delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal is taken from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County sustaining a motion to dismiss a complaint for a class action suit.
The issue presented is whether the complaint alleges proper grounds for a class action under the law in Illinois.
In February of 1972, General Motors Corporation (hereinafter called “defendant”) sent form letters to the owners of many of its automobiles. This notification was specifically made applicable to 1968 Chevrolet autos. The substance of this form letter alerted the owner of a “possible safety hazard” existing in the auto. The owner was informed that as a result of fatigue, the rubber portion of an engine mount may separate. When this condition exists rapid acceleration from a stop or from low speeds can result in the following: (1) inability to close the open throttle; (2) loss of the use of the power braking system; (3) interference with the clutch or shift linkage; and (4) overall loss of control of the vehicle.
Defendant suggests, in the letter, to avoid rapid acceleration from low speeds until restraints have been installed by a General Motors dealer. Furthermore, if the resulting condition of loss of control does occur “the driver should turn off the ignition and apply sufficient pressure on the brake pedal to bring the vehicle to a stop.”
Defendant’s letter, along with urging the owner to take his auto to a General Motors dealer, also included a promise to install restraints on both sides of the engine at no cost to the owner.
On August 14, 1972 Beverly Landesman (hereinafter called “plaintiff” or “named plaintiff”) purchased a 1965 Chevrolet V-8 Impala stationwagon from Marvin Long, who was then the second owner of the auto. The original owner of the auto, Luther Watson, purchased the auto in August of 1965 from an unidentified Chevrolet dealer.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleges defective engine mounts exist in all 1965,1966,1967,1968 and 1969 standard size Chevrolet V-8 autos, all 1965 and 1966 V-8 Nova models and certain trucks manufactured by defendant. On making these allegations plaintiff relies on information and belief, and pursuant to unspecified public statements made by representatives of General Motors.
In response to defendant’s admissions and warnings plaintiff brought her auto to Joe Jacobs Chevrolet, an authorized Chevrolet dealer in Wilmette, Illinois, for service, and was advised the front engine mounts were defective and should be replaced. Plaintiff ordered replacement of the mounts, for which she was charged *41.30.
On August 30, 1972, plaintiff brought this action on her behalf and on behalf of the class of all owners of General Motors vehicles with defective motor mounts who have paid or will be required to pay for the correction of the defect.
The complaint contained two counts: breach of warranty and strict liability.
Defendant moved to strike and dismiss the complaint as being inadequate as a matter of law.
On February 1, 1974, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint upon a finding “the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s complaint do not constitute grounds for a class action suit under the established laws in Illinois.”
Upon said finding the Circuit Court of Cook County ordered the complaint be dismissed. From this order plaintiff has taken this appeal.
There is no statutory law which governs class action in Illinois. Judicial authority controls.
To maintain an action as a class action in Illinois the proponent must establish the following: (1) there are common dominant and pervasive questions concerning members of the class; (2) there is a class of plaintiffs too numerous to join in a single action; and (3) the named parties adequately represent all members of the class. See Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons (1959), 15 Ill. 2d 532, 538, 155 N.E.2d 595; Newberry Library v. Board of Education (1944), 387 Ill. 85, 90, 55 N.E.2d 147.
The defendant questions whether the first and third requirements listed above have been satisfied by the allegations in the complaint.
The defendant points to certain facts in the record and argues the number and complexity of the issues presented preclude a finding the common questions as to the class are dominant and pervasive. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class including as many as 6.7 million persons who own Chevrolet vehicles, each of which had its own unique history of ownership, use, care, maintenance and service for as many as seven years. Also, defenses could be urged against some members of the class but not against others.
Plaintiff refers to her complaint, and notes the class is limited to owners of General Motors vehicles with defective motor mounts and who have paid or will be required to pay a charge for the replacement of the defective motor mounts. Plaintiff suggests all class members share the common central and dominant issue of whether the requirement to pay is proper.
It is significant that the defendant, by its own form letter, treated owners of 1968 model Chevrolets as a single class, with each member having parallel rights. The record does not reveal the number of persons receiving this form letter, however, defendant’s brief and oral argument established it was a large number, into the thousands. Only defendant knows how many letters were sent and to whom.
We think the court’s reasoning in Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons (1959), 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595, is applicable. The court there said, “* ° 9 Where it appeals that the common issue is dominant and pervasive, something more than the assertion of hypothetical variations of a minor character should be required to bar the action. * 9 9 [I]t can hardly be said that it [the defendant] will suffer greater inconvenience by litigating those issues in a single action instead of in separate actions.” Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons (1959), 15 Ill. 2d 532, 538, 155 N.E.2d 595, 598.
In her complaint the plaintiff did present common questions which were dominant and pervasive to the class litigation.
The next question submitted is whether plaintiff can adequately and fairly represent the rights and interests of the class.
Although the named plaintiff did not deal directly with the defendant in the purchase of her automobile, we see no reason why the named plaintiff cannot adequately protect the warranty claims of those members of the class who did buy directly from the defendant. Similarly, even though the plaintiff was the owner of a 1965 auto, and the form letter specifically referred only to 1968 models, the size of the class is a matter of proof to be determined at trial. Defendant’s form letter to owners of 1968 models does not limit the class as a matter of law, inasmuch as it is alleged the other models also have the same motor mount problems.
It is our opinion minor variations in issues between the named plaintiff and members of the class may be litigated in the same class action so long as the named plaintiff’s interests are compatible with — and not antagonistic to — those of the class.
It is a fundamental rule that persons voluntarily assuming the duty of prosecuting a class suit are legally and equitably bound to discharge such duty faithfully and honestly.
Of course, where it is shown to the court that the action is not being prosecuted to the best interests of all those in whose behalf the suit was instituted, any person of the class so situated may file a motion to be made a party to the action, and may file a motion seeking an order allowing separate representation.
We find the named plaintiff is in a position to adequately represent all of the members of the class.
We hold plaintiff’s complaint does allege proper grounds for a class action suit under the laws of the State of Illinois.
Defendant’s brief raises the issue of whether the complaint states a good cause of action in warranty or strict liability, however, this issue is not included in either the trial judge’s order or in the plaintiff’s notice of appeal.
On appeal from a judgment or order of dismissal, questions necessarily involved in determining the propriety of the judgment or order, and only such questions, will be considered. See Stelling v. Stalling (1926), 323 Ill. 122, 153 N.E. 718; Krom v. Public Utilities Service (1943), 318 Ill. App. 639, 48 N.E.2d 545.
This opinion does not include a ruling on the issue of whether a cause of action on the merits was alleged, since such issue is not properly before us.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is hereby reversed and remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.