dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) the majority of another panel of this court evaluated the three part test set forth in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991), reh’g denied. In so doing the majority noted this court’s inconsistent application of the test when applied to cases involving the question of whether a utility company owes a duty to members of the motoring public when the vehicle in which they are riding or driving leaves the traveled portion of a roadway and strikes a pole owned by the utility company. Goldsberry, 672 N.E.2d at 478. The majority concluded that the inconsistency was a result of the failure to distinguish between the foreseeability component of duty on the one hand and the foreseeability component of proximate cause on the other. “Foreseeability in the context of proximate cause involves evaluating the particular circumstances of an incident after the incident occurs.... [T]he foreseeability component of duty requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.” Id. at 479. I agree with the Goldsberry majority. As applied to the facts in this case, the distinction between the foreseeability component of duty and the foreseeability component of proximate cause compels the conclusion that NIPSCO owed Bush a duty regarding the placement of its utility pole.
In determining that the harm suffered by Bush was not foreseeable, the majority engaged in an analysis of the particular circumstances of this case. It found for example that there was nothing inherent in the location of the pole that would put NIPSCO on notice that an accident might occur and that Bush presented no evidence to show that it is foreseeable that a motorist would leave the road and strike that particular pole. However, as the Goldsberry majority pointed out, the forgoing analysis is more appropriate when analyzing foreseeability in the context of proximate cause. When analyzing foreseeability in the context of duty we must focus on the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence. In so doing the conclusion is inescapable. “[Rjegardless of the facts that actually occur, it is foreseeable that motorists (or their occupants) will leave the traveled portion of a road and strike utility poles set and maintained along that road.” Id. at 480. The foreseeability factor in this ease weighs in favor of imposing a duty on NIPSCO.
The majority here concludes that there was no relationship between Bush and NIP-SCO because Henderson was not using the road as it was intended to be used. However, rejecting this view, another panel of this court has observed “whether the highway was being used as it was intended to be used is a more appropriate consideration under the foreseeability factor [of the duty analysis].” State v. Cornelius, 637 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) trans. denied, Ind. Code § 8-20-1-28 as in effect on April 19, 1991 imposed a duty on a utility company to erect and maintain utility' poles “in such a manner as not to incommode the public in the use of such roads, highways, and wa-ter_”2 This statute evidences a relationship between the utility company erecting poles along the highway and the public which uses the roads. Cornelius, 637 N.E.2d at 199; see also Gilliam v. Contractors United, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, (the fact that a motorcyclist is a member of the public using the highway is sufficient to establish the requisite relationship between him and a contractor performing work on the highway). In this case Bush was a user of the road, and thus a relation*180ship existed between her and NIPSCO on which a duty can be imposed.
With respect to public policy concerns, again I cite Goldsberry on this point, a position with which I agree. “Public policy is not offended by imposing a duty on telephone companies who place fixed objects along the road way. Such objects pose a danger of harm to members of the traveling public who leave the traveled portion of the roadway. Requiring a telephone company to act reasonably and prudently when placing their poles so as not to make such harm unreasonable, is consistent with principles of public policy.” Id. at 480.
In this case all three Webb factors weigh in favor of imposing a duty on NIPSCO. Whether there has been a breach of that duty which proximately caused Bush’s injuries are questions of fact which should be left to the jury. I therefore dissent and would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
. The record shows the collision at issue occurred on April 19, 1991. The cited statute was amended effective July 1, 1991 and among other things the quoted language was deleted.