decision. Additionally, the record reveals that Edward and Marianne had similar assets and incomes. Thus, I must conclude that the trial court awarded all attorneys’ fees to Edward either for punitive reasons, or because it perceived Marianne’s claims to be unmeritorious. In so doing, the trial court did not fulfill its obligation imposed by Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-16 and Indiana caselaw, thereby committing an abuse of its discretion. I would reverse the award of attorneys’ fees.
Custody Modification (Majority’s Issue I)
I concur in the modification of the custody agreement between Edward and Marianne because there is sufficient evidence in the record which indicates that the relationship between the parties, following their divorce, deteriorated to such a degree that the existing joint custody agreement was an upsetting and unworkable solution. This conclusion is supported by the Guardian Ad Litem’s report which stated that, “[the] joint custody agreement was doomed to fail from the beginning. Both parents have great animosity toward the other, which unfortunately places [M.S.] in the middle of a very intense battle zone.” (R. 1182). Moreover, both parties petitioned the court for modification of the then existing custody agreement. I respectfully decline to join in the opinion of the majority, however, to the extent that it validates the trial court’s reliance on “Parental Alienation Syndrome” (PAS) evidence. Admittedly, the trial judge never specifically used the term PAS. It is clear from the language in his findings, however, that the trial court relied heavily on the testimony offered by Dr. Lawlor regarding this “syndrome” and all but used the exact term “PAS” when stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law. I recognize the concept of “parental alienation” and understand that it is not uncommon for parents, during a dissolution proceeding, to make disparaging comments about their respective spouses in the presence of their children. However, I am troubled by, and seriously question the existence of a parental alienation “syndrome”.
PAS is a relatively new theory created by Dr. Richard A. Gardner, M.D., and is explained in his self-published book, The Parental Alienation Syndrome (1992). This theory, developed solely through Gardner’s personal observations of his own patients in private practice, is defined by Gardner as a situation where children are not merely systematically and consciously “brainwashed”, but are also subconsciously and unsubcons-eiously “programmed” by one parent against the other parent. Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome p. 59-60. Gardner further asserts, “PAS is a disorder of children, arising almost exclusively in child-custody disputes, in which one parent (usually the mother) programs the child to hate the other parent (usually the father).” Richard A. Gardner, Dr. Gardner Defends Work on Sex Abuse, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 16. Moreover, Dr. Gardner professes that in 90% of the cases it is only the mother who attempts to alienate the children from the father. Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome at 62,106. When questioned as to why women are programming their children against their fathers in nine out of ten cases where PAS is present, Dr. Gardner explains by quoting William Congreve: “Heaven has no rage, like love turned to hatred. Nor hell a fury, like a woman scorn’d.” Id. at 62,122. This gender-biased generalization is ludicrous and an affront to all reasonable women and men. This is unacceptable.
The record indicates that Dr. Lawlor, a clinical psychologist and attorney, testified as an expert witness in this ease. His testimo*85ny, elicited primarily through a series of one-sided hypothetical, was replete with PAS language suggesting that Marianne was causing PAS to occur in MS., but was not yet a “full blown syndrome.” (R. 1917). For example, Dr. Lawlor’s responses on direct examination included language such as, “[Marianne is] systematically trying to convey through a denigration of father that he’s evil, that uh he’s dangerous, and that the child uh shouldn’t be involved with [Edward].” (R. 1887). Dr. Lawlor also stated during his direct examination that he thought it was, “... extremely detrimental to be in custody of a parent who’s engaging in a pattern of alienation against the other parent” and that the research on parental alienation shows that the “... prognosis [for the child] is poor once uh an alienation situation uh has developed. Uh the success rate is almost zero and the failure rate is almost a hundred percent in cases like that once they get going.” (R. 1880). Furthermore, Dr. Lawlor admitted under oath that he is familiar with Dr. Gardner’s syndrome called “Parental Alienation Syndrome” and described it as “... a situation where you have a systematic uh attempt at denigration of the parent with with attempts at isolation of the child from the parent.” (R. 1910)
Dr. Lawlor’s “PAS language” is rephrased and woven throughout the trial court’s findings, as can be seen in his specific finding number eight which includes statements such as:
8. The Court Specifically finds that since the joint custody agreement in this case, Marianne, beyond a reasonable doubt, has engaged in a concerted bad faith effort to destroy any relationship the minor child, [M.S.], has with Edward. It is not necessary to include the litany of vicious and false allegations made by Marianne against Edward ... Marianne ... made numerous trips to social workers and counselors alleging unsubstantiated allegations of Edward’s conduct, his psychiatric condition, and a general vicious broadside on Edward’s character. Marianne met willing accomplices with her visits to social workers and counselors and continued to allege to the counselors false and vicious rumors. Marianne established no basis in fact or believable testimony that would support her baseless claims ... Marianne’s false and disgusting behavior based on false allegations were beyond a doubt designed to destroy any relationship Edward has with Margaret. (R. 1344-45).
There are also several other significant problems with PAS including “causation”, “scientific reliability” and “admissibility” as scientific evidence10. Dr. Garner’s PAS syndrome has no apparent objective criteria to determine its validity or its reliability. Moreover, PAS has not been subjected to peer review and has not gained general acceptance by scientists in the relevant scientific communities. Thus, it is my opinion that Dr. Garner’s PAS “disorder” is a disturbing, inflammatory, unscientific and unsubstantiated theory which has no place in our courtrooms. As the court in United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1977) so eloquently stated, “A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of [a party] should not hang on his ability to successfully rebut scientific evidence which bears an ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,’ although, in reality the witness is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypothesis in an isolated experiment which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field.” Id. at 556. The PAS syndrome described by Dr. Garner is analogous to “cult” theories like the “Peter Pan Syndrome” or the “Cinderella Complex”, and is more suitable in a pop psychology venue rather than in a court of law.
Finally, the record reveals that Edward has emotional problems so severe that he is totally disabled and unable to work. Moreover, Dr. Lawlor, who never interviewed Marianne, Edward, or M.S., apparently formed his opinions based on notes from Dr. Crane, a therapist who also had never met Edward. Thus, Dr. Lawlor and the therapist would be unable to determine the extent to *86which Marianne’s allegations regarding Edward’s conduct might be true. Further, the lack of clinical research to substantiate the theory of PAS, along with the lack of evidence as to Edward’s emotional health and the slender threads of evidence which supported the hypothetieals posed to Dr. Law-lor, make the apparent recognition of PAS very troubling. This case poses a threat not only to the well-being of this small child, but also to any child with less than perfect parents who are divorcing.
. For example, the record reveals that the trial court’s order specifically forbade Edward and Marianne from discussing “any divorce or court matters” with M.S. Consequently, the child was precluded from any contact with her mother, without explanation, for two months, including Christmas when even Marianne’s request for a telephone call was denied. (R. 1346, 1366-73).
. See generally Cheri L. Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 1367 (1994); Judith S. Wallerstein, Through A Child's Eyes, Fam. Advo., (Summer 1990); Lucy Berliner & Jon R. Conte, Sexual Abuse Evaluations: Conceptual and Empirical Obstacles, 17 Child Abuse & Neglect 111 (1993).