dissenting.
I fully concur with sections II and III of the majority’s opinion, but believe the trial court was correct when it found Culbertson guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine despite the “personal use” language found in Ind. Code § 35^8-4-2 when Culbertson was charged. I must therefore respectfully dissent as to section I of the majority opinion.
When Culbertson was charged, “manufacture” was defined in Ind.Code § 35-48-1-18 as:
the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, independently by- means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container. It does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for his own «.se[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
We addressed that “personal use” exception in Hatcher, where we noted that our legislature had criminalized possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. An individual could be found guilty of a Class D felony if he or she were found in possession of two or more of the reagents that go into the manufacture of methamphetamine. We determined the legislature could not have intended to enact a statute allowing one to be subjected to criminal liability for possession of the ingredients of methamphetamine, but to be excluded from liability if the ingredients were used to manufacture the finished product for personal use. 762 N.E.2d at 173.
We noted in Hatcher that the legislature had amended the statutory definition of “manufacture” to delete the exclusion for “the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for his own use” and determined the amendment “undoubtedly was passed in order to more clearly express the original intent of the legislature.” Id.
Our Supreme Court denied Hatcher’s petition to transfer. 774 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.2002). Another panel of this court determined in Bradley, prior to the denial of transfer in Hatcher, that the “clear language” of the statute controlled and that preparation or compounding of a controlled substance for personal use was therefore exempted from the definition of “manufacture.” 765 N.E.2d at 211.
I believe our analysis in Hatcher was correct, and accordingly would find there was ample evidence to support Culbertson’s conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine. I would affirm that conviction as well.