concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the judgment as to Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc. I dissent, however, from the opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment against Eastman Kodak Company.
Without supportive rationale, the majority places a tortured construction upon the *1279language of the limitation clause contained on the film box. The limitation clearly extends beyond the initial sales transaction notwithstanding what the majority feels is covered by the sales price. The limitation applies not only to film which is defective when purchased by the consumer but also “if damaged or lost” by Kodak. Once film has come into the possession of a consumer it could not be damaged or lost by Kodak unless returned to the corporation for processing. Additionally the limitation provision specifically gives notice that “processing, or other handling” of the film might occur by Kodak or a subsidiary company. Therefore, I cannot agree that this limitation clause is inapplicable.
Although the receipt is clearly that of Hoosier Photo the specific use of the Kodak name is in direct and unmistakable conjunction with the processing operation. The receipt invalidates the majority’s reliance upon price as an indication that liability for negligence in processing is not limited. To construe the word “us,” as used in the receipt notice, to refer to someone other than Hoosier or Kodak is untenable. No other person or corporation is indicated on the receipt other than Hoosier or Kodak. If the ijilm had been purchased from Hoosier it could have been returned to Hoosier thus making the limitation applicable. Furthermore, it makes little sense to emphasize that the purchase price of the film did not include processing by Kodak unless it is contemplated that Kodak might do the processing. In my view any reasonable person reading the receipt is placed on notice that the film may be processed by Kodak, and if so that Kodak’s liability is limited.
While it may be more palatable to hold such limitation provisions contrary to public policy the current state of the law does not permit us to do so in this case. The record before us does not disclose that the contractual provisions here involved were unconscionably forced upon Mr. Carr. Compare Weaver v. American Oil Co. (1971) 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144.
affirm I would reverse as to Kodak and as to Hoosier.