I concur. In view of the current state of the law, represented by Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 [90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154] (Internat. Shoe) and its progeny, California lacks sufficient minimum contacts with defendant for the exercise of either general or specific jurisdiction.
However, I write separately to reiterate the view expressed by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 299 [62 L.Ed.2d 490, 100 S.Ct. 559], that the standards enunciated in Internat. Shoe and its progeny “may already be obsolete as constitutional boundaries.”
Justice Brennan observed “Though its flexible approach represented a major advance, the structure of our society has changed in many significant ways since International Shoe was decided in 1945. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 [2 L.Ed.2d 223, 78 S.Ct. 199] (1957), recognized that ‘a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.’ He explained the trend as follows: PH] ‘In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modem transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.’ (Id., at [pp.] 222-223.)” (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 308 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).)
Justice Brennan continued: “As the Court acknowledges, ante, [444 U.S.] at [pp.] 292-293, both the nationalization of commerce and the ease of transportation and communication have accelerated in the generation since 1957. [Fn. omitted.] The model of society on which the International Shoe Court based its opinion is no longer accurate. Business people, no matter how local their businesses, cannot assume that goods remain in the business’ locality. Customers and goods can be anywhere else in the country usually in a matter of hours and always in a matter of a very few days.” (World-Wide Volkswagen *1323Corp. v. Woodson, supra, 444 U.S. at pp. 308-309 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.), italics added.)
Justice Brennan also cited statistics to “help illustrate the amazing expansion in mobility since International Shoe. The number of revenue passenger-miles flown on domestic and international flights increased by nearly three orders of magnitude between 1945 (450 million) and 1976 (179 billion). U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, pt. 2, p. 770 (1975); U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 670 (1978). Automobile vehicle-miles (including passenger cars, buses, and trucks) driven in the United States increased by a relatively modest 500% during the same period, growing from 250 billion in 1945 to 1,409 billion in 1976. Historical Statistics, supra, at [p.] 718; Statistical Abstract, supra, at [p.] 647.” (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, 444 U.S. at pp. 308-309, fn. 13 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).)
In the 29 years since Justice Brennan authored his dissenting opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, these trends have only accelerated. Therefore, the necessity for a revisiting of Internat. Shoe is even greater today.
I also write separately in order to point out that this is a close case. As our Supreme Court recognized in Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 58 P.3d 2], the minimum contacts test is not susceptible of mechanical application. This determination “ ‘is one in which few answers will be written “in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 268.)
In Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City (9th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 1474 (Hirsch), the evidence showed “Blue Cross freely negotiated the Enrollment Agreement with Southwest, to cover all of its employees, knowing that Southwest employed people nationwide.” (Id. at p. 1479, italics added.) Thus, Blue Cross, “through its own actions . . . created a continuing obligation to [its California insureds], and a substantial connection with California.” (Id. at pp. 1479-1480, italics added.) These circumstances gave rise to specific jurisdiction over Blue Cross in California.
Hirsch is not all that different from the instant case. Here, National States Insurance Company (National) issued a guaranteed renewable long-term care insurance policy to Esther Elkman (Elkman) in Florida. In view of the fact said policy was guaranteed renewable, coupled with the reality of a highly mobile society, it seems self-evident that National knew it was creating a continuing obligation with Elkman and other insureds throughout the country.
*1324Further, in Hirsch, the nonresident insurer only had a handful of insureds in California, namely, the Kirsches and two other employees. (Hirsch, supra, 800 F.2d at pp. 1476-1477.) Here, in contrast, National has 389 premium payers with California addresses. Although that number is not sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction, if a nonresident insurer has a critical mass of insureds in California, it would follow that the nonresident insurer’s activities in the forum are so continuous and systematic “that the corporation may in fact be said already to be ‘present’ there.” (Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co. (9th Cir. 1977) 556 F.2d 406, 413.) What constitutes a critical mass of insureds remains open for another day.