dissenting:
Although I otherwise agree with the majority’s opinion, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that the trial court need not have complied with Rule 401(a) during the hearing on Young’s posttrial motions.
The majority holds that Rule 401 applies only to “defendants who are considering a waiver of counsel at the initial-appointment stage of the proceedings.” 341 Ill. App. 3d at 387. That holding flies in the face of precedent.
In People v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 743, 589 N.E.2d 824, 825 (1992), the defendant was represented by an attorney throughout the trial but represented himself during the sentencing hearing. We held that the trial court should have admonished the defendant under Rule 401(a) before accepting his waiver of counsel in the sentencing hearing. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 589 N.E.2d at 831. Clearly, under our decision in Langley, Rule 401(a) remains applicable after arraignment and even after trial. The majority disposes of Langley by ignoring it.
The majority assumes that because Young had been convicted and sentenced, he “already knew everything a Rule 401(a) admonishment would have told him.” 341 Ill. App. 3d at 387. In an ideal world with ideally perceptive defendants, one could safely make that assumption. Unfortunately, the record suggests that we exist in a less-than-ideal world. At the pretrial hearing, the public defender informed the trial court that Young had “been diagnosed as schizophrenic” and was “receiving SSI [(supplemental security income)] because of that condition.” It appears, from Young’s oral responses during the pretrial hearing, that he was incapable of remembering what the trial court told him only a month earlier, during the first appearance. The trial court had to explain to him again the nature of the charge. In the hearing on his posttrial motions, Young seemed to be laboring under the delusion that he was “[t]here for a minor possession.”
The very purpose of Rule 401 is to eliminate any reliance on the assumption that the defendant already knows the information in Rule 401(a) or that the defendant has “picked up” the information along the way. In unambiguous, mandatory language, Rule 401(a) states: “The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel *** without first *** informing him of and determining that he understands the following ***.” (Emphases added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a). Rule 401 does not contemplate a one-way conduit of communication. “The conclusion that defendant has knowingly waived his right to counsel is based upon the totality of [the defendant’s] responses to the court’s admonitions.” People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 128, 131, 462 N.E.2d 930, 932 (1984).
As the majority states, Young had a constitutional right to counsel at the hearing on his posttrial motions. The purpose of Rule 401 is to prevent the defendant from “waiving the right to counsel without full knowledge and understanding.” People v. Schrodt, 8 Ill. App. 3d 660, 662, 289 N.E.2d 652, 653 (1972). Obviously, by promulgating Rule 401(a), the supreme court has expressed its conclusion that defendants cannot intelligently waive counsel without understanding their right to counsel as well as some basic information about their case: the nature of the charge and the minimum and maximum potential punishment. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a). Regardless of how far the criminal proceedings have progressed, a defendant cannot intelligently waive his or her right to counsel without a grasp of that essential information.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for a new hearing on Young’s posttrial motions, including strict compliance with Rule 401. See People v. Berra, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1112, 416 N.E.2d 688, 692 (1981) (defendant’s waiver of counsel was ineffective without strict compliance with Rule 401).