I join in the opinion of Justice Johnson.
I write separately to highlight the analysis required by Penal Code section 422 (statutory references are to the Penal Code).
California law has many threat statutes. (See §§ 69,71,76,95,136.1,137, subd. (b), 139, 140, 422, 422.6, 646.9, 653m, 2947, 4503, 11412.) Their elements vary.
Section 422 is addressed to any person. (Some threat statutes target a narrow class, e.g., § 139 applies only to a “person who has been convicted of *1347any felony offense specified in Section 12021.1 . . . .”) It prescribes two mental states (“willfully threatens” and “with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat”) and eliminates one (“even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out”). It requires that “death or great bodily injury” be threatened (cf. §§ 69 [“any threat” (italics added)], 95, subd. (c) [“any threat”], 71 [“a threat ... to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property”]). It does not require the threat be directly conveyed to the threatened person1 (cf. §§71 [“a threat, directly communicated to such person” (italics added)], 11412 [“a threat, directly communicated to such person” (italics added)]). But, whether directly or indirectly, the threat must be conveyed to the threatened person. And, having been conveyed, the threat must cause particular effects: the threatened person must be “in fear”; that fear must be “sustained”; the fear must be reasonable; and it must be for “his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety.”2 (Cf. § 422.6 where actual fear by the victim is not required [In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]].)
And the threat, “on its face” and “under the circumstances” must be “unequivocal,” “unconditional,” “immediate,” and “specific.”
But section 422 does not require the threat be literal or even verbal. Sending a government informant a dead, tongueless rat may well violate section 422.
If the communication, by whatever means, was intended to convey and did convey an unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific threat of great bodily injury or death, the statute has been violated.
Here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding appellant made such a threat.
It bears repeating that just as we may not add elements to section 422, we may not subtract elements from section 422. Inclusion of “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific” in section 422 are not like race car decals, functionless and just for show.
In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655 [286 Cal.Rptr. 398] so holds.
Reasonable, sustained fear for the life of one’s dog, best friend, or too distant kin does not satisfy the statute.