dissenting:
I agree that there is no constitutional prohibition against courts determining the inheritance tax due the State of Illinois. That determination is made after notice to all interested parties as provided by section 11 of the inheritance tax act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 120, par. 385) and an opportunity to present evidence as to the facts and argument as to the law. The order which the circuit judge then enters fixing the amount of the tax is, however, in my judgment a final, appealable order, and the appellate court was correct in so holding. It was also correct, in my judgment, in holding unconstitutional the provisions of section 11 for appeal from that order within 60 days.
Section 16 of article VI of our 1970 Constitution provides:
“Section 16. ADMINISTRATION
*** The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 16.)
This court has promulgated Rule 303, which provides that a notice of appeal from final judgments of the circuit court must be filed with the clerk of that court within 30 days after entry of the judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 303.) The State’s argument that the circuit judge’s assessment order is not a final judgment, but rather an administrative assessment or order not subject to Rule 303 is, in my judgment, simply not supportable.
This court has described a judgment as “the official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to an action or suit therein litigated and submitted to its determination.” (People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm (1959), 17 Ill.2d 131, 134.) Under section 11, the circuit judge may hold an evidentiary hearing and has subpoena power to summon witnesses and documents. The opposing parties submit the question of the taxes due from the estate to the court for a judicial determination. The Court’s determination must be considered a judgment. That was the conclusion in People v. Jennings (1933), 353 Ill. 432, which involved a proceeding under section 11. This court said: “*** that where the county judge has assessed the tax and no appeal is taken from his order, as provided by section 11, his decision is final and conclusive ***.” 353 Ill. at 437.
However, though that order, in my opinion, is final and appealable, the section’s provision for appeal of it within 60 days to the circuit court is clearly unconstitutional. Section 6 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution states: “Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court ***.” The same language appeared in the 1964 amendment to the Constitution of 1870. (Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, sec. 7.) The provision in section 11 for an appeal to the circuit court of a circuit court judgment is inconsistent with the Constitution and of course invalid.
The statutory provisions establishing this fictional appeal have existed since 1909 (S.H.A., ch. 120, par. 385), and originally required appeal from the “County Judge” to the “County Court”; they now provide an appeal from the circuit judge to the circuit court. Presumably, the appeal will be heard by the same judge who determined the tax initially, for to permit review by a different circuit judge would be contrary to our holding in People ex rel. Kelly, Ketting, Furth, Inc. v. Epstein (1974), 61 Ill.2d 229.
The majority opinion, by characterizing the original order as an “administrative order” perpetuates an anachronistic statutory provision for appeal which never has, and does not now, serve any purpose other than to inhibit the efficient functioning of the courts and expose the judicial system to ridicule. It is totally incompatible with our streamlined judicial system, wasteful of the time of litigants, judges and lawyers, and, in my judgment, clearly unconstitutional.
I would dismiss the appeal because not taken within 30 days of the circuit judge’s original order fixing the tax. And, I might add, if this holding be thought unfair as to pending appeals not taken within the 30-day period, the answer lies in making the holding prospective in its application. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill.2d 350.