dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Typically, this Court’s analysis of traffic infractions notes that infractions are no longer criminal in nature. However, questions regarding the sufficiency of the complaint are often explored within a criminal rather than civil framework. See e.g. Ford v. State, 650 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Terpstra v. State, 529 N.E.2d 839, 841-842 (Ind.Ct. App.1988); but see State v. Hardman, 542 N.E.2d 230, 231-232 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (inquiry based upon civil trial rules). Notwithstanding any controversy whether a traffic infraction can have criminal ramifications based upon punitive consequences, see State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 405-06 (Ind.1997) (to determine civil or criminal nature look to legislative intent then remedial or punitive nature) unlike purely civil eases, traffic infractions are creatures of statute. The State cannot sue a member of the public for a traffic infraction which is not specifically proscribed by statute.
The legislature has prescribed a form complaint to “charge” the alleged infractor. IND. CODE § 9-30-3-6 (1993 Ed.). The statutory form requires a signature by the deputy clerk. Within the concurring in result opinion in Ford, Justice Sullivan noted:
the statute requires that the police officer’s signature be subscribed and sworn to by the clerk or a deputy clerk. In this sense it would appear that the absence of a deputy clerk’s jurat subjects the Uniform Traffic Ticket to attack but appellant here has not made an attack upon that basis.
Ford, 650 N.E.2d at 740.
In Hardman, this Court upheld the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of a traffic infraction based upon the improper attestation by the deputy clerk. Hardman, 542 N.E,2d at 231-232. The defendant was issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket [UTT] signed by the officer at the scene. Months later on the day of trial, the officer acknowledged his signature whereupon the deputy clerk notarized and dated the UTT. At trial, the defendant renewed his motion for dismissal after opening statements. Upon inquiry by the court, it was determined that the deputy clerk’s jurat was incorrectly dated. The trial court *759dismissed the speeding ticket.1
This Court analyzed the dismissal employing the civil rules of trial procedure.
Once a complaint has been filed, the proper method to change it is through a motion to amend, with leave of court, or by written consent of the adverse party. See T.R. 15(A). The prosecutor failed to do this. Instead, he had the officer alter the complaint in the presence of the court clerk, without notice to the judge or Hardman. Thus, the prosecution failed to comply with T.R. 15(A) and the judge had an adequate basis on which to dismiss the complaint.
Id. at 281.
In the present case, the prosecutor made no attempt to comply with the dictates of T.R. 15(A) to amend the complaint. The deputy clerk’s attestation is a statutory requirement. The majority opinion relies upon the procedure for amending a criminal information rather than the framework for a civil action. If a traffic infraction is a civil matter, the investigation outlined in Hardman is appropriate. Accordingly, the request for dismissal based upon the infirmity was well taken. I would vote to reverse.
. Dismissal was appropriate pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 41(E). Id. at 231.